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ABSTRACT 
The United States of America is for all practical purposes, an empire.  It has territories 
separated by bodies of water that are under its control, has the world’s largest economy, 
and it has the ability to project its force with a large and powerful military.  Like other 
empires, the U.S. is prone to follow the historical model of an imperial rise to power and 
a later fall from power.  I hypothesize that the United States is on the verge of a fall from 
preeminence.  By comparing the United States with the Roman and British Empires, I 
intend to research the economic causes behind the collapse of these two empires and see 
if the United States is in a comparable situation.  If the United States is falling from 
power, then it has two options, accept its fate, or like the Romans and British, change 
course and try to continue to hold onto power as long as possible.  The United States can 
learn something by studying the successes and mistakes made by previous world powers.  
By studying older world powers, this thesis will attempt to compare current problems the 
U.S. faces to those problems that Rome and Great Britain faced in their respective eras.  
This thesis will use these two historical case studies to find solutions to some of the 
problems that the U.S. faces today, and make a case for how new fiscal policy as a part of 
a larger National Strategic Narrative might change the fate of the empire of the United 
States of America. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. EMPIRES DEFINED ......................................................................................2 
B. ECONOMICS DEFINED ...............................................................................6 
1. Microeconomics and Macroeconomics ..............................................7 
2. Macroeconomics- Keynesian Economics vs. Hayek and 
Friedman’s Free Market Economy ....................................................8 
3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy ...............................................................10 
4. Why Is Fiscal Policy So Important? .................................................13 
5. U.S. Fiscal Policy- Revenues or Taxes ..............................................14 
6. U.S. Fiscal Policy- Expenditures or Budgets ...................................19 
C.  COMPLEXITY DEFINED ...........................................................................24 
D. GRAND STRATEGY AND NATIONAL STRATEGIC NARRATIVE 
DEFINED........................................................................................................25 
E. METHOD- CASE STUDY ANALYSIS.......................................................34 
1. Multiple Case Study Design ..............................................................34 
2. Case Studies in this Paper .................................................................35 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW- COLLAPSE EXPLORED ..............................36 
1. Depletion Or Cessation Of A Vital Resource Or Resources on 
Which The Society Depends ..............................................................38 
2. The Establishment Of A New Resource Base ..................................41 
3. The Occurrence Of Some Insurmountable Catastrophe ...............42 
4. Insufficient Response to Circumstances ..........................................45 
5.  Other Complex Societies ...................................................................50 
6. Intruders .............................................................................................51 
7.  Class Conflict, Societal Contradictions, Elite Mismanagement 
Or Misbehavior ..................................................................................55 
8.  Social Dysfunction ..............................................................................60 
9.  Mystical Factors .................................................................................61 
10.  Chance of Concatenation Of Events ................................................65 
11.  Economic Factors ...............................................................................67 
G. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................76 
II. THE ROMAN CASE STUDY ..................................................................................79 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................79 
B. ROME .............................................................................................................80 
III. THE BRITISH CASE STUDY .................................................................................97 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................97 
B. BRITAIN ........................................................................................................98 
IV. THE UNITED STATES CASE STUDY ................................................................129 
A.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................129 
B. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ...................................................129 
 viii 
V. COMPARISON, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................179 
A.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................179 
B. COMPARISONS..........................................................................................179 
C. CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................184 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA ....................................................................................................188 
APPENDIX A. NATIONAL STRATEGIC NARRATIVE BY MR. Y .................195 
A. PREFACE .....................................................................................................195 
B. A NATIONAL STRATEGIC NARRATIVE ............................................199 
1. From Containment to Sustainment: Control to Credible 
Influence............................................................................................200 
2. Our Values and Enduring National Interests ...............................201 
3. Our Three Investment Priorities ....................................................202 
4. Fair Competition and Deterrence...................................................204 
5. A Strategic Ecology ..........................................................................205 
6. Closing the “Say-do” Gap - the Negative Aspects of “Binning” ..207 
7. Credible Influence in a Strategic Ecosystem .................................209 
8. Opportunities beyond Threat and Risk .........................................210 
9. A National Prosperity and Security Act ........................................212 
10. A Beacon of Hope, a Pathway of Promise......................................213 
APPENDIX B. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUMMARY OF 
RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND SURPLUSES OR DEFICITS: 1789–2016 ........215 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................219 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................239 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Debasement of the Roman silver currency, 0–269 A.D. .................................12 
Figure 2. The Marginal Product of Increasing Complexity ............................................74 
Figure 3. The Marginal Product of Increasing Complexity ..........................................127 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. 2011 Tax Rates and Tax Brackets ...................................................................15 
Table 2. British Wartime Expenditure and Revenue, 1688–1815 (in pounds) ............110 
Table 3. Comparison of Rome, Britain and U.S. .........................................................180 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ADM - Admiral in the United States Navy 
BOB - Bureau of Budget 
CAPT - Captain in the United States Navy 
CIT - Corporate Income Tax 
Col. - Colonel in the United States Marine Corps or Army 
DOD - Department of Defense 
EPD - Excess Profits Duty 
F.D.R. - Franklin D. Roosevelt 
FY - Fiscal Year 
GAO - Government Accountability Office 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GNP - Gross National Product 
IRS - Internal Revenue Service 
NDS - National Defense Strategy 
NMS - National Military Strategy 
NSA 47 - The National Security Act of 1947 
NSC 68 - National Security Council Report 68 of 1950 
NSN - National Strategic Narrative 
NSS - National Security Strategy 
OMB - Office of Management and Budget 
QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review 
Ret. - Retired off of Active Duty after 20 or more years of Service 
U.S. - United States 
 xiv 
U.S.A. - United States of America 
USN - United States Navy 
USMC - United States Marine Corps 
 xv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States is an Empire because it is globally dominant militarily, 
economically, and politically, and the U.S. Empire even has colonies.  Territories are just 
colonies by another name.  Why is this important?  The U.S. Empire can be compared to 
other empires of the past to learn some important historical lessons about the 
sustainability of empires.  The empires that will be compared to the United States in this 
thesis are the Roman Empire and the British Empire.  Rome is the example of an empire 
that collapsed.  Britain is an example of an empire that gracefully degraded, until it too 
collapsed, but the nation remains as a regional power, and a world influence. 
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that fiscal policy plays a critical role in the 
sustainability of empires, especially the United States Empire.  Furthermore if fiscal 
policy does affect the sustainability of the United States Empire, can the National 
Strategic Narrative be used to make recommendations about fiscal policy that would 
positively affect the course the United States of America?  By looking at fiscal policy and 
its relationship to grand strategy, through the lens of complexity and sustainability, the 
United States can see trends where others have gone before and attempt to learn from 
their mistakes.  The following chart summarizes the three case studies findings.  
Category Rome  Britain United States 
Era Ancient 
31 A.D to 476 A.D 
Middle Ages to Modern 
1588 to 1967 
Modern 
1776 to Present 
Complex Society? Yes Yes Yes 
Loss of Complexity? Yes Yes Potential Exists 
Empire Collapsed? Yes Yes; nation survived Potential Exists 
Collapsed into Vacuum? Yes No Potential Exists 
Grand Strategy and Fiscal 
Policy Aligned: During 
Prosperity? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Aligned: During Crises? No No No 
Budgets: Type of Budget  Simple Complex Complex/Split (12 
parts) 
Methods used to meet 
budget shortfalls:                             
                   Raised Taxes? 
Yes Yes Yes 
                   Debasement? Yes No Yes 
                             Loans? No Yes Yes 
Deficit spending used for 




For:Entitlements/Welfare? Yes (same as above) Yes Yes 
 xvi 
Category Rome  Britain United States 
Taxation: Type of Tax 
System 
Relatively Simple Sophisticated Very Sophisticated 
Tax Exemptions? Yes Yes Yes 
Tax Evasion prevalent? Yes Yes Yes 
Large % of people pay no 
taxes? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Income Tax? Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate Income Tax? N/A- No 
corporations 
Yes Yes 
Income Tax high during 
growth? 
No No No 
CIT high during growth? N/A No No 
Majority of Taxes from 
Income/ Direct taxes 
during periods of growth? 
%’s unknown- but 
tribute from new 
lands substantial 
No- used custom duties 
from imports, indirect/ 
sales taxes on goods 
No- used tariffs from 
imports, indirect/sales 
taxes on goods 
Economy: Type of 
Economy during decline 
Agrarian Industrial to 
Financial & Services 
Industrial to 
Financial & Services 
Consumer Based? No Yes Yes 
Economy peaked before 
military? 
Yes Yes Yes 




Yes, Service Sector Yes, Service Sector 





Price Controls spurred 
inflation? 
Yes (Diocletian) No- did not use. Yes (Nixon) 
Experienced 
Hyperinflation? 
Yes No Potential Exists 
This chart shows that the United States is committing many of the same mistakes 
as previous empires.  The fiscal policy and grand strategy mismatch that started with 
President Johnson, is widening.  The 2008 economic crisis and the current fiscal policy 
crisis have shattered U.S. resiliency and its ability to absorb another economic shock.  
The debasement policy of the Federal Reserve is similar to the one that the Romans 
pursued, which ended in hyperinflation.  Policy makers need to take quick and decisive 
action to balance the budget, reform the tax code, lower the burden of taxation and 
regulation on businesses, and promote policies that encourage economic growth.  These 
elements were all present when all three empires had economic booms, and the current 
U.S. fiscal and economic environment is typical of what these empires experienced when 
they declined and collapsed.  Fiscal policy is critical to the sustainability of the U.S. 
Empire or it too, could collapse.  The National Strategic Narrative can shift the policy 
discussion from threats to opportunities by focusing on prosperity and security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The United States of America is an empire with some very critical but very basic 
problems. The United States Empire has a spending problem, and an income problem.  
The spending problem is centered on the Federal Budget, which is similar in theory to a 
household budget, but larger.  The income problem is based in tax revenues, which is 
theoretically like the income a worker takes home each month.  These two issues, budgets 
and taxation, along with other government policies such as trade policy, all fall under the 
broader heading of fiscal policy. 
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that fiscal policy plays a critical role in the 
sustainability of empires, especially the United States Empire.  Furthermore if fiscal 
policy does affect the sustainability of the United States Empire, can the National 
Strategic Narrative be used to make recommendations about fiscal policy that would 
positively affect the course the United States of America?  These two questions are the 
guiding questions of this thesis, and form the hypothesis and the corollary to the 
hypothesis which this thesis will attempt to answer. 
There are eleven broad categories that affect the sustainability of empires; 
depletion or cessation of a vital resource or resources on which the society depends, the 
establishment of a new resource base, the occurrence of some insurmountable 
catastrophe, insufficient response to circumstances, other complex societies, intruders, 
class conflict, societal contradictions, elite mismanagement or misbehavior1, social 
dysfunction, mystical factors, chance of concatenation of events and economic factors.2 
This thesis will concentrate on economic factors, with a specific concentration on fiscal 
policy as one of many different factors in economics, in order to satisfy the hypothesis.  
Before exploring the hypothesis further, some definitions will aid in the understanding of 
empires, economic factors, complexity, grand strategy and collapse.   
                                                 
1 Class conflict, societal contradictions, and elite mismanagement or misbehavior are all one factor. 
2 Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
42. 
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A. EMPIRES DEFINED 
The beginning of this chapter stated several times that the United States of 
America is an empire.  When one thinks of the word empire, visions of Rome at its 
height, or maps of the great colonial expansion of Great Britain come to mind.  In fact, 
the word imperial, as defined by Webster Dictionary has as one of its definitions “of or 
related to the United Kingdom.”3  There are also things that one does not generally think 
of when the word empire is used.  One of these may be the United States.  However, the 
United States can be considered an empire for several reasons.  It has the largest economy 
in the world.  It has the largest military in the world, and can project the force of that 
military anywhere in the world, two features distinctive of the late Roman and British 
empires.  It also has multiple land holdings outside its borders.  Today we call them 
territories, instead of colonies, but like colonies, they are subject to many of the rules of 
the United States, including some territories paying varying levels of taxes, without 
voting rights.4  The territories also provide forward military bases.  In addition, we have 
military bases in many other countries of the world, which increases our foreign land 
holding and strengthens our ability to project military force worldwide.  Chalmers 
Johnson did an extensive study of the Pentagon’s Annual “Base Structure Report” in 
2003, and found that in addition to all of the reported foreign bases, totaling 702, in about 
130 countries, there are over 6,000 bases in the U.S. and it territories.  Additionally, there 
are many bases that were not accounted for in the countries of Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, 
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Uzbekistan. Other omissions include reporting Camp 
Butler as the only base on Okinawa, thereby failing to report the other nine bases on 
Okinawa, and failing to report garrisons such as Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo. Johnson 
estimates that there is a total of over 1,000 foreign bases worldwide, and uses this as his 
                                                 
3 Merriam–Webster Dictionary, “Imperial,” Merriam–Webster.com,  http://www.merriam–
webster.com/dictionary/imperial.  
4 The Office of Insular Affairs, Department of the Interior, “Puerto Rico,” and “Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas,” Dept. of Interior.gov, http://www.doi.gov/oia/Islandpages/prpage.htm 
http://www.doi.gov/oia/Islandpages/cnmipage.htm.   
The Office of Insular Affairs, under the Department of the Interior reports that Puerto Rico pays a 
customs tax to the U.S. Treasury and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianna’s Islands is subject to 
the internal revenue code and pay a local income tax. 
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proof that the United States is a military empire.5  Laurence Vance echoes Johnson’s 
sentiment, stating that the U.S. has a permanent military base of some kind in 135 out of 
192 countries, which is over 70 percent of the nations of the world.6 
These facts, along with many others contribute to the growing body of data that 
suggests that even if the United States is not an empire by the popularly held classical 
definition, it does in fact behave like one, and therefore can be classified as an empire for 
reasons of historical comparison.  Acclaimed historian, Dr. Niall Ferguson states that the 
U.S. has an “informal empire…of multinational corporations, of Hollywood movies, and 
even of TV evangelists.”7  Compared to the “British empire of monopoly trading 
companies and missionaries,”8 Ferguson argues that the U.S. is not so different than the 
British Empire.  Also, whether we want to admit it or not, the U.S. has stepped in and 
taken up a type of “global burden,” of waging war on terror and rogue states, and similar 
to that of the British, the spreading capitalism and liberty.9  Ferguson further states that 
American citizens not only need to recognize the imperial characteristics of the United 
States but also need “to learn from the achievements and failures of past empires.”10 The 
point that Ferguson is trying to make is “that the United States has always been, 
functionally if not self-consciously, an empire”11 and “it is an empire in denial.”12 
Others, such as Jim Garrison in his book “America as Empire” says that not only 
America, but the world should embrace and celebrate the fact America went from 
“motley band of colonies 225 years ago is now not only the strongest nation in the world 
                                                 
5 Chalmers Johnson, “America’s Empire of Bases,” TomDispatch.com, January 15, 2004, 1–2. 
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115–08.htm.  
6 Laurence Vance “The U.S. Global Empire,” LewRockwell.com, March, 16, 2004, 1–2. 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance8.html.  
7 Niall Ferguson, "America: an Empire in Denial,” an excerpt for The Chronicle Review from Empire: 
The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and Lessons for Global Power (London: Penguin Books, 
2002), 9. http://chronicle.com/article/America–an–Empire–in–Denial/29867.  
8 Ferguson, "America: an Empire in Denial,” 9.  
9 Ferguson, "America: an Empire in Denial,” 10.  
10 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 
2004): viii. 
11 Ferguson, Colossus, viii. 
12 Ferguson, "America: an Empire in Denial,” 10.  
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but the strongest nation in the history of the world.”13  Garrisons reasoning is that the 
ascendency of American power defeated the rise of three other nation’s conquest for 
global imperial domination, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Communist Russia.  He 
contends that the world should be thanking us that they are not being ruled by one of 
those three more ruthless regimes, and instead have seen prosperity through our relatively 
benign world dominance, in comparison to what could have been.14  Additionally, 
Garrison calls the U.S. a “transitional empire,” because he sees the U.S. as the only force 
on earth that can usher in a new world order of a “democratically governed global 
system.”  He also posits that the U.S. might indeed be the “final empire,” because 
globalization will do eventually do away with the need for one world power.15  Even the 
U.S. History Online Textbook states that with the concessions the U.S. won during the 
Spanish-American War, “The country that had once fought to throw off imperial shackles 
was now itself an empire.”16 
There are of course contrarian views to the notion that the United States in an 
Empire.  Paul Schroeder, a history professor, contends that calling the U.S. an empire is 
“a misleading, unhistorical understanding of empire, ignoring crucial distinctions 
between empire and other relationships in international affairs.”  He goes on to explain 
the differences between hegemony and empire, and his pivotal assertion is that “A 
hegemon is first among equals; an imperial power rules over subordinates.”  When 
Schroeder wrote this op-ed, at the request of the American Historical Association 
President, Lynn Hunt, it was February 2003.  Schroeder states in the article with the 
assertion that if the United States “not an empire, not yet” and goes on to say that the 
United States will formally become an empire if it invades Iraq.17  However, the U.S. 
                                                 
13 Jim Garrison, “America as Empire,” an excerpt for EnlightenNext magazine from America as 
Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Power? (San Francisco: Berrett–Koehler Publishers, 2004), 1–2, 
http://www.enlightennext.org/magazine/j24/garrison.asp.  
14 Garrison “America as Empire,” 2. 
15 Garrison “America as Empire,” 5.  
16 ushistory.org, “Seeking Empire,” U.S. History Online Textbook, 2011, 1. Accessed November 16, 
2011, http://www.ushistory.org/us/44.asp. 
17 Paul, Schroeder, “Is the U.S. an empire?” George Mason University’s History News Network, 
February 10, 2003 http://hnn.us/articles/1237.html  It would be interesting to see what Prof. Schroeder’s 
opinion is today, given the fact that the U.S. has invaded Iraq, and see if his opinion has changed. 
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invaded Iraq later that same year, so one hinge point of Schroeder’s argument is no 
longer valid. 
Joseph Nye, professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense also asserts that 
the U.S. is not an empire, and says that empires are derived from political power.  One of 
his examples to support this is that “British officials controlled Kenya's schools, taxes, 
laws and elections - not to mention its external relations.”18  His point is that the U.S. 
does not do this anywhere in the world, and as a result, is missing a key point of 
governance that a traditional empire would normally control.  He formulates a three 
dimensional chess board metaphor, involving military on the first board, economics on 
the second board, and transnational relations on the third board.  Nye uses this to 
illustrate that U.S. “military power is largely unipolar” but that economically the U.S. is 
neither hegemonic nor imperial, for it must still bargain with entities such as the 
European Union.19  On transnational relations, Nye states that the defeat of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq actually increased recruitment to Al Qaeda. 20 Nye also has a compelling 
argument, but he fails to mention that the United States, although having to bargain with 
the European Union, does not deal with the European Union in Euros.  The United States 
dollar is the global reserve currency,21 and “more than 60 percent of the foreign reserves 
of central banks and governments are in dollars.”  Additionally, “85 percent of foreign-
exchange transactions world-wide are trades of other currencies for dollars.”22  This 
                                                 
18 Joseph Nye, “Is America an Empire?” Project Syndicate.org, January 26,2004, 1. 
http://www.project–syndicate.org/commentary/nye5/English.  
19 Nye, “Is America an Empire?” 1. 
20 Nye, “Is America an Empire?” 1.  
21 Investopedia Dictionary, “Reserve Currency” Investopedia.com, 2011. 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reservecurrency.asp#ixzz1USqLcQv9.  Reserve Currency: A foreign 
currency held by central banks and other major financial institutions as a means to pay off international 
debt obligations, or to influence their domestic exchange rate. A large percentage of commodities, such as 
gold and oil, are usually priced in the reserve currency, causing other countries to hold this currency to pay 
for these goods.  Holding currency reserves, therefore, minimizes exchange rate risk, as the purchasing 
nation will not have to exchange their currency for the current reserve currency in order to make the 
purchase.  In 2011, the U.S. dollar was the primary reserve currency used by other countries. As a result, 
foreign nations closely monitored the monetary policy of the United States in order to ensure that the value 
of their reserves is not adversely affected by inflation.  
22 Barry Eichengreen, “Why the Dollar’s Reign is Near and End” Wall Street Journal, March, 2, 2011,  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703313304576132170181013248.html.  Eichengreen also 
points out that the U.S. dollar is not only a U.S. currency, but a global currency. 
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alone puts the U.S. on a different playing field economically than any other nation in the 
world, and shows that the U.S. currency not only dominates, but, facilitates global 
commerce due to its reserve status and foreign exchange rate levels.   
A common thread that is found through both those that support and those that 
oppose labeling the U.S. as an “empire” is that the United States is not the same as other 
empires.  It is true that the United States resembles an empire in many cases, such as 
military might, and economic standing, but does not resemble an empire in certain 
aspects such as exercising full control over the daily lives of subjugated colonies.  Yet, 
even this point can be debated when one considers the U.S. territories, and all the U.S. 
military bases on foreign soil.  It is also expressly not the purpose of this thesis to prove 
that the U.S. is or is not an empire.  However, it appears that there is enough supporting 
evidence to use the term “empire” as an explanation of what the United States is, or at 
least acts like, in order to facilitate a historical comparison.  This will also not be the first 
time that the term “empire” has been used in a broader sense of the word. In “The 
Economic Decline of Empires,” Carlo Cipolla writes “The term ‘empire’, as I use it here, 
is not an exclusively political description.  It refers also to an economic or cultural 
predominance.”23  It is from this standpoint, that this thesis will utilize the term empire, 
in an effort to make comparisons of the three case studies as similar entities.   The U.S. 
bears many of the same characteristics as empires of old; therefore the term is useful to 
academically compare the U.S. to other empires, for the aforementioned reasons of 
commonality. 
B. ECONOMICS DEFINED 
Economics is a social science with a broad variety of topics and many competing 
viewpoints.24  This thesis cannot adequately explore all of the topics of economics, but in 
order to sufficiently discuss the hypothesis, economics, microeconomics, 
macroeconomics, resources, fiscal policy, and monetary policy will be defined. 
                                                 
23 Carlo Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd , 1970), 2. 
24 American Economic Association, “What are the fields in Economics?” American Economic 
Association.org, 2011, 1. http://www.aeaweb.org/students/Fields.php.  The Journal of Economic Literature 
alone has 20 major topic headings for fields of economic studies, each with subtopics within a field. 
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Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines economics as “a social science concerned 
chiefly with description and analysis of the production, distribution, and consumption of 
goods and services.”25  Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus define economics as the 
"study of how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable commodities and 
distribute them among different people."26 Other definitions include Alfred Marshalls; 
"Economics is the study of people in the ordinary business of life,"27 and Lionel Robbins 
"Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between given 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses."28  The American Economic 
Association states that “Economics is the study of how people choose to use 
resources.”29  Furthermore they explain that “In short, economics includes the study of 
labor, land, and investments, of money, income, and production, and of taxes and 
government expenditures.”30  The American Economic Association’s definition and 
corollary are the most applicable to this thesis, and therefore will be used with the 
understanding that fiscal policy is referring to the “taxes and government expenditures”31 
portion of the American Economic Association’s economics definition. 
1. Microeconomics and Macroeconomics 
Microeconomics is “the branch of economics which today is concerned with the 
behavior of individual entities such as markets, firms and households.”32   Adam Smith is 
credited with being the father of microeconomics.  His book The Wealth of Nations, 
                                                 
25 Merriam–Webster Dictionary, “Economics” Merriam–Webster.com, http://www.merriam–
webster.com/dictionary/economics.  
26 Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, Economics. 18th ed. (New York: McGraw–Hill, 2005), 4. 
27 Alfred Marshall, Principles of economics; an introductory volume (London: Macmillan, 1890) 
quoted in American Economic Association “What is Economics?” American Economic Association.org, 
2011, 1. http://www.aeaweb.org/students/WhatIsEconomics.php.  
28 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London: 
MacMillan, 1932) quoted in American Economic Association “What is Economics?” American Economic 
Association.org, 2011, 1. http://www.aeaweb.org/students/WhatIsEconomics.php. 
29 American Economic Association, “What is Economics?” American Economic Association.org, 
2011, 1. http://www.aeaweb.org/students/WhatIsEconomics.php. 
30 American Economic Association, “What is Economics?” 1. 
31 American Economic Association “What is Economics?” 1. 
32 Samuelson and Nordhaus, Economics, 5. 
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written in 1776, discusses such topics as “how individual prices are set,” “determination 
of prices of land, labor and capital,” and “the strengths and weaknesses of the market 
mechanism.”33  Smith also “identified the remarkable efficiency properties of markets 
and saw that economic benefit comes from the self-interested actions of individuals.”34  
While microeconomics focuses on the cause and effect of decisions for the individual’s 
budget, macroeconomics takes a broader view. 
Macroeconomics “is concerned with the overall performance of the economy.”35  
Macroeconomics originated from John Maynard Keynes book The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, written in 1936.  Motivated by the high unemployment 
of the Great Depression, Keynes looked at “business cycles, with alternating spells of 
high unemployment and high inflation.”36  The field of macroeconomics includes many 
areas, including “how total investment and consumption are determined, how central 
banks manage money and interest rates, what causes international financial crises and 
why some nations grow rapidly while others stagnate.”37  Microeconomics and 
macroeconomics comprise the two major branches of the field of economics.38   
2. Macroeconomics- Keynesian Economics vs. Hayek and Friedman’s 
Free Market Economy 
It is important to note at this point that there are two basic economic camps with 
respect to macroeconomics.  Keynesian economics is a “theory of total spending in the 
economy (called aggregate demand) and its effects on output and inflation.”39 Keynes 
believed that “aggregate demand is influenced by a host of economic decisions—both 
public and private—and sometimes behaves erratically.”40 His ideas of public decisions 
                                                 
33 Samuelson and Nordhaus, Economics, 5. 
34 Samuelson and Nordhaus, Economics, 5. 
35 Samuelson and  Nordhaus, Economics, 5. 
36 Samuelson and  Nordhaus, Economics, 5. 
37 Samuelson and  Nordhaus, Economics, 5. 
38 Samuelson and  Nordhaus, Economics, 5. 
39  Alan S. Blinder, “Keynesian Economics” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Library of 
Economics and Liberty.org, 2008, 1. http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html. 
40 Blinder, “Keynesian Economics,” 1. 
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were “monetary and fiscal policy,”41 which will be defined shortly.  Keynes ultimate 
view was that in periods of economic depression, the government should intervene in 
order to boost aggregate demand by using deficit spending and monetary policy to boost 
employment.42 
The contrarian view to Keynes is held by economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman.  Friedrich Hayek was originally from Vienna, Austria, where he was part of 
the school of thought called “Austrian Economics,” and later taught at the London School 
of Economics.43  He was a contemporary academic rival of Keynes.44  His book The 
Road to Serfdom, written in 1944, was a warning to the British of the danger of 
socialism.45 His firsthand view of Nazi Germany on its rise to political power before 
World War II convinced him that government control of the economy led to 
totalitarianism.46 He believed that the free market would always prevail over government 
intervention.  Milton Friedman taught at the University of Chicago and was also a 
stalwart challenger of Keynesian policies.  His book A Theory of the Consumption 
Function, written in 1957 was a direct challenge to Keynesian economic theory.47  Like 
Hayek, Friedman was a champion of the free market as well.  He also wrote extensively 
on monetary policy, and in 1956, his work Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, 
stated “that in the long run, increased monetary growth increases prices but has little or 
no effect on output. In the short run, he argued, increases in money supply growth cause 
employment and output to increase, and decreases have the opposite effect.”48  He later 
                                                 
41 Blinder, “Keynesian Economics,” 1. 
42 Blinder, “Keynesian Economics,” 1. 
43 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, “Friedrich August Hayek” The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics: Library of Economics and Liberty.org, 2008, 1, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Hayek.html. 
44 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, “Friedrich August Hayek,” 2.  
45 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, “Friedrich August Hayek,” 3.  
46 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, “Friedrich August Hayek,” 3.  
47 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, “Milton Friedman,” The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics: Library of Economics and Liberty.org, 2008, 1. 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Hayek.html. 
48 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, “Milton Friedman,” 2. 
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coauthored another book called Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 that 
blamed the Great Depression on the Federal Reserve’s poor monetary policies.49  
Both schools of thought are important to understand, because they represent the 
two places from which policy makers make fiscal and monetary policy decisions.  
Mancur Olson, in The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and 
Social Rigidities notes that Keynesians and anti-Keynesians, both agree “that Keynes’s 
contribution, however brilliant and important it might be, assumes certain types of 
behavior that are not reasonable or fully consistent with the interests of those individuals 
or firms that are assumed to engage in it.50  Olson further states that “Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory (a theory of the economy in the aggregate) does not have an 
adequate basis in microeconomic theory (a theory of the behavior of individual decision-
makers in the particular markets or contexts in which each operates).”51  Olson shows 
how Keynesian policies can distort the economy in a way that only temporarily lowers 
involuntary unemployment.52 
Based on the quoted definitions of economics, resources are necessary to any 
economy.  Although this thesis will not concentrate on resources, a good working 
definition is needed for the discussion about economics.  The American Economic 
Association also has a good definition for resources. “Resources include the time and 
talent people have available, the land, buildings, equipment, and other tools on hand, and 
the knowledge of how to combine them to create useful products and services.”53 
3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Central to the hypothesis of this thesis is fiscal policy, and it can be defined as the 
following.  “Fiscal policy is the use of government spending and taxation to influence the 
                                                 
49 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, “Milton Friedman,” 2. 
50 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social 
Rigidities (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982), 7–8. 
51 Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, 8. 
52 Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, 229. 
53 American Economic Association “What is Economics?” 1. 
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economy.”54  This policy is determined through the actions of the Executive Branch and 
the Legislature in the United States.  Both the President and Congress have a part to play 
in fiscal policy.  Recently, President Barack Obama’s 2012 Budget, Republican 
Representative Paul Ryan’s budget proposal and several other legislative measures 
known as Continuing Resolutions have been thrust into the spotlight in the news.55  
These are all a part of the fiscal policy process.  Fiscal policy should not be confused with 
monetary policy.   
“Monetary Policies are demand-side macroeconomic policies. They work by 
stimulating or discouraging spending on goods and services.”56  Monetary policy is not 
determined by elected politicians in the United States of America.  Instead, monetary 
policy is determined by the Federal Reserve Bank, currently headed by Benjamin 
Bernanke, a political appointee.  Influencing interest rates, printing or destroying money 
to change the value of the dollar and change inflation rates, and buying and selling 
Treasury bonds to influence the economy are all parts of monetary policy.  Monetary 
policy is important, and has a part to play in any economy.  This thesis will not 
concentrate on monetary policy, but it will be discussed because fiscal and monetary 
policies can affect each other.  Also, the separation of fiscal and monetary policy is a 
more modern phenomenon.  In Rome, the Emperor was in charge of the Imperial budget, 
taxes and making the decision whether or not to debase the currency. 
In the later Roman Empire, the debasement of currency was used to solve 
problems when the Imperial Budget could not pay for all the Imperial Expenses.  In 
Roman times, the debasement of currency literally meant changing the percentage of 
precious metal and base metal in a coin.  It started with Emperor Nero in A.D. 64, who 
                                                 
54 David Weil, “Fiscal Policy,” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Library of Economics and 
Liberty.org, 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FiscalPolicy.html. 
55 Paul Ryan “Where’s Your Budget Mr. President?” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2011. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903341404576484124282885188.html?mod=WSJ_hps_s
ections_opinion.  This is just one example of a news article that discusses the contemporary fiscal issues of 
the U.S. 
56 James Tobin, “Monetary Policy,” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Library of Economics 
and Liberty.org, 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MonetaryPolicy.html. 
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debased the silver denarius and changed the content of the base metal to ten percent.57  
See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Debasement of the Roman silver currency, 0–269 A.D.58 
By adding more base metal to a coin, more coins were needed to equal the same 
value or content by weight of silver.  Today governments generally debase their currency 
by printing money.  The increased supply of money lowers the value.  It is speculation, 
but it stands to reason that if the Roman Emperors had enough money to pay for 
                                                 
57 Tainter, Collapse of Complex Societies, 133–134. 
58 From Joseph Tainter, “Complexity, Problem Solving and Sustainable Societies,” from GETTING 
DOWN TO EARTH: Practical Applications of Ecological Economics, Washington D.C.: Island Press, 
1996, 5. http://www.goldonomic.com/tainter.htm.  The chart shows grams of silver per denarius (the basic 
silver coin) from 0 to 237 A.D., and per 1/2 denarius from 238–269 A.D. (when the denarius was replaced 
by a larger coin tariffed at two denarii). 
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everything, they would probably not have had a reason to continuously lower the value of 
their currency. 
4. Why Is Fiscal Policy So Important? 
Fiscal policy is the primary manner in which elected officials can actively 
influence their economy.  As a result, it is also the primary way in which elected officials 
can actively stimulate or stifle economic growth and promote or sabotage long-term 
prosperity for their economy.  To explain this more clearly, an individual who spends an 
equal amount or less than the amount that individual makes in income will not go into 
debt.  Likewise, an individual who spends more money than they make in income will go 
into debt, and if that individual does not eventually change their spending habits and pay 
down their debt, then they run the risk of going bankrupt.  This simple concept is no 
different from an individual to a government.  Any government that spends more than it 
makes, also incurs debt, and if the spending habits of that government are not changed, 
then they run the risk of amassing too much debt, and eventually going bankrupt.  This 
buildup of an increasing amount of debt is precisely the risky path that the United States 
of America is currently on. 
The United States has amassed an external debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
ratio of just slightly over 100 percent.  “External debt is the total public and private debt 
owed to non-residents payable in foreign currency goods and services.”59   
National income is the total market value of production in a country’s 
economy during a year. The broadest and most widely used measure of 
national income is gross domestic product (GDP), the value of 
expenditures on final goods and services at market prices produced by 
domestic factors of production (labor, capital, materials) during the year.60 
This means the United States Government owes foreign entities more than the 
United States as a nation makes in income (GDP) as a whole in one year.  This is not to 
be confused with the income from tax revenues to the U.S. government.  GDP is the total 
                                                 
59 U.S. Debt Clock.org ,“World Debt Clock,” U.S. Debt Clock.org, Accessed May 22, 2011, 
http://www.usdebtclock.org/world–debt–clock.html. 
60 Mack Ott, “National Income Accounts,” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Library of 
Economics and Liberty.org, 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/NationalIncomeAccounts.html. 
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income of every individual, and business in the United States combined.  For an 
individual, this would be similar to owing the same amount of money on one’s credit card 
as that person made in one year.  This is just illustrative of why fiscal policy is important, 
and why the United States Empire is in such a dire situation. 
5. U.S. Fiscal Policy- Revenues or Taxes 
In order to be able to adequately discuss fiscal policy, there are some additional 
definitions and concepts within fiscal policy that need to be addressed.  First of all, there 
are two primary tools of fiscal policy, revenue and expenditures, and one implied tool, 
the surplus or deficit. Most of the U.S Governments revenues, otherwise known as 
income, come from taxes, with a small portion coming from custom duties and excise 
taxes related to trade.  However, until the early 1900s, the U.S. government made most of 
its revenue from custom duties and excise taxes on trade. The largest portion of tax 
revenue comes from the income tax.61 
Merriam Webster’s online dictionary defines income tax as “a tax on the net 
income of an individual or business.”62  Income subsequently, is defined as “a gain or 
recurrent benefit usually measured in money that derives from capital or labor.”63  These 
two definitions can be re-written to mean a tax on the net gain or recurrent benefit 
derived from capital or labor.  In layman’s terms, this is a tax on all the money that a 
person makes in one year. Income taxes are the most important source of revenue for the 
United States Federal Government, and along with payroll taxes, property taxes and 
corporate income taxes comprise the majority of revenues for the U.S.64  The Internal 
Revenue Service or IRS, is responsible for collecting federal taxes.65 
                                                 
61 Robert D. Lee Jr., Ronald W. Johnson, and Philip G. Joyce, Public Budgeting Systems, 8th ed. 
(Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2008): 694. 
62 Merriam–Webster Dictionary. “Income Tax,” Merriam–Webster.com, http://www.merriam–
webster.com/dictionary/income+tax. 
63 Merriam–Webster Dictionary. “Income,” Merriam–Webster.com, http://www.merriam–
webster.com/dictionary/income. 
64 Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, Public Budgeting System, 76. 
65 Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, Public Budgeting System, 59–60. 
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Income tax did not start in the United States until 1913, when Congress passed the 
16th Amendment to the Constitution, which officially instituted the income tax as a legal 
form of taxation.  Prior to this, taxation of income had not been lawful.66  The current 
U.S. tax system utilizes withholding as the primary means of receiving payment, which 
was originally instituted in 1913, done away with due to popular protest and was re-
instituted during World War II to guarantee a steady flow of money to fund the war 
effort.67  A series of tax brackets are used to determine how much income tax a person 
owes.  The tax is called a “progressive tax” which is a tax that increases as ones income 
increases.  Therefore, each tax bracket is used to determine the tax percentage for a given 










10% Up to $8,500 Up to $17,000  Up to $8,500  Up to $12,150 
15% $8,501 – $34,500 $17,001 – $69,000  $8,501 – $34,500 $12,151 – $46,250 
25% $34,501 – $83,600 
$69,001 – 
$139,350  $34,501 – $69,675 
$46,251 – 
$119,400  
28% $83,601 – $174,400 
$139,351 – 
$212,300  $69,676 – $106,150 
$119,401 – 
$193,350 
33% $174,401 – $379,150 
$212,301 – 
$379,150  $106,151 – $189,575 
$193,351 – 
$379,150 
35% Over $379,150 Over $379,150 Over $189,575 Over $379,150 
Table 1.   2011 Tax Rates and Tax Brackets68 
This means that no one is really in one single tax bracket, unless all of their 
earnings for the year are under the maximum amount for the lowest tax bracket, which is 
$8,500 for 2011.  For example, a single earner, making $45,000 dollars in 2011 would 
fall into 3 tax brackets.  They would pay 10 percent on the first $8,500, 15 percent on the 
next $26,000, putting the total up to $34,500, and 25 percent on the final $10,500, putting 
                                                 
66 Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, Public Budgeting Systems, 76. 
67 Neal Boortz and John Linder, The Fair Tax Book: Saying Goodbye to the Income Tax and the IRS 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2005): 23.  
68 Madison, “2011 Tax Rates and 2011 Tax Brackets,” MyDollarPlan.com, Accessed March 18, 2011, 
http://www.mydollarplan.com/tax–brackets/ (page discontinued). 
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their total tax liability or the total amount of taxes required to be paid to the IRS at $7375.  
This person’s actual tax rate is 16.39 percent.  This is calculated by taking the percentage 
of the total amount at each tax bracket, and multiplying that by the tax rate.  Add these 
numbers together and one can arrive at their tax rate.  In this case (.189 x .10) + (.578 x 
.15) + (.233 x .25) = .16385.  Although this is a complicated system, it is the current 
system in place in the United States. 
To further complicate matters, there are many tax credits, tax deductions and tax 
exemptions.  A tax credit is a dollar for dollar reduction of the person’s tax liability.  
Therefore, a tax credit of $1000 dollars would reduce the single earners taxes to $6375.  
Deductions are different, because deductions only reduce the taxes by the marginal tax 
rate, so at the 25 percent tax rate, a $1000 dollar deduction would only reduce the taxes 
by $250 dollars, which only takes the single earner down to $7125.  A tax exemption 
lowers the person’s overall taxable income, so an exemption of $1000 would lower the 
single earners total income to $44,000.69  Put this three in conjunction with each other, 
and the single earner would only owe $5875 in taxes, which is a savings of $1500 dollars.  
If the single earner had the exact amount of $7375 withheld from his taxes and filed his 
taxes using only the credit, deduction, and exemption stated here, he would receive a 
refund check of $1500 dollars from the IRS.  This is called a tax expenditure.  A tax 
expenditure is a spending initiative implemented through the tax code.70  The $1500 
dollars that the single earner gets back is another way for the government to incentivize 
or reward some activity, such as a tax credit for buying energy efficient windows for a 
home, or to target a group of people, such an income tax exemption for military members 
on pay earned while in a combat zone. 
The complexity of this system and the incentives that are built into it has led 
people to increasingly rely on professional help in preparing taxes.  “According to the 
annual report of the IRS's National Taxpayer Advocate, about 62 percent of all taxpayers 
                                                 
69 Jeff Schnepper, “Your 15–point tax–return checklist,” MSN Money.com, 22 October 2010 
http://money.msn.com/tax–preparation/your–15–point–tax–return–checklist–schnepper.aspx. 
70American Progress, “Tax Expenditures 101: What They Are and How They Slip Under the Radar,” 
Center for American Progress.org, 15 April 2010, 1, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/tax_expenditures101.html. 
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use tax return preparers.”71  This burden is expensive and time consuming.  In 2006, The 
Tax Foundation estimated that taxpayers spent 6 billion hours, at a cost of $265 billion 
dollars to comply with the tax code.  This also means that, if using the Tax Foundations 
results, a 22 cent surcharge is added to every dollar collected by the Federal 
government.72  The director of the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost of 
compliance with the U.S. tax code is between $400 and $500 billion dollars.73  As was 
stated previously, the IRS brought in $2.3 trillion dollars in tax revenues in 2009.74  
However, tax expenditures were $1.2 trillion dollars, which is more than 50 percent the 
amount it raised in taxes.75  This means that although the IRS claims efficiency by its 
tagline “The IRS spent just 50 cents for each $100 it collected in FY (Fiscal Year) 
2009,”76 it also returns over $50 dollars of every $100 dollars collected, back to the 
American people, and not necessarily to the same people that paid the $100 dollars. 
So although American’s pay a lot to have their taxes done by professionals, it 
pays well, because if the above numbers are averaged (depending on which figure is 
used), each dollar spent on tax preparations nets between $2.40 and $4.53 for the 
taxpayer.  In individual investment terms that is 240 percent to 453 percent return on 
investment, which is a good investment, but this investment comes at the expense of 
some other taxpayer, and ultimately at the expense of the government as well.  These 
individuals are called nonpayers, and their numbers are increasing. 
The income level at which a typical family of four will owe no income taxes has 
risen rapidly, now topping $51,000. As a result, recently released IRS data for the 2008 
                                                 
71 Scott A. Hodge, “Record Numbers of People Paying No Income Tax; Over 50 Million "Nonpayers" 
Include Families Making over $50,000,” The Tax Foundation.org, 10 March 2010, 2. 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/25962.html. 
72  Scott A. Hodge, J. Scott Moody and Wendy P. Warcholik, Ph.D. “The Rising Cost of Complying 
with the Federal Income Tax,” The Tax Foundation.org, 10 January 2006, 
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73 Boortz and Linder, The Fair Tax Book, 36. 
74 Internal Revenue Service, “The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority,” IRS.gov,1, 
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98141,00.html. 
75 American Progress, “Tax Expenditures 101,” 1. 
76 Internal Revenue Service, “The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority,” 1. 
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tax year show that a record 51.6 million filers had no income tax obligation.  That means 
more than 47 percent of all Americans who filed a tax return for 2010 were nonpayers.77 
There are several other taxes besides the personal income tax that are important to 
understand as well.  There is the payroll tax, which is another type of income tax but 
slightly different, the corporate income tax, property tax and sales tax.  There are other 
types of taxes as well, but these comprise the most important taxes for generating revenue 
for the Federal Government and for State governments. 
The payroll tax “is differentiated from income taxes because they are taxes on 
wages and salaries only.”78  In other words, this is only taxing the money one makes 
from his or her employer, and does not include capital gains through interest on savings 
accounts, money from the sale of or dividends on stocks, or income generated from 
activities such as yard sales or eBay auctions.  However, all of these other income 
generating activities are taxable as part of one’s total income.  The payroll tax is paid by 
the employee and the employer, in equal proportion to the Federal government.  It is 
collected by the U.S. government from the employer on behalf of the employee.79  Its 
only purpose is to provide funding for the federally administered programs of Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and state administered Unemployment Insurance and 
Workman’s Compensation.  These five programs are government insurance trust 
programs to protect and provide for its citizens.80 
The corporate income tax or CIT “applies to the net earnings of incorporated 
businesses, following the theory that the legal person created by incorporation creates an 
economic entity with tax-bearing capacity separate from the owners (shareholders).”81  
Although corporations do not have the same exemptions and deductions that individuals 
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do, they can claim “deductions for charitable contributions (to encourage corporate 
generosity) and ordinary and necessary costs of operating the business.”82  
Property Taxes are “based on accumulated value in some asset rather than on 
current earnings from the asset.”83  The two most common property taxes in the U.S. are 
real estate taxes and vehicle taxes.  These taxes are essential for providing a significant 
portion of revenue to local and state governments, and primarily funds schools.84   
“The general sales tax is the largest revenue source for state governments”85 and 
is used in 45 of the 50 states of the United States.  Only Alaska, Delaware, Montana, 
New Hampshire and Oregon do not have a state sales tax.86  There are two types of sales 
taxes.  “Ad Valorem taxes are levied as a percentage of the purchase price of an item.”87  
For example, if the ad valorem tax percentage was 6 percent, then for every dollar spent, 
6 cents would be added as a tax.  So a $1 dollar purchase would cost $1.06 and a $2 
dollar purchase would cost $2.12 and so on.  The other type of sales tax is a unit tax.  
Unit taxes “are levied per unit of the item sold, without regard to price.”88  For example, 
gasoline and liquor are taxed on the unit of 1 gallon and cigarettes are taxed on the unit of 
1 pack. 
6. U.S. Fiscal Policy- Expenditures or Budgets 
Now that government revenues have been thoroughly defined, the other principal 
tool that needs to be discussed is expenditures.  U.S. Federal expenditures or expenses 
fall into several categories.  There is “discretionary spending, which is provided for 
through the annual appropriations process and mandatory spending, which is provided for 
through “permanent” law.89  To put it more plainly, discretionary spending covers most 
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of the day to day operations of the government, for example, cabinet level and federal 
agency spending such as “the Department of Defense, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
Internal Revenue Service and so on.”90  Mandatory spending is mandated by law, for 
expenses such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Pensions, Veterans’ 
Benefits, as well as other social welfare programs, income insurance programs and a few 
miscellaneous programs.91  Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid make up the largest 
portion of mandatory spending.92  The net interest or debt service on the National Debt is 
a third category of federal spending.  It fluctuates as a percentage of total spending, based 
on the amount of debt the federal government is using to finance its operations.  “The 
only way to control net interest expenses is to control the amount of debt issued by 
controlling deficit spending.”93 
These three types of spending, discretionary, mandatory and net interest together 
comprise the Federal Budget.  “A budget is a document or a collection of documents that 
refers to the financial condition and future plans of an organization (family, corporation, 
government).”94  Public “budgets serve as the choice mechanism for allocation of public 
resources.”95  The Federal Budget is a type of public budget, but there are also state and 
local governments that are public budgets as well.  Public budgets serve the purpose of 
“making choices of ends and means.”96  Simply put, “budgeting is the manifestation of 
an organization’s strategies.”97 
Before the budget cycle is explained there are several specific peculiarities to the 
U.S. budgeting system that must be addressed.  The first important concept is 
authorization and appropriation.  “Federal programs must be authorized and 
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appropriated”98 before funds may be spent or executed.  An authorization bill gives the 
government permission to spend a certain amount of money on a specific program or 
function.  An appropriation bill tells the government how much money can legally be 
obligated or taken from the Treasury to spend on a certain program.  Both of these bills 
must be approved by both houses of Congress and signed by the President in order to 
legally use funds for any purpose.  This makes the process complicated.  However, there 
is another peculiarity to the United States, in that there is not one authorization or 
appropriation bill.  There are 12 authorization committees, per house of Congress,99 and 
12 appropriation committees per house of Congress.100   This means that to fully pass the 
U.S. operating budget yearly, 24 separate bills have to be agreed upon between both 
houses of Congress and signed by the President.  This makes it difficult for Congress to 
get the budget completed in time each year.  When Congress can’t agree, they usually 
pass a Continuing Resolution, which allows the government to continue to operate on the 
last approved level of funding from the previous year until a new authorization and 
appropriation can be approved.  One result of there being no single bill that contains the 
entire budget, is that as the U.S. makes fiscal policy, each committee in Congress is 
looking at fiscal policy in a vacuum, unaware of what other budget priorities are 
competing for funding in other committees. 
The Federal government has an elaborate budget cycle that can be summarized in 
four main parts: executive preparation, legislative consideration, execution and audit and 
evaluation.101  During executive preparation, the Office of Management and Budget or 
OMB, assists the President and his cabinet in preparing a budget to submit to Congress.  
Interestingly, OMB was originally established in 1921 with the name of BOB or Bureau 
of Budget.  It wasn’t until 1970 when President Nixon reorganized BOB, did the name 
change to OMB.102  Once the President’s Budget is completed, it is sent to Congress, 
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normally in February for legislative consideration, or in other words review, edit and 
approval.103 
The budget normally starts in the House of Representatives, where budget 
proposals originate.  Then committees and subcommittees meet and work out the details 
of various appropriations for the budget.  Eventually, both the House of Representatives 
and Senate will vote on appropriations bill for each category such as Defense spending.  
Then the two Defense Appropriation bills will go to a conference committee which will 
come to an agreement on all the issues in the bill, and send to identical bills back to both 
the House and the Senate for a final vote.  Then the President will sign the appropriation 
bill into law.104  The authorization process works in a similar fashion.  This has its own 
process of committees, similar to the appropriation process and must also be signed by 
the President.  An authorization must also be signed into law in order to allow the 
government to spend the money that was appropriated.   
This brings us to the third part of the budget process, which is execution.  
Execution is when “agencies carry out their approved budgets.”105  In other words, this is 
when the executive branch spends the money that Congress appropriated and authorized 
for execution.  Execution starts for the Federal Government on October 1st, which is 
considered the start of a new Fiscal Year.106  One sub-function of the Execution phase is 
the collection of revenues by the Internal Revenue Service.  The IRS is a part of the U.S. 
Treasury, and collects the funds that are then spent by the Treasury,107 based on the 
approved authorization and appropriation bills. 
The fourth part of the budget cycle is audit and evaluation.  The audit and 
evaluation portion is conducted by the federal agencies but supervised by the 
Government Accountability Office, or GAO.108  The GAO reports to Congress, so there 
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is no conflict of interests with the auditor being a part of the Executive Branch.109  In 
addition to auditing the budget, the GAO also aids Congress with opinions on legal 
disputes over executive agency conduct, it resolves bid protests for government contracts, 
and it has a significant role in assessing the results of government programs.110 
An easy way to relate how this whole budget cycle works is by this metaphor.  A 
boy (the executive branch) request $10 dollars to buy candy.  The father (the legislative 
authorization committees) approves the request for $10 dollars for candy.  He sends the 
boy to the mother (the legislative appropriation committee) to get the money.  The 
mother only has $8 dollars available to give to the boy.  The boy goes to the store and 
spends the money (execution).  The older sister (GAO- audit and evaluation) tells her 
parents (Congress) that her younger brother actually bought a slingshot instead of candy. 
The final pieces of fiscal policy that need to be defined are the deficit and the 
debt.  Many people confuse the two, and use the terms interchangeably, but they are 
distinctly different.  The GAO defines the deficit and debt as follows: 
The federal deficit (also called the “unified deficit”) is the difference 
between total federal spending and revenue in a given year.  To cover this 
gap, the government borrows from the public.  Each yearly deficit adds to 
the amount of debt held by the public.  In other words, the deficit is the 
annual amount of government borrowing, while the debt represents the 
cumulative amount of outstanding borrowing from the public over the 
nation’s history.111 
The deficit can only be eliminated by balancing the federal budget, or making 
revenues equal expenditures.  Furthermore, the only way to pay down the debt itself is by 
running a surplus, or making more in revenue than what is paid out in expenditures.  
Once a surplus is made, it can be used to pay down the principal on the debt.112  The next 
section will define complexity, an important concept in understanding complex societies. 
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C.  COMPLEXITY DEFINED 
The hypothesis states that fiscal policy is a critically important factor in the 
sustainability of the U.S. Empire.  However, this does not mean that fiscal policy is the 
only factor and everything else should be ignored.  Complexity is an important concept in 
understanding the decline and fall of empires.  It is defined here by Joseph Tainter. 
Complexity is generally understood to refer to such things as the size of a 
society, the number and distinctiveness of its part, the variety of 
specialized social roles that it incorporates, the number of distinct social 
personalities present, and the variety of mechanism for organizing these 
into a coherent function whole.  Augmenting any of these dimensions 
increases the complexity of a society.113 
Based on this definition, complexity includes a multitude of important areas of a 
complex society or empire, such as energy, education, the arts, entertainment, 
infrastructure, science and technology.  One of the reasons that fiscal policy is a critically 
important factor in sustainability is that without money, sufficient complexity cannot be 
attained or maintained.  All of the areas mentioned require money to be able to purchase 
or invest in a greater level of complexity, and once complexity is attained, further 
investment is required in order to maintain the status quo.  For example, two towns that 
trade with each other have several winding dirt paths between each other.  The mayors of 
both towns get together and agree to build a road to connect the towns. Once a road is 
built between two towns, a new level of transportation complexity has been attained.  
Now there is a more efficient and expedient path of transportation from one town to the 
other.  Now that the road is established as a good route between these two towns, people 
will use the road.  As people use the road, it will eventually need to be repaired.  In order 
to maintain the level of complexity attained in transportation between these two towns, 
more money will need to be spent to repair the road in order to maintain the current level 
of complexity.  If the road falls into extreme disrepair, where the road can no longer be 
traveled, then people will make their own paths or find a different route between the two 
towns, thereby losing a level of transportation complexity.  Although relatively simple, 
this example is illustrative of what is meant by investment in complexity.  Once one 
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considers complexity in the form of interstate highways, bridges, national education 
standards, the arts, monuments, energy consumption, and waste removal, it can be 
quickly understood why money is needed to initially invest in, and also to maintain a 
society’s level of complexity. 
D. GRAND STRATEGY AND NATIONAL STRATEGIC NARRATIVE 
DEFINED 
John Collins defines grand strategy as: 
The art and science of employing national power under all circumstances 
to exert desired types and degrees of control over the opposition by 
applying force, the threat of force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, 
subterfuge, and other imaginative means to attain national security 
objectives.114 
Peter Feaver writes that “Grand strategy is a term of art from academia, and refers 
to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness 
political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state's national 
interest.”115  In other words, grand strategy includes more than just national defense and 
military might.  It includes diplomacy, economics, foreign policy, domestic policy, 
education, science and technology, infrastructure, healthcare, and intangible things such 
as national identity, social morals and values and vision for the future.  John Lewis 
Gaddis, in his paper “What is Grand Strategy?” also provides a definition of grand 
strategy. Gaddis defines grand strategy as “the calculated relationship of means to large 
ends.”  Later in the paper he also says “Grand strategy is an ecological discipline, in that 
it requires the ability to see how all of the parts of a problem relate to one another, and 
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therefore to the whole thing.”116  In all three definitions, an understanding of a larger 
picture is presented.  Although not necessarily agreeing on the particulars, the authors 
agree that grand strategy encompasses multiple aspects or multiple disciplines, and 
cannot be relegated to one or two areas or specialties. 
The United States has many different strategies, but does not have one single 
document which, based on the definitions above, can be called a grand strategy.  There is 
however a recently published document that does suggest a new way forward with 
writing a grand strategy of the United States.  The National Strategic Narrative is a white 
paper that was published on April 8, 2011, by the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars.117  It was written by Mr. Y, a nom de plume (penname) used by the two 
military officers who wrote the narrative.  CAPT Wayne Porter, USN and Col. Mark 
Mykleby, USMC Ret. wrote the NSN while working as Special Assistants for Strategic 
Synchronization to ADM Michael Mullen, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but 
published the document with a waiver explain that the contents reflected their views only 
and were not intended to represent the official policy or position of the US Navy, US 
Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.  In the National Strategic Narrative (NSN), 
the authors recognize the need for a grand strategy for the United States. But first they 
recognize the need for a common understanding of where we are, where we are going, 
and what we can become as a Nation and a people.  Without a common understanding, a 
common national philosophy, the U.S. will not be able to address the realities of the 
world and navigate through the increasing complexity of the twenty-first century.  The 
NSN addresses why CAPT Porter and Col. Mykleby think that the U.S. desperately needs 
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a convergent national story and a grand strategy to bring that story to life through a new 
and more efficacious strategic framework and mindset.118 
 The National Strategic Narrative addresses many of these issues in a coherent 
manner in order to change the way the United States looks at the relationship between 
security and prosperity.  In the past, security has simply been a function of the military 
and has fallen under the Department of Defense.  Porter and Mykleby state that “security 
means far more than defense and strength denotes more than power.”119  One of their 
main points is:  
It is time to move beyond a strategy of containment to a strategy of 
sustainment (sustainability); from an emphasis on power and control to an 
emphasis on strength and influence; from a defensive posture of exclusion, 
to a proactive posture of engagement.120 
The nom de plume Mr. Y, suggested by Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, was in 
reference to the “Long Telegram” written by George Kennan in 1946.  Kennan was a 
U.S. Foreign Service Officer in Russia, prior to and during the outset of the Cold War.  
He wrote the “Long Telegram” under the name of “X” so the Russians would not know it 
was him who wrote it.121  It was  published in 1947 in Foreign Affairs as an article called 
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct” by X.122  In it, Kennan discussed the history of the 
Communist ideology, the problems that dictatorial control were giving Stalin and the 
Kremlin, and their main strategy of polarizing the masses against the “basic badness of 
capitalism.”123  Kennan stated what he thought the strategy of the time should be.  “In 
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these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward 
the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of 
Russian expansive tendencies.”124  This is where the Cold War strategy of containment 
originated and led to the creation of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47).  The 
National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council, merged the War 
Department and the Navy Department, with the newly created Department of the Air 
Force into the Department of Defense, under a Secretary of Defense and created the 
Central Intelligence Agency out of the World War II era Office of Strategic Services.  
Overall, it reorganized the U.S. military and foreign policy establishments to meet the 
Soviet threat.125 
Another important document that shaped the way the Cold War was fought by the 
U.S. was National Security Council Report 68 or NSC 68.  NSC 68, entitled “United 
States Objectives and Programs for National Security” was a top secret report for the 
President of the United States which included a high level but detailed analysis of Soviet 
capabilities and intentions.  It had a list of recommended actions for the President to 
approve or disapprove, and lead to the buildup of atomic weapons and vast expansion of 
the U.S. military.  The Department of State Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, 
wrote the report for then Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  Nitze believed that the only 
way to counter the Soviet threat was militarily.  Some of the recommendations included 
diverting funding from other programs to the Department of Defense, increasing taxes to 
help pay for the buildup and increasing the size of the U.S. atomic arsenal. NSC 68 
reflected Nitze’s bias, which was in contrast to Kennan’s ideas of political and economic 
means of containment.  Nitze’s ideas won out after the outset of the Korean War in June 
1950.  Many were convinced by the Soviet and Chinese backed invasion of South Korea 
by the North Koreans that a military solution was the only solution to stop communism.  
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The Truman Administration nearly tripled defense spending from 1950 to 1953 from 5 
percent to 14.2 percent.126 
Many of the same institutions that were implemented during this time period to 
counter Communism are still around today.  The problem with this is that the U.S. is no 
longer fighting the Soviet Union.  Porter and Mykleby state that “For forty years our 
nation prospered and was kept secure through a strategy of containment.”127  They 
discuss the need to move away from a strategy that is “focusing all our attention on 
specific threats, risks, nations, or organizations, as we have in the past.”128  The future, 
they argue, brings a different set of challenges and opportunities.  Instead, they state that 
“It is time for America to re-focus our national interests and principles through a long 
lens on the global environment of tomorrow.” 129 
Currently, the U.S. has many strategies, far too many to research and discuss in 
this thesis.  Examples of the broad topic areas of U.S. National Strategies include a 
National Financial Literacy Strategy, A Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 
Crime, a Tax Gap Strategy, a Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure Strategy, an 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, a National Cyberspace 
Strategy and a National Sage-Grouse Habitat Conservation Strategy.  Interestingly there 
is a Department of Housing and Urban Development Energy Strategy, a Department of 
Defense (DOD) Energy Strategy called Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy 
Strategy, an Environmental Protection Agency sponsored Energy Strategy for the Road 
Ahead and a Department of Energy Critical Materials Strategy, but none of them are 
integrated.  Some of the above listed strategies are coordinated among multiple agencies, 
but many are written by one department or agency for that department or agency only.  
Just like what was revealed in the discussion on budgeting, where the U.S. does not have 
one consolidated budget, and therefore cannot purse a consolidated fiscal policy, the U.S. 
                                                 
126 Office of the Historian: US Dept. of State “NSC 68, 1950,” U.S. Dept of State.gov 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945–1952/NSC68.  
127 Porter and Mykleby “A National Strategic Narrative,” 5. 
128 Porter and Mykleby “A National Strategic Narrative,” 8. 
129 Porter and Mykleby “A National Strategic Narrative,” 5. 
 30 
also does not have a single national or grand strategy.  Without integrating fiscal policy in 
the pursuit of one grand strategy, the United States runs the risk of making one or the 
other irrelevant.  By building individual strategies in a vacuum, each strategy competes 
with others for funding.  With so many strategies, Congress cannot possibly pursue the 
best interests of each strategy with fiscal policies, for there are far too many to consider.  
Even within individual departments, strategies conflict with one another. 
A classic example of this is the Department of Defense.  The DOD has a 
hierarchy of strategies, all primarily derived from the National Security Strategy (NSS), 
signed by the sitting President of the United States.  Under the National Security Strategy 
is the National Defense Strategy (NDS) which is signed by the Secretary of Defense.  
Under the National Defense Strategy is the National Military Strategy (NMS) which is 
signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Additionally, there is a Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) conducted by the Secretary of Defense, which is a 
congressionally mandated review every 4 years of the DOD strategies and priorities.130  
These documents, the NSS, NDS, NMS and the QDR comprise the highest level of 
security strategy in the United States, yet only focus on one department, the Department 
of Defense.  There is also a National Strategy for Homeland Security, which is not 
integrated with these documents because it is written by the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Aside from the Department of Homeland Security Strategy, the DOD 
theoretically uses these documents to create and implement a strategy from the President 
on down, however the publishing dates alone illustrate their fractured nature.  The most 
recent NSS was signed by President Barrack Obama in May of 2010.131  Yet, the NDS, 
which is supposed to be based on the NSS, was signed by Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates in June of 2008.132   The NMS was signed by ADM. Michael Mullen on February 
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8, 2011.133  Even within its own department, DOD has trouble keeping its strategies 
current with each other at the most senior level.   
The National Security Strategy of 2010 takes a step in the right direction toward a 
broader view of security.  In the introduction the President writes “Our strategy starts by 
recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with steps we take at home.”134  
He discusses revitalizing the economy, making education a priority, developing clean 
energy, and continued innovation in science and technology.135  All of these ideas are 
also addressed in the NSN.136 
There is a big difference here between how the two documents discuss security.  
The NSS still concentrates on security as a function of military defense of the nation.  For 
example, not only are there multiple examples in the Presidents cover letter of talking 
about security in terms of defense, as noted above, but as early as page 1, paragraphs 2 
and 3, the NSS starts talking about threats.  There is no doubt that the attack of 
September 11, 2001, as discussed in the third paragraph, was a threat to the United 
States.137  There is always place for the U.S. military in the security of our nation.  The 
NSS even states that we have an “unmatched military.”138  This is not being disputed 
however; the focus needs to be much broader.  A specific look at the document reveals 
that starting on page 4 and 5; the focus is on Al-Qaeda, and the nuclear threat.139  On 
page 19, Al-Qaeda is again the focus.  On page 20 the NSS transitions to Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, and then to Afghanistan and Pakistan on pages 20- 21.  Then page 21 
continues with terrorist safe havens and at risk states, namely “Yemen, Somalia, the 
Maghreb and the Sahel”140 and ends on 22 with more about Al-Qaeda.  Pages 23 through 
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24 talk more about nuclear proliferation and specifically name Iran and North Korea as 
threats.  The end of page 24 starts talking about America’s greater interests in the Middle 
East, and transitions to a focus on Iraq on page 25.  Page 26 starts with a discussion of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, then labels Iran as a threat and ends with more discussion of the 
Iraq and Afghani conflicts.  The prose on page 27 talks about at risk states and preventing 
the emergence of conflict, and ends with a discussion on the threats in cyberspace, which 
ends on page 28.141  The last paragraph in the conclusion of this document uses the word 
“threat” and the word “capability,” an indication that this document is still focused on 
threats and capabilities as opposed to opportunities and weaknesses.142 
However, the NSN, states that “we must recognize that security means more than 
defense.”143  The emphasis is not on threats, but on opportunities. Col. Mykleby was 
quoted in the New York Times on May 4, 2011 as saying “This is a critical moment to 
talk about a narrative that isn’t just focused on threats.”144  The NSN states that “Rather 
than focusing all our attention on specific threats, risks, nations, or organizations, as we 
have in the past, let us evaluate the trends that will shape tomorrow’s strategic 
ecology.”145 
The NSN does not name any specific nation as a threat.  In fact, the NSN, in 
talking about strategic ecology and trends, states that “global trends, whether manifesting 
themselves in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, or within our own hemisphere 
impact the lives of Americans.”146   By keeping this broad view, and not implicating or 
labeling any nation as a threat, the authors seek to change the way that we view foreign 
nations.  The focus becomes the relationship between nations, instead of the threat posed 
by certain nations.  Porter and Mykleby’s view of security is quoted here: 
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It follows logically that prosperity without security is unsustainable. 
Security is a state of mind, as much as it is a physical aspect of our 
environment. For Americans, security is very closely related to freedom, 
because security represents freedom from anxiety and external threat, 
freedom from disease and poverty, freedom from tyranny and oppression, 
freedom of expression but also freedom from hurtful ideologies, prejudice 
and violations of human rights.147 
Since prosperity is viewed by Porter and Mykleby as equally important with 
security, it would naturally follow that a strong economy is one portion of the NSN the 
authors mention.  “As we pursue the growth of our own prosperity and security, the 
welfare of our citizens must be seen as part of a highly dynamic, and interconnected 
system.”148  Then they go on to state in the next paragraph that “This begins at home 
with quality health care and education, with a vital economy and low rates of 
unemployment.”149  As Lewis Mumford noted, on commenting on the Roman populace 
around the time of the invasion of Rome, “Everyone aimed at security: no one accepted 
responsibility.”150  During World War II, Americans bought war bonds,151 donated 
precious supplies such as rubber, metal, paper, and other essential goods for the war 
effort, endured rationing of goods,152 and grew victory gardens, all in the name of 
patriotism and security.153  This same involvement, although manifested differently, 
needs to be seen today.  Security will only be fully realized for the United States when it 
has the support of its citizenry, whether that be in maintaining a steady job and getting 
out of debt, paying taxes instead of evading them, voting, reporting crime instead of 
engaging in it, educating the next generation of Americans through mentorship, or 
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serving in the government, emergency services or military.  In short, the NSN tells a 
broader story than the traditional NSS, and provides the context for a new strategy to 
address the challenges of the twenty-first century.  This thesis will explore the National 
Strategic Narrative in more depth to determine if it can add value to changing the nation’s 
course with regards to fiscal policy.  
E. METHOD- CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
This thesis will use cases study analysis as its primary method of hypothesis 
exploration. “In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when 
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.”154  Case 
studies are qualitative in nature.  Qualitative research methods are primarily inductive 
and are used to formulate a theory.  They are typically text based and more in depth in 
nature.  Quantitative research methods are deductive, using numbers and statistical 
methods by sampling a large body of data to explain a generalizable theory.155  This case 
study will use a multiple case study design. 
1. Multiple Case Study Design 
This thesis will use two cases studies, Rome and Britain to illustrate a hypothesis 
and apply it to a third case study, the United States.  This multiple case study design, is 
best illustrated by “The Rise of the Pentagon and U.S. State Building: The Defense 
Program as Industrial Policy” by Gregory Hooks.  In this case study, Hooks looked at 
two extreme cases of American Industry and used them to illustrate a pertinent policy 
related issue, that of planned economies.156  Hooks hypothesis was that although the U.S. 
is not a planned economy, the Pentagon acted as an economic planner in certain sectors 
of the economy in order to meet the specific needs and will of the military. Hooks 
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researched the aeronautical industry, which was largely subsidized and almost wholly 
dependent upon the Pentagon for survival and the microelectronics industry, which did 
not depend on the Pentagon as a primary source of revenue, yet still spent large amount 
of research and development funds on making microelectronics for the military that had 
no civilian application and no additional profit besides what was contracted through the 
Pentagon.  In this study, Hooks showed two extremes to illustrate his point of how the 
Pentagon has acted as an economic planner across multiple private sectors of the U.S. 
economy.157 
2. Case Studies in this Paper 
In this case study analysis, a similar approach will attempt to use the case of 
Rome, which rose, declined, and collapsed, and the case of Great Britain, which rose and 
has had a slow but graceful degradation, yet has maintained itself as a strong nation, a 
world political player and the eighth largest world economy,158 despite shedding most of 
its colonies and losing its empire status. These two cases raise questions about the 
spectrum of decline and collapse of empires, and allow for a theory that can be applied to 
a multitude of cases, but in this case will only be applied to the U.S. 
Rome is the classical empire, an old world power that stood for over “500 years 
after Caesar’s death in Italy and the western provinces and three times as long in the east, 
where emperors would rule in Constantinople until the fifteenth century.”159  This case 
study will concentrate on the Western Roman Empire based out of Rome, and not the 
Eastern Roman Empire of Constantinople.   
Great Britain is a more recent empire, and is one that more recognizable and 
understandable to Americans.  The British and Americans both speak different dialects of 
the same language, English.  America was once a colony of the British Crown.  England 
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is one of America’s staunchest allies.  Also, because it is a relatively modern empire, 
many of the governmental institutions and public offices can more easily be compared to 
the United States. 
The final case study is the United States.  An empire in its own right, the United 
States has risen, is on the decline but has not yet fallen.  This thesis will use the Roman 
and British case studies to compare and contrast the similarities and differences between 
each in order to inform the discussion about the possible outcomes for the United States.  
Also, by looking at these historical examples, there may be lessons that can be learned 
that could be used to inform fiscal policies in a way to try to avoid the pitfalls that 
ensnared these two empires.   
F. LITERATURE REVIEW- COLLAPSE EXPLORED 
Collapse is a word that holds many meanings.  It can mean anything from what 
happened to the Soviet Union, to what happens when a person faints from exhaustion.  
Empires and societies collapse, but houses, dams, folding chairs and lungs also collapse.  
Many authors speak about collapse and make the assumption that the reader implicitly 
knows the definition of collapse.160  As was previously stated, this paper uses the 
definition of collapse as defined in The Collapse of Complex Societies by Dr. Joseph 
Tainter.  “A society has collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant loss of an 
established level of sociopolitical complexity.”161  He further explains that an 
“established level” of complexity is one that has been at or developing toward a level of 
complexity for one or two generations.162  At the end of the book he also adds to the 
definition that “collapse occurs and can only occur in a power vacuum.”163  Another 
famous author and professor, Jared Diamond, in his book Collapse: How Societies 
Choose to Fail or Succeed defines collapse similarly.  “By collapse, I mean a drastic 
decrease in human population size and/or political/economic/social complexity, over a 
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considerable area, for an extended period of time.”164  Although Tainter and Diamond do 
not agree on the cause of collapse,165  Diamond’s definition seems to agree with Tainter 
at least on the loss of complexity.  The purpose of this essay is not to prove that any one 
theory of collapse is correct, or to disprove any theory either.  The purpose of this essay 
is to examine the role of fiscal policy in the long term sustenance of the United States.  
As such, the following literature review of various theories of collapse, are meant to 
enlighten and inform the discussion surrounding the cases studies. 
In his book, Tainter explores a large body of literature, which he has since 
supplemented with additional journal articles to cover what he believes are 11 major 
explanatory themes of the collapse of complex societies.  This provides a very concise 
synopsis of the plethora of books, theses and journal articles on the topic of decline and 
collapse.  It also provides a simple framework within which a review of the large 
amounts of literature of this field can be summarized.  The categories are as follows; 
1. Depletion or cessation of a vital resource or resources on which the 
society depends.  2. The establishment of a new resource base.  3. The 
occurrence of some insurmountable catastrophe.  4. Insufficient response 
to circumstances.  5. Other complex societies.  6. Intruders.  7. Class 
conflict, societal contradictions, elite mismanagement or misbehavior.  8. 
Social dysfunction. 9. Mystical factors.  10. Chance of concatenation of 
events.  11. Economic Factors. 166 
Each of these eleven factors will be explained further, but it is interesting to note 
that Tainter concludes his work by mentioning that economic factors seemed to always 
pair up with some of the other factors that he explores as the reason for collapse. 
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1. Depletion Or Cessation Of A Vital Resource Or Resources on Which 
The Society Depends 
The resource depletion category covers two subcategories.  The first subcategory 
is a “gradual deterioration or depletion of a resource base” and the second subcategory is 
a “more rapid loss of resources due to an environmental fluctuation or climate shift.”167  
Both categories attribute collapse to resource depletion or cessation, but from different 
viewpoints. 
Jared Diamond discusses a wide range of societies, from the Easter Islanders, to 
the Norse Greenlanders, the Mayans, the Anasazi and more modern societies such as 
farmers in Montana, Australian miners and the Chinese, in an attempt to make the case 
for ecological decay and environmental resource depletion as a primary cause of collapse.  
Diamond divides his reason into twelve categories, the first eight for ancient civilizations; 
“deforestation and habitat destruction, soil problems, water management problems, 
overhunting, overfishing, effects of introduced species on native species, human 
population growth, and increased per capita impact of people” and four additional 
categories for modern societies; “human-caused climate change, buildup of toxic 
chemicals in the environment, energy shortages, and full human utilization of Earth’s 
photosynthetic capability.”168  Diamond then states that although the environment is 
important, “I don’t know of any case in which a society’s collapse can be attributed 
solely to environmental damage.”169  He also says later that “It would be absurd to claim 
that environmental damage must be a major factor in all collapses: the collapse of the 
Soviet Union is a modern counter-example, and the destruction of Carthage by Rome in 
146 B.C. is an ancient one.”170  In essence, Diamond set out to write the book purely 
about environmental problems, and realized as he conducted research, that there were 
other factors involved, and he openly admits to this in his book.171  However, his book 
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has a number of compelling arguments about how various societies collapsed due to 
resource depletion through environmental problems. 
The link of resource depletion and decline is nothing new.  Santo Mazzarino 
quotes Cyprian, a Christian who lived in the third century A.D. at the time when Philip 
the Arab was Emperor of Rome.172  Cyprian wrote:  
The production of silver and gold has gone down in the exhausted mines, 
as well as the production of marble; the worked-out veins give less and 
less from day to day.  The cultivator is no longer in the fields, the sailor on 
the seas, soldier in the barracks, honesty in the marketplace, justice in the 
law court, solidarity in friendship, skill in the arts, discipline in 
manners.173 
Cyprian acknowledged dwindling yields of current resources, but attributed it to 
the moral decay of man, not a lack of management.  Mazzarino also notes that in addition 
Cyprian took account of changing weather and climatological factors, and related them to 
a lack of vigor or youthful energy, much like Ellsworth Huntington did in contemporary 
literature.174 
Ellsworth Huntington wrote “Climatic Change and Agricultural Exhaustion as 
Elements in the Fall of Rome” in 1915 with the intention of sparking a new academic 
debate about the effect of climate change on human efficiency.  The basic premise of his 
argument is that climates favorable for agriculture, are also favorable for civilization 
growth, and likewise favorable for humans to exert greater amounts of energy.  
Huntington posits that humans become more lethargic and less willing to exert more 
energy when the temperatures shift, which in turn causes crops to fail, political systems to 
stop working and allows other forces, such as barbarians to enter and wreak havoc.  With 
more energy, humans might be better able to deal with these problems.  He attributes the 
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fall of the Roman Empire to such climatic shift that caused the loss of human energy to 
fail to maintain the agricultural base that supported the Roman Empire.175 
Kasja Ekholm provides an alternative view of resource depletion as a breakdown 
of trade networks, external resources and imported goods.176  Ekholm uses as an example 
a discussion of how Iran went from a strong central economy, manufacturing their own 
goods from 1600-1800 to a “period of disintegration and then integration into the 
European world economy.”177  Ekholm also discusses the loss of buying power, and how 
a loss of income can be “a catastrophic consequence” for laborers.  “No buying power 
means no consumption,” which is a disaster for anyone who produces goods, instead of 
subsistence farming for their means of survival.178 
There are many more authors who explore resource depletion and environmental 
factors than can be discussed here.  It is a logical and compelling argument.179  It is also 
economic in nature, for it has already been stated that “economics is the study of how 
people choose to use resources.”180  Depletion of resources beyond a certain point would 
result in a loss of complexity.  One of the stabilizing forces in a complex society is its 
ability to overcome adversity, and this argument, by nature, assumes that the societies 
which collapse due to resource depletion do not have the ability foresee or overcome 
these problems.181  However, resources are vitally important to any complex society, so 
this standpoint can aid in the understanding of the greater economic problems that 
contribute to collapse.  This category is also related to the next, the establishment of a 
new resource base. 
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2. The Establishment Of A New Resource Base 
This view has less support than the first, and is an assertion that a group that 
experiences a plentiful increase in resources will collapse.182  Michael Harner uses the 
example of a society that is based around a hunter gatherer model.  He says that if that 
tribe or group grows it population to the point where hunting, fishing and gathering are 
no longer sufficient to provide for the needs of the group, then domesticated plants and 
animals, i.e. agriculture and livestock, would be needed to provide for the growing 
populace.  Once the switch is made to agriculture, there is now an abundance of land, 
because one acre of forest cannot support as much wildlife food as one acre of farmland.  
By a manifold increase in a resource, (land), the group will lose a level of complexity due 
to the fact that the group itself will part ways for each to make their own farm.  The tribe 
of hunter/gatherers no longer needs to stay together to survive, so they will part ways, 
causing a collapse of that society.183 
M. Kay Martin wrote about the South American hunter-gatherer tribes, and how 
the tribes devolved until they were only smaller bands or family units.  She blames this 
loss of complexity on the introduction of the Europeans to South America.184  Martin 
says that European trade was introduced as early as 1520, and although she suggests 
multiple reasons why the tribes devolved, she does not give a conclusive answer.185  One 
reason may be that the additional trade goods were a new resource, supporting Harner’s 
thesis.186  Other views, such as that of author Gordon Childe, expresses that the 
introduction of iron, which was easier to acquire and less expensive than bronze, allowed 
peasants and barbarians to make weapons that could be used against soldiers.  This, he 
argues, brought about the collapse of the Mycenaean’s and Hittites.  This category seems 
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to have a narrow application to apply only to hunter-gatherer and agricultural peasantries, 
and cannot explain the collapse of large societies such as an empire.187 
3. The Occurrence Of Some Insurmountable Catastrophe 
The third category is the occurrence of some insurmountable catastrophe.  A 
catastrophe can take many forms.  Some examples might include a war or invasion, a 
weather anomaly, such as a hurricane, earthquake or flood, an epidemic, or a social or 
economic event such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall or a Stock Market crash.  There is 
not a clear cut difference between resource depletion and catastrophe theories, so it lies 
more on the emphasis of the author.188  One classic example of this is the great flood in 
the Bible that wiped out all mankind except for Noah, his family and a few animals.  
12 God saw how corrupt the earth had become, for all the people on earth 
had corrupted their ways. 13 So God said to Noah, “I am going to put an 
end to all people, for the earth is filled with violence because of them. I 
am surely going to destroy both them and the earth. 14 So make yourself an 
ark of cypress wood; make rooms in it and coat it with pitch inside and 
out… 17I am going to bring floodwaters on the earth to destroy all life 
under the heavens, every creature that has the breath of life in it. 
Everything on earth will perish. 18But I will establish my covenant with 
you, and you will enter the ark—you and your sons and your wife and 
your sons’ wives with you.189 
More contemporary examples include Euan Mackie’s analysis that the end of the 
classic Mayan culture at Benque Viejo, British Honduras was the result of a devastating 
earthquake.  Mackie writes “an earth tremor could actually have caused the collapse of 
the authority of the hierarchy.”190 
James Brewbaker’s hypothesis is that the cause of collapse of the Lowland 
Classic Mayans was due to an agricultural epidemic by the Maize Mosaic Virus.  He 
equates the collapse of the Classic Maya with the introduction of the Maize Mosaic 
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Virus, due to the fact that they abandoned fertile lands that had been successfully farmed 
for over 1000 years.  He asserts that any peasant revolt or invasion, as other authors have 
theorized, should have capitalized on the fertile lands, but instead they were abandoned 
for centuries.  He compares this catastrophe to the “late blight” (Phytophthora infestans) 
of diseased potatoes, where in 1845 in Ireland, widespread famine caused half of the 4 
million person population to die or migrate to find food.191 
Spyridon Marinatos writes about the eruption of the volcano Thera and the 
devastation that it caused the Minoan island of Crete.  Crete lies 62 miles from Thera, but 
Marinatos, using a nautical chart, mathematical calculations, and data from several 
excavations theorizes that Crete was destroyed by a combination of mud and ashes 
raining down from volcano, a wave of water that covered certain structures with pumice 
from the volcano and knocked over others by the force of water, and successive 
earthquakes after the eruption, the rendered the island nearly inhabitable.192  Marinatos 
states that Crete “received an irreparable blow, and from then onwards gradually declined 
and sank into decadence, losing its prosperity and power.”193 
William Henry Samuel Jones writes of how malaria was a primary cause of the 
fall of the Roman Empire.  Jones argues that a malaria endemic caused the Romans to 
become weaker and less productive.  He points to scientific evidence that says malaria, if 
not treated properly, leads to lethargy and moral debasement of character.194  Jones uses 
this as part of the basis for his argument that malaria, over generations, lead to lethargy, 
which lead to less cultivation of agricultural fields, and then further lead to the moral 
decline and savagery of the people.  All of these factors, plus others, originating with 
malaria, caused the destruction of the empire.195 
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This theory has a weakness for the reason that complex societies regularly 
withstand catastrophes without collapsing.  For example, Brewbaker’s argument of the 
potato blight in Ireland weakens his overall hypothesis, because although 50 percent of 
the population dying or migrating due to famine was catastrophic, it did not result in the 
collapse of Ireland.196  Marinatos compares the eruption of Thera to the eruption of 
Krakatua in the Dutch East Indies on August 26-27, 1883.197  However, no collapse has 
been documented as a result from the volcanic eruption in Krakatua.198  If a single 
catastrophe is the reason why the society collapsed, then it is the society, and not the 
catastrophe that needs further analysis, to determine why it was not able to withstand this 
challenge when it was able to overcome previous challenges.199  It may be that in certain 
cases, a natural disaster such as the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 A.D.200 which 
completely destroyed the city of Pompeii, would cause a localized collapse, but to a 
complex society as large as an empire, a catastrophe that causes collapse would likely 
have indicating factors leading up to the collapse.  In support of this, George Cowgill, on 
discussing the causes for Mayan collapse states, “Earthquake damage at certain sites 
could conceivably have hastened a collapse already underway for other reasons but can 
hardly be the principle causal factor.”201  The very definition of a complex society makes 
it unlikely that complex system can be overcome by a simple, single event explanation, 
and is not useful for a society the size of an empire.202 
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4. Insufficient Response to Circumstances 
This topic is based on the assertion that some complex societies do not have the 
right structures in their political, social and economic institutions with the ability to 
sufficiently respond to circumstances that lead to a collapse.  There are many different 
opinions in this field, so only a few will be reviewed.203 
One of the core arguments in this field was described by Betty Meggers, an 
anthropologist, who in 1954, wrote about the Mayans and her idea of environmental 
limitations.  She makes the case that it is important to understand the type of environment 
and “to be culturally significant, a classification of environment must recognize 
differences in agricultural potential.”204  In Meggers’ opinion, there are 4 types of 
agricultural land that are available on the earth, from Type 1, which is no agricultural 
potential, to Type 4, which is unlimited agricultural potential.205  She further states that 
“the level to which a culture can develop is dependent upon the agricultural potentiality 
of the environment it occupies”206  The less agricultural yield an area has, the less able an 
area has to become culturally complex, because they have to be more concerned with 
survival than with culture.  Meggers contends that the Mayans, lived in a Type 2 or area 
of limited agricultural potential, and “this means that a culture of the level attained by the 
Classic Maya could not have developed in the Type 2 environment where the 
archeological remains are found, but must have been introduced from else-where.”207  
Her theory is that the Mayans did not develop a sufficient system to feed the population 
in an area with limited agricultural potential, and this lead to their decline and caused 
their eventual collapse.208 
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Another core view in this field comes from Elman Service and his “Law of 
Evolutionary Potential.”209  Service’s Law states, “The more specialized and adapted a 
form in a given evolutionary stage, the smaller it its potential for passing to the next 
stage.”210  A different way he describes the law is “Specific evolutionary progress is 
inversely related to general evolutionary potential.”211  In other words, once something 
evolves to meet a specific challenge, it has less opportunity in general to meet or adapt to 
successive challenges.  Tainter calls this the “failure to adapt” theory.212  Service 
specifically argues against the linear model of evolution that many use,213 is wrong, and 
does not account for the “discontinuity in advance(s)” or leaps in evolution.214  As a 
result, Service discusses in depth the ability for evolutionary leaps, especially at the 
societal level.  One of his examples of this is Russia.  Service quotes Leon Trotsky in his 
History of the Russian Revolution, to explain how Russia was able to make the leap from 
an underdeveloped agricultural and trade society to an industrial nation.215  Trotsky 
writes, “The privilege of historic backwardness- and such a privilege exists- permits, or 
rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, 
skipping a whole series of intermediate stages.”216  Trotsky attributed this to the “Law of 
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Combined Development.”217  Trotsky states that, “Arising late, Russian industry did not 
repeat the development of advanced countries, but inserted itself in this development, 
adapting their latest achievements to its own backwardness.”218  Service uses Trotsky’s 
example of Russia as an explanatory example for his own law, and shows that evolution, 
both in “biology and culture” can take leaps, and does not always progress linearly.219 
Interestingly, Service also relates his law to “the rise and fall of civilizations.”220  
He suggests that many historians could have better explained their concepts of “decline” 
and “decay,” if they had looked at it from an evolutionary perspective.221  The basic 
premise of this portion of his argument is that many historians try to quantify why certain 
societies “rise and fall,” but if looked at within the construct of his law, Service shows 
that it makes sense that a society rises to a certain level, then is overtaken by another 
backwards society who capitalizes off of the innovations of the previous society.  Service 
uses a multiple part example of the rise of Mesopotamia, which eventually gave way to 
Babylon and Egypt.  Then these two societies fell behind Greece.  Rome started as a 
tribal society and “was built in a day,” improving upon the successes of the Greeks, later 
passed up by the Arabs and then Northern Europe.222  His ultimate view is that this law is 
the rule, and not the exception, and then the “rise and fall problem is not a problem.”223  
Instead, people can concentrate on studying the exceptions to the law, instead of those 
societies that follow the law itself. 
An alternate view on this topic is that the more complex and interconnected a 
society becomes, the less resilient it is toward shocks to the system.  Kent Flannery is one 
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of the main proponents of this view and asserts that as a society gets larger, and it starts 
to break down the barriers that would have previously insulated it from shocks.  The 
larger and more complex the society becomes, the more linearly connected, which 
decreases resilience.  To illustrate this, he used the analogy of a long strand of Christmas 
tree lights, where when one bulb breaks, the whole strand goes out.  By this, Flannery is 
trying to show that a shock in one part of the system can have a devastating effect on the 
whole system.224 
Mason Hammond looks at “stagnation in the early Roman Empire” from the 
standpoint of economics.225  His primary argument is that the “static character of the 
economic system of the Roman world” caused its decay. 226  Hammond notes four 
specific areas as symptoms of this stagnation “agriculture, industry, trade and 
finance.”227  He goes on to say that some of the specific symptoms were “difficulties 
with respect to coinage, the changing character of labor and the increase of government 
regulation” and that these problems not only affected multiple areas but were general 
causes for the economic stagnation of the Roman Empire.228  With agriculture, 
Hammond shows that the problem was not with fertility or soil exhaustion, but with 
labor.  He writes that agricultural “stagnation resulted rather from the low economic 
status of labor on the large estates.”229  The stagnation in industry was “to be found in 
aspects not purely economic.”230  Hammond shows that a policy of decentralizing 
industry into the provinces and decline in artistic and professional skills caused industrial 
stagnation.231  Trade was extremely expensive, and “therefore profitable only for goods 
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of small bulk and high value.”232  However, in order to feed the city of Rome, the 
government had to take control of the grain trade. 233  The symptoms of stagnation with 
respect to trade also stem from areas outside of trade itself.  For small bulk, high value 
items, the issue was that of finance, draining the coffers of the empire. “Increasing 
government control and support” of the grain trade were factors of politics and 
finance.234  With regards to finance, Hammond points out that the two primary factors 
that caused stagnation was a financial system that “was based primarily on hard cash” 
and “did not provide for any extensive system of credit.”235  The public did not accept a 
coins face value, but instead based the worth off of the precious metal content, which 
meant that debasement of currency led to a loss in faith in the coinage and high 
inflation.236  Also, the fact that there was no system of credit meant that the government 
could not issue any long-term debt. 237  Hammond’s overarching point is that the early 
empire’s economic system did not change, led to stagnation in key areas, and did not 
allow for the later empire to adequately respond to stresses on the empire.238 
These “failure to adapt” arguments add to the conversation on collapse, 
specifically in that they recognize that “collapse often depends more on the 
characteristics of the society than of its stresses.”239  These arguments recognize that the 
structure of the society and its ability to respond to difficulties is a key part of the 
survival of a complex society.  However, this argument does not take into account the 
ability of a complex society to recognize its shortcoming, overcome its boundaries, 
reorganize and respond to circumstances with a new tactic or adaptation.  One example of 
this is the Roman resurgence after the reorganization in the third century A.D.240  The 
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insufficient response to circumstances theory may not be completely explanatory by 
itself, but this argument is a valuable addition to the overall concept of collapse. 
5.  Other Complex Societies 
This argument is based on competition between societies, and the competition of 
one complex society with another complex society causes collapse.241  Edward Lanning, 
in commenting on the fall of the Huari Empire in the Andes, suggests that “destructive 
competition between empires” may have caused the fall of both the Huari and Tihuanaco 
empires.242  In this case, Lanning is suggesting that competition ended with two losers 
and no winners.  Another Mesoamerican reference to this is Richard E. W. Adams 
analysis of Teotihuacan.  He suggests that initially, the Teotihuacan Empire “had the 
organizational jump on most Mesoamerican cultures during its first centuries, but as time 
went on, the gap narrowed, and the great city finally came into peril.”243  This 
competition, in Adams work, motivated the rise, but also precipitated the fall of the 
Teotihuacan Empire.  Gordon Willey and Demitri Shimkin also suggest that competition 
between ceremonial centers in the Lowland Maya civilization due to increasing 
manpower focused on building temples and attacking rival cities and decreasing 
manpower devoted to agriculture and feeding the people may have contributed to the 
collapse.244  Another contributing factor they cite is the increasing competition with “the 
more dynamic and aggressive societies then emerging in Mexico” with regards to 
trade.245 
Richard Blanton looks at this situation differently.  He argues that collapse of 
Monte Alban was a response to the collapse of the Teotihuacan.  The Oaxaca Valley had 
a strong military alliance to counter the rising strength of the Teotihuacan.   When the 
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Teotihuacan fell around 700 A.D., it precipitated the fall of the Main Plaza at Monte 
Alban in the same century.  This coupled with population growth that stressed the 
agricultural subsistence, and a decline in support of the elites to the political center, 
caused collapse.  Once the competition fell, Blanton argues, there was no longer a reason 
for a strong military alliance, and therefore the alliance faltered, causing collapse.246  
Although some of these ideas are possible, this is not normally the case as “conflict 
between empires more often leads to expansion of the victor, than to the collapse of 
both.”247  This theory does not lend itself to explaining the collapse of a major empire 
like Rome.248 
6. Intruders 
The collapse due the invasion by intruders, many times of a lower social 
complexity than the society being invaded, is a relatively popular theory, and there are 
many examples in history that may support this theory.249  Jeremy Sabloff and Gordon 
Willey’s hypothesis is:  
…that the Southern Lowlands (the Guatemalan Peten and bordering 
portions of Chiapas and Tabasco) were invaded by non-Classic Maya 
peoples. This invasion began in the ninth century A.D., and it set in 
motion a train of events that destroyed the Classic Maya within100 
years.250 
Sabloff and Willey state that invaders using superior weapons, namely the atlatl 
and dart, conquered the Classic Mayans.  They also assert that the Mayans may have 
fallen to the invaders because the invaders had a military sociopolitical structure, whereas 
the Mayans had a more peaceful economic and religious societal orientation.251  Lanning 
                                                 
246 Richard E. Blanton, Monte Alban: Settlement Patterns at the Ancient Zapotec Capital (New York: 
Academic Press, 1977), 103. 
247 Tainter, Collapse of Complex Societies, 61. 
248 Tainter, Collapse of Complex Societies, 61. 
249 Tainter, Collapse of Complex Societies, 61. 
250 Jeremy A. Sabloff and Gordon R. Willey. "The Collapse of Maya Civilization in the Southern 
Lowlands: A Consideration of History and Process," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23, no. 4 
(Winter 1967): 312. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3629449.  
251 Sabloff  and Willey “The Collapse of Maya Civilization in the Southern Lowlands,” 327. 
 52 
also states that invasions of barbarians may have led to the collapse of the Huari and 
Tihuanaco empires in the Andes Mountains of South America.252 
Professor A. Goetze writes of the fall of the Hittite Empire.  He asserts that 
“archaeological evidence proves that a catastrophe overtook Anatolia and Syria.”253  The 
Hittites were ravaged and cities were razed.  He dates the catastrophe at about 1200 B.C.  
Goetze, states that it was the migration of “Peoples of the Sea” that invaded and 
destroyed the Hittite Empire.254  An Egyptian Chronicler wrote “Not one stood before 
their hands from Khatti (Hittites) on.  Qode, Carcemish, Arzawa and Alshiya were 
crushed.”255  R. D. Barnett, looking at the other side and writing about “The Sea 
Peoples,” echoes this sentiment that the Hittites were indeed destroyed by the invasion of 
“The Sea Peoples.”256 
V. R. D’A. Desborough chronicles the end of the Mycenaean’s.  Desborough says 
that “the archaeological record reveals, at the end of the (thirteenth) century, a series of 
catastrophes in the central and southern mainland of Greece, affecting the heart of the 
Mycenaean world.”257  The result was a breakdown of the central political power and 
people everywhere fleeing the empire for safer locations.258  He implicates the invasion 
of the Dorian’s in bringing about the collapse of Mycenaean civilization.259  Frank H. 
Stubbings also mentions “the Dorian invasion and the final break-up of the Mycenaean 
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Greece.”260  He states, “We should be perverse not to recognize the strong probability 
that the destructions are to be linked with the Dorian invasion, of which clear and 
irrefutable account have come down to us.”261 
Santo Mazzarino writes of the barbarian hordes that invaded Rome.  The idea that 
Rome fell to invaders is a classic and very popular view, and as Mazzarino found out, 
was even written about by Christian writers centuries prior to the fall of Rome.262  He 
also briefly outlines the timeline of the invasions from the defeat of Emperor Valens at 
Adrianople in 378 A.D. by the Goths, the breach of the empire by the barbarian tribes of 
Alans, Suevi, and Vandals to the invasion of Rome in 410 A.D. by the Visigoths. 263  
Arnold Hugh Martin Jones, also implicates barbarians, stating “It was the increasing 
pressure of the barbarians, concentrated on the weaker western half of the empire, that 
caused the collapse.”264  Arther Ferrill, in his explanation of the fall of the Roman 
empire, argues heavily for the military cause of collapse, as his book, entitled “The Fall 
of the Roman Empire; The Military Explanation,” might suggest.  Ferrill looks at many 
aspects of the Roman military and the effects the military victories and defeats had on the 
later Roman Empire.  He ends his book with this point; “As the western army became 
barbarized, it lost its tactical superiority, and Rome fell to the onrush of barbarism”265.  
Ferrill’s argument is that by subsuming Germanic tribes into the Roman Army, they lost 
what made the Roman Army superior to the barbarians.266 
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Although this is a relatively popular theory for the cause of collapse, there are 
some distinct arguments against invasion.  Cowgill writes that “It seems that the invasion 
theory also comes to grief by not being able to account for desertion of the Southern 
Maya Lowlands.”267  He points to the invasion in the Yucatan Peninsula to the north and 
says that “even remarkably savage invasions” did not cause complete depopulation of a 
region, and therefore discounts this theory as a viable cause for the collapse and 
depopulation of the Classic Maya.268  Another argument against invasion in the collapse 
of the Mayans is Fredrick Bove.  Bove conducted a trend analysis of the movement of 
peoples in Central America, looking specifically at the Lowland Mayan culture, and 
found a weak trend for the migration shift that many authors claim due to invasion.  Bove 
writes; “The invasion hypothesis and its possible related aspects of historical diffusion 
and/or migration is not supported very well because of the low degree of explanation in 
regional trend surfaces produced.”269 
Tainter puts it best when he comments that “The overthrow of a dominant state by 
a weaker, tribally organized people is an event in need of explanation.”270  Tainter’s 
point is that although a popular methodology, the invasion argument is similar to the 
catastrophe argument in that a simple answer is given to solve a complex problem.  “The 
fundamental problem with intruder theories is that they do not clarify much.”271  He uses 
the example of the Dorian invasion of Mycenaean Greece as a counter example.  
Although the Dorian’s supposedly invaded the Mycenaean’s, there are no archaeological 
artifacts to prove this.  Only two new archaeological artifacts were introduced during this 
period, the cut and thrust sword and the violin bow fibula.  Both of these innovations 
“were used by Mycenaean’s and not by invaders.”272  Tainter’s point is that this 
evidence, along with the evidence for the Mayan’s suggests that in both cases, invader’s 
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ravaged the land and left without a trace, not even leaving intact the things that would 
make the conquest worthwhile.  These ambiguities detract from the intruder argument, 
and along with the fact that it is a simple solution to a complex problem, weaken the 
overall intruder theory.273 
7.  Class Conflict, Societal Contradictions, Elite Mismanagement Or 
Misbehavior 
This category captures several different popular theories of “class conflict, 
Marxian contradictions and elite misbehavior or mismanagement,” with a common theme 
of an antagonistic relationship between social classes which each have differing goals.274   
This broad topic is designed to capture the various arguments that discuss the societal 
nature of civilization, class struggles, and how the various hierarchies of societies either 
aid in the resilience of or hasten the demise of said society. 
Robert Erwin states that “civilizations gain more or less stamina according to how 
widely they diffuse operational responsibility.”275  One of Erwin’s supporting examples 
for this statement are the Indus civilization, which was very hierarchical in structure, with 
a large amount of control concentrated in a few individuals on top of the masses, and how 
quickly they crumbled when the Aryans attacked them.  He also contrasts this with the 
Egyptians and the Chinese, two cultures that have been resilient in the face of adversity.  
The Egyptians believed they were part of one “household” and were able to bounce back 
after invasion by the Hyksos.  The Chinese believed that the Emperor was the divine 
portal between god and all mankind, and were able to absorb many intruders.276 
Mancur Olson takes a different angle.  He writes that “small groups are more 
likely to organize than large ones,”277 and uses this logic to postulate that a society with 
small, special interest groups, such as factory workers, or professional associations are 
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more likely to collectively bargain for a common goal than a large group, such as all 
taxpayers, or all consumers.278  Olson spells out nine implications that this can have on a 
society.  One of the main premises of his argument is that some small groups will work to 
increase the interests of the group above the interests of others, at all costs. “This would 
include choosing polices that, though inefficient for the society as a whole, were 
advantageous for the organized groups because the costs of the policies fell 
disproportionately on the unorganized.”279  Furthermore, it is normally not in the best 
interests of the group to lobby for a positive change for the whole society, because each 
member of the group will only gain as much as every other member of society.  By 
advocating a special policy for the group only, each group member derives a much larger 
benefit than they would if the policy was the same for the whole society.  An example of 
this might be artificially raising the price or lowering the tax on a manufactured good for 
one sector, in which that sector will then see an increase in their wages due to larger 
profits.  However, this is grossly inefficient for the society as a whole, and distorts the 
market and what resources the society has for other activities.280  Ultimately, these 
special interest groups inefficiently reallocate resources to meet their own self-serving 
purposes, and the end result is to reduce the overall rate of economic growth for the 
whole society.281 
Robert Hamblin and Brian Pitcher discuss the role of class conflict in the Classic 
Maya collapse.  Hamblin and Pitcher assert that there was a shift from subsistence 
farming to an organized agricultural system.  The shift was probably made in order to 
support population growth. This new system was managed by the Mayan elites, and “the 
intensive agriculture probably resulted in the displacement of the peasants from their 
land, turning them into an agricultural proletariat who were increasingly exploited.”282  
The peasant rebellions that eventually followed may have been led by a class of priests 
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that served the god Chac and other agricultural gods.  These men were marginalized, and 
not regarded with the same respect as elite priests who served the Classic Mayan gods, 
but were educated enough to be able to capitalize off the peasant injustices and 
successfully lead a rebellion.283 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, a social scientist, notes four categories of internal political 
problems that empires experience.  They are: 
General pressure on resources caused by the extravagances of the 
emperors and the bureaucracies, the rulers’ and bureaucracies’ faulty 
administration and inefficiency in dealing with concrete administrative 
problems, crises focusing around the distribution of power among 
different groups and regions, and crises in the relations between the rulers 
and the cultural elites, or strong competition among these elites.284 
These four issues are directly implicating elite mismanagement of resources and 
societal conflict as the major causes of internal strife in an empire.  The ruler’s 
autonomous goals require a constant need for additional resources, higher spending and 
the resulting higher taxes and inflation that follow drain the resources of the very groups 
that are providing these resources to the ruler.  These goals counter long term economic 
policies that are pro-growth, and instead favor short term policies that provide more 
resources in the present.  By subjugating the long term strategy to fulfill the needs of the 
present, the ruling elite hamper the growth of the economy.  Eventually, the peasants and 
urban elite’s resources become depleted, which makes them more dependent on the 
aristocracy for sustenance.  All of these factors decrease the resilience of the economy to 
be able to deal with external shocks to the system effectively. 285  Eisenstadt is painting a 
picture of how higher spending, and taxes by the rulers of the country can ruin an 
economy, because the excessive demands on limited resources strain the economy to a 
breaking point.  This example of the negative effects that elite mismanagement can have 
on the economy of an empire is a lucid one, which may have applicability in the case of 
the United States. 
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Gordon Willey and Demitri Shimkin discuss internal factors in the collapse of the 
Lowland Mayan civilization.  They attribute the collapse to a variety of internal factors.  
One factor is the intensification of agriculture, to allow for more manpower for non-food 
producing activities.  This may have led the Mayans to become more susceptible to 
shocks to the system if the agricultural yields fell below the level needed to sustain life.  
Another factor is the secondary effects of the land clearance for intense agriculture, such 
as lower yields on animal protein due to deforestation of habitats, lack of cooking fuel 
and threats of disease once wild animals and the population cohabitated the same 
areas.286  These two factors point to resource mismanagement by the elites.  Another 
factor, competition of ceremonial centers, was already mentioned in the section on 
competition of other complex societies, but in this example, also contributes because it is 
another example of elite mismanagement of resources.  The priests were more focused on 
drawing wealth and constituents to their temples that to looking out for the good of the 
people under their religious care.287  A fourth factor, is the “peasant revolt” or “peasant 
collapse”288 due to the societal conflict between the commoners and the elite.  Willey and 
Shimkin cites several examples, including differences in skeletal sizes, which denotes 
differing levels of nutrition, recruitment or capture of rival tribesman to maintain the 
economic base of commoners and also state that “the upper class continued to grow and 
to expand its demands for luxury and funerary splendor.”289  The fifth and final factor 
that is cited as a possible factor contributing to collapse is increased resource allocation to 
long distance trade.  Not only would this have contributed to the imbalance in resource 
allocation, and managerial mismanagement but may have incited external hostilities with 
Mexican societies that could have capitalized on stealing from the wealthy but 
decentralized Mayans.290 
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In terms of Rome, Mazzarino cites Ammianus Marcellinus his view that 
overbearing taxation combined with the growth in the bureaucracy contributed to 
“Roman decadence.”291  Aurelio Bernardi echoes this, and goes further to state that the 
Roman decadence caused the collapse of the Empire.292  He talks about how traveling 
and vacations were popular, and also cites Diocletian’s Edict of Prices in 301 A.D. as 
listing a large number of luxury items, which has an implication of widespread use of 
these items by the Roman populace.293  He also mentions how some emperors, such as 
Constantine, lavished gifts upon their favorite subjects, adding to the problem.294  W. L 
Westermann also discusses the luxuries of the elites in Roman times.  He not only talks 
about the trade with India that saw a large amount of gold leave the Empire, he also 
discusses the prevalence of household slavery as a luxury to the wealthy.295 
Interestingly, both Bernardi and Westermann discuss land policies in the later 
Roman Empire that brought a short term profit but created a long term societal rift and 
decreasing output.  It became the policy of the emperor to lease public lands to increase 
agricultural output.  Also, large landowners subsumed the peasants in their area to work 
the lands they owned.  This combined with other poor policies, such as assigning lands of 
no value to a local landowner, who was forced to cultivate the land at great expense to 
him in order to pay the taxes on the land.  These policies forced people off their lands and 
into the servitude of large land barons that gave them protection from tax collectors and 
provided them with sustenance in exchange for working the land.  This all resulted in an 
overall decrease in output over the long run.296 
There are a multitude of arguments here that boil down to some type of conflict, 
whether peasant, societal or class oriented and elite mismanagement of resources.  These 
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two arguments have some inconsistencies.  For example, “class conflict theories must at 
some point make the argument that complex societies come ultimately to violate one of 
the tenets of their existence.”297  By this, the ruling elite cannot survive without the 
population that supports it.  It also raises the question as to why some societies collapse 
because of overbearing taxes, and why some do not.298  A recognition that “some elites 
behave rationally and some don’t…is not illuminating.”299  This does not add a definitive 
reason for collapse.  “If the Roman elite class, for example, was corrupt and exploitative 
by the first century B.C. (as many argue), and if this led to collapse, why then did the 
Western Empire survive until the fifth century A.D.?”300  If mismanagement is 
considered to be systemic to all hierarchies, then it is a function of society that cannot be 
escaped and cannot be a cause for collapse.301  The peasant revolt scenario also has its 
weaknesses.  Eisenstadt contends that peasants usually turn to wealthy landowners for 
protection as their main weapon for passive resistance.  He also states that more radical, 
“well-organized social and political movements” like the ones seen in France, are “rarely 
employed by peasant groups.”302 
8.  Social Dysfunction 
Social dysfunction as a cause for collapse is one theory.  Paul Martin, George 
Quimby and Donald Collier postulate that the Pueblo Indians collapsed under such a 
problem.  The Pueblo Indians had learned to live in small towns, and functioned well in 
this environment.  The theory is that when several towns came together to share resources 
such as “defense, preparation of fields, use of a common water supply, manufacture of 
one style of pottery and basketry, etc,”303 the Indians functioned well initially.  However, 
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it appears that “the material aspects of Pueblo culture became adjusted to large-town 
existence, but the social and religious organizations were unchanged and continued to 
function in terms of small (clan) town units.”304  As a result, Martin, Quimby and Collier 
assert that after a while the towns collapsed and each clan or family unit packed up and 
moved elsewhere.   Jonathan Friedman, in his analysis of various societal structures, 
writes, “History is built on the failure of social forms as much as on their success.  If 
social forms fail, it is because they have laws of their own whose purpose is other than 
making optimal use of their techno- environment.”305  In other words, Friedman’s view is 
that the society determines its fate by how it structures its internal and external 
relationships.  These views are not satisfactory explanations of collapse because they 
“offer neither sources of stress nor causal mechanisms that can be analyzed in any 
objective manner.”306 
9.  Mystical Factors 
Mystical factors are a popular theory for collapse, however, they “contain no 
reference to empirically knowable processes.”307  Instead, terms like “decadence, vigor 
or senility,” pervade the literature, drawing the conclusion that a decadent society is 
going to collapse.308  Many authors resort to making judgments that are subjective in 
nature, based on the author’s opinion.309  Nonetheless, this area of collapse literature still 
merits review. 
Mazzarino, in his preface states that one of the purposes of his book is to 
“describe the history of the ideas of ‘decadence’ and the ‘death of Rome’.”310  Mazzarino 
cites multiple primary sources for which mystical reasons of decline and collapse 
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resonate. He cites Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, who, during the second century 
B.C. argued that “Carthage must be left standing, since its existence was necessary to 
prevent the decadence of the Roman State.”311  He writes of Polybius, a historian who 
wrote of Rome, and how “the pride and luxury, will give rise to decadence.”312  Polybius 
was concerned with both internal and external factors in the decay of Rome, and 
decadence was a central internal theme of his.313  Sallust was one of the first to use the 
term ‘decline’ in Roman writing to denote “decline of the state.”314  He took decadence 
to another level, commenting that “everything born must die.”315  St. Ambrose, the 
Bishop of Milan spoke of a moral crisis, and during the same time period Vegetius also 
cautioned against the decadence of Rome.316  Around 410 A.D., when Alaric sacked the 
city of Rome, Orientus wrote Commonitorium, a poem about the sins of Rome and how 
the divine judgement of God was upon the empire.317  In 416.A.D. another Christian poet 
wrote the Carmen de providentia with a similar theme, echoing the sentiment that God’s 
wrath was the cause of the Gothic invasion.318  In 1540-1543, Rheticus, a pupil of 
Copernicus, in wrote in his Narratio prima:  
We see that all monarchies have their beginning when the centre of the 
eccentric comes to be in a certain notable point of the terrestrial orbit.  
Thus when the sun’s eccentricity was greatest the Roman Empire passed 
into a monarchical form and, as the eccentricity diminished, so the empire, 
as it grew older, became less and completely disappeared.319 
His contemporary, Jean Bodin, a French historian, had a different view.  He 
believed that the perfect number 496 was the determining factor in the birth and death of 
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states.320  Otto Seeck, a historian of the late nineteenth century, argued that Romans 
married not for love, but were betrothed for a dowry, and he asserted that the best men of 
the empire disappeared through demographic decay, bringing the end of the empire.321  
Mazzarino has compiled a large number of first-hand accounts and historical references 
to support his theory of decadence and the collapse of Rome. 
Arnold Hugh Martin Jones cites a “decline in public spirit in the later Roman 
Empire,” and waning civic patriotism as contributing factors.322  He also notes that the 
Christian Church was teaching that imperial service was sinful.  The church also taught 
that only heaven mattered, and “that the things of this world did not matter, may have 
caused apathy and defeatism.”323  Edward Gibbon, in what may be the most famous 
historical account of the Roman Empire “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,” also 
implicates Christianity as a cause for collapse.  “The introduction, or at least the abuse, of 
Christianity had some influence on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.”324  He 
goes on to discuss how the clergy taught patience, but discouraged the “active virtues of 
society,” “military spirit were buried in the cloister,” and both public and private wealth 
went to charity.325  Gibbon goes so far as to say that “the Roman world was oppressed by 
a new species of tyranny.”326 
Oswald Spengler writes about civilizations as if they were their own living being.  
“A culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the proto-spirituality 
of ever-childish humanity and detaches itself, a form from the formless, a bounded and 
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mortal thing from the boundless and enduring.”327  He also states that “Every culture 
passes through the age-phases of the individual man.  Each has its childhood, youth, 
manhood, and old age.”328  Spengler thought that a civilization dies much like a human.  
“At last, in the grey dawn of Civilization, the fire in the soul dies down.”329  Arnold 
Toynbee, a contemporary and critic of Spengler took a different view.  His life work A 
Study of History, is twelve volumes.  His main theory is that of “challenge and 
response.”330  Basically, that a civilization faces challenges, which help it grow, until it is 
no longer able to meet those challenges, and then collapses.331 
There are three problems throughout mystical explanations that are prevalent in 
many authors such as Spengler and Toynbee.  They are, “reliance on a biological growth 
analogy, reliance on value judgments and explanation by reference to intangibles.”332  
The biological analogy does not advance an understanding of collapse, because unlike a 
human body that has a scientifically proven biological path, no such path can be proven 
for a civilization.  The problem with value judgments is that they are unscientific and 
therefore cannot be proven.333  Robert Merrihew Adams, in his book Decadent Societies, 
gives a counterpoint to the decadence as a cause for collapse argument.  Adams states 
that; 
…we cannot seriously suppose that major political structures disintegrate 
from anyone’s indulgence in excessive food, drink or sex.  No, the 
mechanisms of social disintegration have to be somehow proportionate to 
the dimensions of the resulting downfall.334 
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The third point about reference to intangibles is just that.  Once again, it is 
impossible to prove these intangible ideas and they can therefore be dismissed.  Other 
arguments such as numerology or astrology or reproduction and marriage are also equally 
useless without any tangible evidence.335 
In addition to these thoughts, there are several counterpoints to the argument that 
Christianity was the cause of the fall of Rome.  Westermann uses papyri writings and 
population studies to conclude that there was no appreciable Christian population in the 
Roman Empire before 300 A.D. He concludes that the lack of Christians means a lack of 
Christian influence, and therefore Christianity could not have been a factor in the collapse 
of the empire.336  Bury counters this argument with more vigor.  He contends that the 
notion that Christianity led to the demise of Rome is not only false, but that the opposite 
was true.  He discusses how the Church would have been a unifying force.  He also 
refutes the assertion that Christian teaching would go against defense of the empire.  
Additionally, Bury cites a text where St. Augustine shows that Christianity does not 
condemn all warfare.337  In all, mystical arguments are not useful for analyzing collapse, 
because “none has isolated causal mechanism that provides any grounds for building a 
scientific theory.”  In other words, mystical factors cannot be scientifically proven, so 
they are useless for collapse analysis. 
10.  Chance of Concatenation Of Events 
To concatenate by definition is “to link together in a series or chain.”338  
Therefore, a chance concatenation of events is a random series of events linked together 
by chance.  John Bagnell Bury, in his classic work “A History of the Later Roman 
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Empire,” attaches no single event or date to the “Fall of the Western Empire.”339  His 
larger point is that historically speaking, there is no such thing as a “Western Roman 
Empire,” for although there was more than one emperor at certain times, having a divided 
empire goes against what constitutes an empire to begin with.340  He says, that instead, 
the Roman Empire was “in the process of disintegration”341 throughout the entire fifth 
century.  He sets the stage with several events such as “the usurpation of Magnentius, the 
battle of Hadrianople, the consulate of Merobaudes,… Alaric’s invasion,” of Rome in 
410 A.D.342 
Bury’s hypothesis is that, “The gradual collapse of the Roman power in this 
section of the Empire was the consequence of a series of contingent events (emphasis in 
original).  No general causes can be assigned that made it inevitable.”343  The 
contingencies were: (1) “the irruption of the Huns in Europe,” which “drove the 
Visigoths into the Illyrian provinces,” (2) the death of an incompetent emperor, (3) his 
successor, Theodosius, “who allowed a whole federate nation to settle on provincial soil” 
died early, and (4) his son, Honorius, who became emperor, was “a feeble-minded 
boy.”344  Additionally, Honorius’ guardian was Stilicho, a half- German Roman who 
betrayed the Empire through his poor policy caused civil war.345  Finally, the Roman 
army had become too reliant upon barbarians to man the army, which led to the 
dismemberment of the Empire.346  Bury actually assigns the fall of Irene in 802 A.D. as 
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the date of the end of the Roman Empire.347  Willey and Shimkin also give a general 
overview of a multitude of factors in the collapse of the Lowland Mayan Civilization.  
These factors include immense population growth, competition between socio-political 
centers, class divisions, budding militarism, increased military and economic pressures, a 
breakdown in trade, and agricultural problems, which all contributed in their own way to 
the collapse.348 
This argument cannot be generalized to a theory, because a number of random 
factors causing collapse do not provide a construct with which to evaluate other societies 
under similar circumstances.349  “There is some validity to the notion that random factors 
influence all processes,” but this is not able to be replicated, and therefore cannot explain 
collapse in a global context.350 
11.  Economic Factors 
Economic factors are the final area requiring review.  Economic explanations are 
varied but can be condensed into several themes.  Some of these themes are “declining 
advantages of complexity, increasing disadvantages of complexity or increasing 
costliness of complexity.”351 
Colin Turnbull writes of the Ik, a tribe in Africa that is a modern example of both 
a loss of complexity and of economic collapse.  “They live in the North of Uganda, on 
the borders of Sudan and Kenya,” however, their hunting grounds used to extend across 
the borders of all three countries, until the governments of the other countries kicked 
them out of their hunting grounds.352  Because of the interesting climate and rain and 
flood patterns, the Ik tribe used to travel in a pattern over mountain and desert terrain as 
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nomad hunter gatherers, following the game, until governments discovered them and 
kicked them out of most of their tribal hunting grounds.353  This had a profound effect on 
their internal economy.  The Ik were starving, so they took to terrace farming, and cattle 
raiding, but several droughts later, even this was not enough to provide enough food to 
survive.  They started not feeding the old, and the young, letting them fend for 
themselves or die.  The Ik could not afford even the most basic human luxuries of 
“generosity, kindness, compassion, considerateness, affection, even love.”354  
“Ultimately, the family disappeared, for the Ik had developed their survival organization 
to the point where family was replaced by system.”355  Mothers wean their children at 
age three and let them fend for themselves.  Packs of children scavenge together to 
survive, and when they reach the age of 13, they are adults, on their own for life.356  This 
harsh survival is necessitated by a collapse in a hunter-gatherer economy. Turnbull states, 
“Society itself has died.”357  At this point, the Ik have the lowest social complexity 
available, the individual human.   
Owen Lattimore discusses economic collapse in terms of the Chinese dynastic 
cycle.  His words are succinct yet revealing: 
The rise and fall of dynasty after dynasty is a calendar of recurrent events.  
First, increasing returns as the result of concentrating people in favorable 
areas in order to organize them for water-conservancy works on a large 
scale and for the practice of agriculture.  Second, apparent stability as 
production reached its peak by means of these activities…Third, 
diminishing returns, because the social system emphasized large families, 
while the economic system resisted new kinds of activity to employ the 
surplus manpower…Fourth, agrarian risings which destroyed the state but 
did not open up a way to build a new kind of state. 358 
Lattimore then shows how eventually a strong man comes in, restores order, and 
starts the whole process of slow economic collapse again.  No change was made to the 
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societal foundation to change this process in any way, so it continued to repeat itself until 
Westerners inserted themselves into the cycle.359 
Bernard Lewis chronicles the decline of the Ottoman Empire as economic in 
nature.  “In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire reached the limits of its expansion, 
and came up against barriers it could not pass.”360  These barriers proved to be both 
geographical, and ideological, such as fighting other Muslims, when the Empire was 
accustomed to fighting a holy war on infidels.  They advanced on Europe, and after 
conquering Hungary, they advanced to Vienna on September 27, 1529.  On October 15, 
the army retreated, and from this point on was in a position where it had to defend the 
loss of its territory, never to expand again.361  This began a decline in military training, 
readiness and an empire once on the cutting edge of military science found itself behind 
its enemies in Europe.  This was exacerbated by “a general deterioration in profession 
and moral standards in the armed forces, parallel to that of the bureaucratic and religious 
classes.”362 
The Ottoman Empire experienced a major shift in its economic, social and 
political fabric when it could no longer expand.  Much like the early Roman Empire, 
which relied heavily upon geographic expansion to subsidize the increasing costs of the 
empire,363 the Ottoman Empire was similarly structured, and felt the shock as a result.364  
Additionally, new trade routes by European explorers were circumventing the Ottoman 
Empire, which had a marked effect on trade.  At one time the Muslims would have traded 
the luxuries of India and China to Europeans, now the Europeans were selling these 
goods to the Muslims at a hefty profit.365  Then, American gold and silver flooded the 
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Ottoman Empire.  This created a monetary crisis of epic proportions that had never been 
seen before.  Debasement of the currency and control of the money supply in times of 
austerity were well known to the Turkish rulers, but the sudden excess supply made silver 
fall by 70 percent and gold by 100 percent.  European money exchangers sent money to 
Turkey, to resell it for a profit.  This ended up draining the Turkish Treasury.  The 
monetary crisis also resulted in a price increase on goods that was devastating to the 
populace.366 
At the same time, the Ottoman’s “were compelled to embark on a great expansion 
in its salaried personnel and a great increase in expenditure in coin.”367  This resulted in a 
shift from the sipahis, or cavalrymen, who were paid in fiefdoms, to a salaried 
professional soldier.  This policy spelled the end of the sipahis, who were the foundation 
of the agrarian economy.  Without sipahis to run agricultural fiefs, the agrarian economy 
collapsed.368  The shrinking economy had to support a growing number of palatial, 
bureaucratic, religious and military personnel.  This need for increased revenue led to tax 
farming, but much of the money collected went to the corrupt tax farmers, not the 
government.  Lewis relates that this was a much larger public support structure than the 
Roman Empire or any medieval state.369  The other contributing problem was that the 
financial sector, bankers and merchants, were Christians or Jews, and considered second 
class citizens in a Muslim land.  They did not have the political support needed to “create 
political conditions more favorable to commerce or to build up any solid structure of 
banking and credit.”370  “The peace treaty of Carlowitz, signed on 26 January 1699, 
marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another.  This was the first time that the 
Ottoman Empire signed a peace as the defeated power in a clearly decided war.”371 
                                                 
366 Lewis, “Decline of the Ottoman Empire” in Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires, 223–224. 
367 Lewis, “Decline of the Ottoman Empire” in Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires, 224. 
368 Lewis, “Decline of the Ottoman Empire” in Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires, 224–225. 
369 Lewis, “Decline of the Ottoman Empire” in Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires, 225. 
370 Lewis, “Decline of the Ottoman Empire” in Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires, 226. 
371 Lewis, “Decline of the Ottoman Empire” in Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires, 231. 
 71 
These economic theories have some merits beyond other arguments previously 
addressed.  Tainter identifies three supporting arguments for the economic argument.  
First, economic theories attempt to identify specific internal factors of weakness that 
caused collapse, as opposed to simply looking at characteristics of the society.  Second, 
“economic explanations identify a specific mechanism or event controlling change.”372  
Finally, “economic models identify a definite causal chain between the controlling 
mechanism and the observed outcome.”373  The economic models reviewed are not 
without weaknesses, as they only look at one case, instead of generalizing to a greater 
theory.374  However, the economic argument also has the potential to include multiple 
factors already discussed in its framework, such as resources, conflict, mismanagement, 
weakness to intruders and other arguments as well.  They can all be explained within the 
framework of economics. 
Joseph Tainter also regards collapse as an economic problem, but from the strict 
perspective of declining marginal returns in relation to the increasing costs of 
complexity.375  Tainter uses four concepts to help explain his theory of collapse.  They 
are: 
“1. human societies are problem-solving organizations, 2. sociopolitical 
systems require energy for their maintenance, 3. increased complexity 
carries with it increased costs per capita, and 4. investment in 
sociopolitical complexity as a problem-solving response often reaches a 
point of declining marginal returns.”376 
Tainter’s first three points all support the final point, and the final point is the 
basis of his economic collapse theory. Humans need to problem solve to survive, and 
societies provide problem solving organizations.  Humans also need energy to survive.  
Energy is used to get food, water, shelter, and protection.  Energy is also used to maintain 
sociopolitical organizations.  By organizing into a society, the complexity has increased.  
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With increased complexity comes an increase in the need for energy, just to maintain the 
sociopolitical structure.  This increase in complexity also comes with an increased cost 
per person or per capita.377 
Tainter’s also states that as a society evolves, or grows more complex, greater 
resources are needed to maintain the level of complexity attained.  Initially, as the 
simplest and least expensive solutions are implemented, the benefit may be high relative 
to the costs.  The society may encounter more difficult problems, which then require 
more costly solutions.  At each successive problem, problem solving involves increasing 
complexity, but by doing so, it holds higher costs for that society but has a diminishing 
return.378  Once that point is reached, no matter how many resources are invested in 
attaining another level of complexity, the marginal return will still be diminishing.379  At 
some point, the costs of maintaining the current level of complexity accelerate, and 
become too high.  The society no longer has the ability or the will to invest the resources 
needed to maintain this level of complexity, so the system collapses.380 
In order to further understand this theory, three more economic definitions need to 
be defined: average product, marginal product and the law of diminishing returns.  “The 
marginal product of an input is the extra output produced by 1 additional unit of that 
input while other inputs are held constant.”381  For example, assume by placing one 
worker on a machine, in a manufacturing plant, he or she can produce 100 units of a 
product in one 8 hour shift.  Now if we add another worker (our unit of input) to the same 
machine (because all other things are left constant), and we may be able to increase 
output because the second person can hand parts to the first person, or preassemble 
portions of the product, but with only one machine, they will never be able to product 200 
units together.  They may only be able to produce 180.  The additional 80 units is the 
increase or the marginal product.  Adding a third person to the machine and they may 
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only produce 225, a marginal increase in 40.  The average product is “the total output 
divided by the total units of input.”382  Using this same example, the average product for 
1 person is 100 units of product, for 2 people is 90 units of product (180/2), and for 3 
people  is 75 (225/3).   
This is related to the law of diminishing returns. Samuelson and Nordhaus define 
the law of diminishing returns as follows: 
The law of diminishing returns holds that we will get less and less extra 
output when we add additional doses of an input while holding other 
inputs fixed.  In other words, the marginal product of each unit of input 
will decline as the amount of that input increases, holding all other inputs 
constant.383 
Tainter uses the law of diminishing returns to illustrate how “at some point in the 
evolution of society, continued investment in complexity as a problem-solving strategy 
yields a declining marginal return” per unit of investment.384  Tainter chooses to refer to 
marginal product as marginal return, because whatever the investment society makes in 
complexity, the return that society gets out of the investment might not necessarily be a 
product.385  He also uses a graph to depict the relationship of diminishing returns to 
complexity. 
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Figure 2.   The Marginal Product of Increasing Complexity386  
In Figure 2, point B1/C1 is a point at which “investment in further complexity 
yields increased returns, but at a declining marginal rate.  When this point is reached, a 
complex society enters a phase where it becomes increasingly vulnerable to collapse.”387  
He points out that between B1/C1 and B2/C2 is a point where declining returns start to 
affect the society, and its economy.  “Taxes rise and inflation becomes noticeable.  Prior 
to point B2/C2 investment and intensification can still produce positive benefits, but 
collapse becomes increasingly likely.”388  A society between B2/C2 and B1/C3 is at a 
critical part of the curve.  Increasing investment yields decreasing benefits, to the point 
where investing more yields the same benefits as when between B1/C1 and B2/C2.389  
This can be seen at B1.5, where the benefits of complexity are the same but a 
significantly greater investment was needed to reach the curve between B2/C2 and 
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B1/C3.  “A society at B1/C3 is in serious danger of collapse from decomposition (as well 
as from any external threat).”390 
Tainter uses three examples to prove his point.  He looks at the Western Roman 
Empire, the Classic Maya of the Southern Lowlands and the Chacoan Society of the 
American Southwest.391  Only the Roman example will be examined here because it 
relates to the case study in the next chapter.  The Roman Empire grew through an 
expansionist policy.  The conquest of new lands added large sums of money to the 
Imperial treasury, which many times paid for the conquest and temporarily eliminated the 
need for taxes.  The new lands widened the tax base and added land rentals for additional 
Imperial income.  Many Roman citizens also emigrated into the newly conquered 
lands.392  Once the policy of expansion ceased under Augustus, so did the income from 
conquest.393  The biggest expense of the Roman Empire was maintaining its large 
standing army of 25 legions under Augustus.  Later, Vespasian increased it to 30 
legions.394  Another drain on the treasury was the wheat entitlement given free to the 
citizens of Rome.  The number of people on the dole varied from 150,000 to as much as 
320,000.395  Roughly 90 percent of the Roman economy was agricultural.  Trade and 
industry accounted for only a small part of revenues.  Trade was very expensive due to 
the high cost of over land transportation.  As an agricultural society, the Roman Empire 
was able to make the money it needed through taxes, but was not able to easily respond to 
financial crises.396 
As was already mentioned in the fiscal policy section, the Roman Emperors, 
starting with Nero in A.D. 64, debased the currency when necessary to be able to afford 
to pay the military and other obligations.397  Through a series of crises, costly conquests 
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that were no longer paid for by the plunder taken, and civil war, the Empire was 
faltering.398  Before Diocletian took over in 284 A.D. the government coinage was so 
debased that the economy used payment in kind, and taxes were paid in supplies or 
bullion, not coins.399  Diocletian became Emperor in 284 A.D. and staved off collapse for 
a while, but at a great cost.  He increased the size of the army and the civil service, built a 
series of strategic roads and forts on the frontiers, raised taxes and took away many civil 
liberties.  He introduced a new coin, and issued his Edict of Prices in 301, fixing the price 
for every good, in order to stop hyperinflation.400  However, even these drastic measures 
did not encourage population growth that was desperately needed to increase the 
agricultural output and widen the tax base after two centuries of plague.  Therefore, the 
Empire was never able to fully recover.  The agricultural output shrunk, which had a 
ripple effect throughout the Empire.  Policies were put in place to keep people in 
hereditary occupations, i.e. the son doing the same job as the father, for life and without 
choice.  This also hurt economic output.401  Oppressive taxation caused people to 
abandon their land, joining as serfs for landlords who would feed them and give them 
protection from the tax collectors in exchange for working the land.  This abandonment 
of land also decreased the tax revenues.402  “The decreased manpower and wealth of the 
Western Roman Empire helped contribute to the military successes of the invaders.”403  
Tainter concludes that “Rome’s collapse was due to the excessive costs imposed on an 
agricultural population to maintain a far-flung empire in a hostile environment.”404 
G. SUMMARY 
The eleven different categories of collapse all aid in our understanding of the 
plethora of differing views on collapse.  Many of the factors espoused by these 
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viewpoints are certainly contributing factors in one way or another to the overall collapse 
of a society.  For example, the eruption of a volcano may or may not cause the collapse of 
a society, but it is certainly a stress put on the system, and a contributing factor to the 
decreased resiliency to shocks which that society may face in the future.  Resource 
depletion has its basis in economics, as does weakness to invaders.  A weak economy and 
population cannot support a strong military indefinitely.  By using an anthropologists 
extensive and in depth review of collapse as a basis for this literary review, it has aided in 
the understanding of the application of the scientific method to these varying theories of 
collapse.  There is not an attempt on the part of the author to disprove any theory of 
collapse, for that is not the purpose of this thesis.  However, that was the intent of Tainter 
when he wrote his book, so many of his opinions have shown through the analysis, but 
they have all be referenced in the footnotes.  The purpose of this thesis is to examine 
fiscal policy and its effect on the sustainability or the collapse of the United States.  
Fiscal policy is a part of economics, so the economic theory that Dr. Tainter postulated 
will be the one that is used in the rest of this thesis to examine collapse and decline of 
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II. THE ROMAN CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Roman Empire is the classic example of an ancient empire that collapsed.  
Why did it collapse, and what implications does the Roman experience have for 
informing the current U.S. situation?  The Roman Empire was by its very nature a 
complex society, spanning across the Mediterranean, with the peoples of many different 
languages and cultures under its umbrella of protection.  In this respect, Rome is similar 
to the United States, as the U.S. is a nation with a very diverse population.  Rome has 
some other striking similarities that make it a valuable case study to compare with the 
United States.  It “was massive, heavily populated and rich.”405  Rome “had a transport 
system of all-weather roads and busy commercial routes by river, canal and sea on a scale 
unmatched again in Europe until recent centuries.”406  Rome had some of the comforts of 
the modern world, to include: “glass windows, central heating, bath houses.”407  Also, the 
Roman military was “a large, sophisticated, permanent and professional force backed by 
an extensive logistical system.”408  Some of these facts help set the stage for the Roman 
case study and its relevance to the United States. 
This case study will show how the grand strategy of the Roman Empire was 
disconnected from its fiscal policy.  The Roman Empire understood security, as it was the 
premier fighting force of its time, but it did not understand the relationship between 
security and economic prosperity.  It will also draw parallels with the United States, in an 
effort to make comparisons between the issues facing Rome and the issues facing the 
modern day United States.  Although it is true that in many ways, Rome and the U.S. are 
vastly different, there are still enough similarities that will help to illuminate areas where 
the U.S. can learn from the mistakes of the Romans. 
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B. ROME 
The Roman Empire did not start as an empire, it started as a republic.  Historians 
disagree when the Republic actually began, and there are multiple historical narratives on 
how the Republic was founded.409 However, at some point in time between the 6th and 
3rd centuries B.C. a Roman Republic emerged.410 The Roman Republic expanded 
through multiple conquests which benefitted the Roman Empire.   The following areas 
were conquered by the Republic, bringing large monetary surpluses to the Roman 
treasury: Macedonia in 167 B.C, the Kingdom of Pergamon in 130 B.C., Syria in 63 B.C. 
and Gaul under Julius Caesar. 411 Later in his reign, internal strife led to the murder of 
Caesar in 44 B.C.  His adopted son, Octavian, defeated Marc Antony in the Battle of 
Actium in 31 B.C.  Octavian, better known as Augustus, became the first Roman 
Emperor in 27 B.C.412  Augustus determined that the Republic must die and that the 
power of rule must rest with one individual.  He did this by declaring himself First 
Citizen.  The people were willing to hand over the power of the Roman Senate to him 
because he was able to provide for their needs.  By diminishing the political freedoms of 
the Romans, Augustus was able to increase the economic freedoms, and usher in a period 
of economic prosperity.413  This was how the Roman Republic transitioned into 
becoming the Roman Empire, with Augustus as its Emperor.    
Augustus ended the policy of expansion after he conquered Egypt.414  So 
effectively, almost all of the Roman Empire’s expansion was done while still a Republic.  
There were a few deviations from this, for example, Claudius’s conquest of Britain and 
Trajan’s conquest of Dacia,415 but in general, the emperors of the Principate just 
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maintained the borders set by Augustus.416 Once Augustus ended the policy of Roman 
expansion, he had to come up with a different grand strategy.  This strategy will be 
referred to as the policy of consolidation.  By abandoning the policy of expansion, 
Augustus concentrated on the consolidation of the empire and the defense of its borders.  
However, this posed a significant fiscal risk.   
Geographic expansion under the Republic had served to fill the Roman coffers 
and in some cases, such as conquering Macedonia in 167 B.C. led to the abolition of 
taxes.  Expansion also served to widen the agricultural base, and required subjugated 
peoples to pay tribute, taxes and land rentals to the government, further adding to the net 
benefits of expansion.  In many cases, the plunder associated with the expansion more 
than paid for the cost of the military campaign, making expansion a compelling policy.417  
However, it was not a sustainable model, and when Augustus ended the policy of 
expansion,418 the Roman economy had gotten used to an unsustainable economic model 
that was largely unchanged over the entire history of the empire. Therefore, expansionist 
policy during the Republic had been a significant fiscal stimulus that had been relied 
upon by the government to help subsidize the cost of expansion and subsidize the 
standing army that made it possible.  When this was no longer an available option for 
revenue, the Augustus had to resort to taxing his people.   
Many consider Augustus to be the most brilliant of the tax strategists in the 
Roman Empire, 419 because he was able to revitalize the economy through his tax policy 
changes. 420   Augustus used direct taxation, which had the effect of stabilizing the tax 
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system, and of getting rid of tax farmers, because there was no longer an incentive to 
collect taxes without a way to distort the tax burden and make usurious profits.421 
Tax farmers were often utilized to collect provincial taxes. They would 
pay in advance for the right to collect taxes in particular areas… thus the 
collections by tax farmers had to provide sufficient revenues to repay their 
advance to the state plus enough to cover the opportunity cost of the funds 
(i.e., interest), the transactions cost of converting collections into cash, and 
a profit as well...Augustus ended tax farming, however, due to complaints 
from the provinces. Interestingly, their protests not only had to do with 
excessive assessments by the tax farmers, as one would expect, but were 
also due to the fact that the provinces were becoming deeply indebted.422 
Augustus then changed the tax system in the Roman Empire.  With the new 
system he almost completely eliminated the need for tax collectors at the central 
government level and decentralized tax collections, putting the burden on the cities, 
which saved the emperor money. He used a 1 percent sales tax and imposed a 5 percent 
inheritance tax, in order to fund military retirements.  To start this fund, he donated 170 
million sesterces of his own money.  Soldiers received 12,000 sesterces after 20 years of 
service.423 The provinces now paid a wealth tax of about 1 percent and a flat poll or head 
tax on each adult.424 
The shift to flat assessments based on wealth and population both 
regularized the yield of the tax system and greatly reduced its 
"progressivity." …thus any increase in income accrued entirely to the 
people and did not have to be shared with Rome… this was obviously a 
great incentive to produce, since the marginal tax rate above the tax 
assessment was zero.425 
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By promoting a system that decentralized the collection of taxes to the provinces 
and local cities, Augustus ultimately saved money, and made the process more efficient, 
because the cost of a tax collector traveling to the far reaches of the Roman Empire was 
eliminated.  Now only the provinces had to forward the collected taxes to Rome.  
Additionally, he encouraged prosperity, because there was now an incentive to earn more 
money.  Once the fixed taxes were paid, the individual kept the rest of the money.  This 
led to a sharp increase in the money supply, but prices remained constant.426  During this 
period there were also a significantly higher number of shipwrecks, suggesting that 
exports increased.427  “Interest rates also fell to the lowest levels in Roman history in the 
early part of Augustus's reign.”428  Tiberius (14-37 A.D.) continued Augustus’s free 
market policies, which helped to grow the economy and establish a strong middle class, 
which Tiberius believed would be the backbone of the Roman Empire.429 
This is an important parallel with the United States.  The lesson that can be drawn 
from this is that when faced with fiscal difficulties, Augustus restructured the Roman tax 
system, making it easier to understand, and cheaper to implement.  This in turn 
incentivized people to grow more crops, because they knew that regardless of how much 
they grew, they would pay their taxes and be able to keep the rest.  One a certain tax 
environment had been established, the economy started to grow, and the government 
benefitted from it with increased revenues, and decreased costs in implementing the tax 
code. 
The Roman economy was mostly agricultural in nature.430  This is evidenced by 
fact that approximately 90 percent of the Imperial revenue was from agriculture.431  As a 
result, most of the taxes were levied based on agricultural yields from the land.  
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Agricultural problems stemmed more from organization and labor that actual agricultural 
productivity due to quality of soil.432  This was problematic as agricultural yields were 
highly dependent on factors such as rainfall, and most importantly, labor.  As a result, 
drought, wars, plagues and natural disasters greatly affected agricultural yield.  While 
drought is obvious, wars and plagues both negatively affected the working population.  
Since men both tilled the land and filled the ranks of the military, human capital, and in 
the case of the Romans, male human capital, was really the most precious resource of the 
empire.  This was especially evident during the reign of Marcus Aurelius from 161-180 
A.D., when there were two major crises.  A plague that started in about 165 or 166 A.D. 
and lasted for 15 years killed as much as one third of the population in some areas.  Also, 
he spent much of his reign fighting Germanic tribes.433  These two crises were a huge 
drain of human capital, which was needed in the form of manpower for both economic 
output for farming and manpower for military strength in the face of enemy attack.  
Marcus Aurelius was so desperate for money, not only did he raise taxes, debase the 
currency and used his predecessor’s entire surplus, but he also sold the Imperial valuables 
at public auction.434    This is clear evidence of the negative affect that lack of manpower 
necessary for farming had on the primitive Roman economy. 
There were several other components of the economy that are important to 
mention, namely industry, trade and finance.435  Industry never progressed beyond the 
homemaker, shopkeeper or large estate level, where one or several people were making 
all the goods by hand.436  Trade was very expensive, as the cost of overland 
transportation was prohibitive for any items that were not both small and light or of 
significant value, such as luxury items.  Sea borne transportation was the most 
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economical way to transport anything of significant weight.437  It was not always 
reliable, as seasonal weather patterns affected shipping, however it was still preferred, 
because “it was less costly to ship grain from one end of the Mediterranean to the other 
than to cart it 120 kilometers” (74.56 miles).438  It was also stimulated by the massive 
amounts of imports of grain, wine and other goods that were needed to feed the 
population of Rome.  The government had to control the shipments and regulate the grain 
market in Rome in order to effectively feed its citizens.  This was very expensive though, 
because the Roman citizens did not contribute to the economy, but instead were fed using 
the taxes from the rest of the Empire.  Some emperors attempted to limit the number of 
people being fed by the Empire, but were largely unsuccessful.439 The finances of the 
Empire were all done in hard currency.  There was not an extensive network of credit or 
loans. 440 
The lack of available credit and the lack of economic diversity of the Roman 
Empire made it especially susceptible to economic crisis.  Since over 90 percent of the 
revenue was through one source, agriculture, this left the empire strategically vulnerable.  
There was no built in resiliency, and no real mechanism by which the Emperor could 
borrow money in times of crisis.  This lack of available credit is an important difference 
between the Romans and the U.S., but the reliance upon one sector of the economy is not.  
While the Romans relied too heavily on agriculture, the United States relies far too 
heavily on the service sector.  In 2007 services accounted for 78.5 percent of GDP and 
manufacturing accounted for 20.5 percent.  Although agriculture is still an important 
industry in America, it only contributed 1 percent toward GDP. 441  This over reliance on 
one sector of the economy affected the resiliency of the Roman Empire, and poses a 
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serious threat to the resiliency of the modern day United States.  Although the Romans 
had no system of credit, the U.S. is at the opposite end of the spectrum, relying very 
heavily on borrowing, which poses a different strategic vulnerability.    
The Emperor’s rule was tenuous, and the disconnect between fiscal policy and 
grand strategy of the Empire reflected this.  The Roman Army was the number one 
expense for the Roman Empire.442  The Emperor increasingly derived much of his power 
from control of the Army.443  Many times Emperors, such as Septimius Severus and 
Caracalla used pay increases to win the support of the Army.444  Another significant 
expense was the entitlement spending or the public dole.445  This dole was paid directly 
out of the emperor’s personal wealth, and in some ways was another way to derive 
power.  By bribing the people of the city of Rome, the Emperor was less likely to face 
civil unrest within the capital city.446  The bureaucracy or civil service was a significant 
and growing expense throughout the history of the empire as well.447  Other expenses 
included other state employees such as those working in Imperial arms factories, public 
works, the postal service, and education.448  
These expenses reflect not only the grand strategy of the empire, but also the 
individual strategy of the Emperor.  Many emperors were simply in survival mode, which 
explains why the two greatest sources of their power, the military and the citizenry of 
Rome, were the two biggest expenses in the Imperial budget.  By concentrating on what 
was going to keep them in power, most Emperors made the optimal decision for placating 
his power base, but at the same time made suboptimal decisions for the sustainability of 
the Empire.  This lack of alignment between strategy and policy, due to the individual 
needs of the Emperor was made at the expense of the Empire.  This is quite relevant to 
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the United States situation, where politicians, more concerned with reelection than with 
the long term consequences of their actions and decisions, make optimal decisions for 
their reelection bid, but make suboptimal decisions for the future viability and the 
sustainability of the United States of America. 
There is a second parallel here that is strikingly similar to the U.S.; the issue of 
entitlement spending.  The entitlement spending or the public dole in Rome was a 
significant cost to the Emperor.  The policy of giving free grain to the citizens of Rome 
originated during the Republic in 58 B.C. and was continued by Augustus, who had 
roughly 200,000 citizens on the dole.449  Over time, this entitlement grew.  Some 
increased the costs of the entitlement by adding additional cities, such as Hadrian 
instituted a dole in the city of Athens,450 and Diocletian, who added Constantinople, and 
an additional 80,000 people.  Other Emperors added the cities of Alexandria and 
Antioch.451  Another way the entitlements were increased was by adding additional 
goods.  Septimius Severus, added oil to the dole.452 Aurelian further increased the cost of 
entitlements to the empire.  Instead of giving grain, he gave baked bread, which alone 
was more expensive because now bakers had to be paid to make the grain into bread.  
Additionally, he added a reduction in the prices of pork, salt and wine to the benefits of 
the Roman citizens.453   On the issue of entitlements, Bernardi notes that “the expansion 
of public expenditure at a time when inflows of treasures from occupied territories were 
dwindling added to the financial difficulties of the state.”454  This holds a direct parallel 
to the United States, which has had significant increases in entitlement spending in recent 
years.  One example of this is President Bush enacting tax cuts and then adding a 
prescription plan to Medicare.  President Obama has further exacerbated the problem by 
adding a national health care initiative during a time of decreased revenues due to 
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economic recession.  The lesson that can be learned here is that while the Roman 
Emperors who added these entitlements did so with great personal success at bribing the 
people, the long term effects of these entitlements put significant pressure on the Roman 
budget.  This is similar to the situation the U.S. is in today, with entitlements growing to 
the point where they cost more than any other part of the budget. 
The growing Roman expenses were increasingly paid for through debasement of 
the silver denarius,  which was the primary Roman currency, and also the currency that 
was used to pay soldiers wages.  This is important to note because it made the most sense 
to debase the currency that was used to pay the army, because the army was the single 
largest expense.  The subject of debasement of currency was briefly explained in the first 
chapter, under the definition of monetary policy, as currency debasement in today’s 
world is considered to be monetary policy, not fiscal policy.  However, in Roman times, 
there was no central bank and no distinction between types of economic policies because 
the policies were all made by the Emperor.  Debasement lead to inflation, which in turned 
eroded the purchasing power of the military and bureaucracy, which were paid in 
coins.455  Currency was made of precious metals, namely silver and gold, and the 
population valued coins based on their metallic content, not their face value.  Therefore, 
the policy of debasement was meaningless to the economy, because people simply 
conducted transactions based on the content of precious metal, not the face value minted 
on the coin.456  Furthermore, people hoarded the coins of higher precious metal content 
and thus higher value and conducted trade and monetary transactions in the coins with the 
least value.457  “Inflation is the expedient governments resort to when, for whatever 
reason, they feel unable to tax.”458  One measure of inflation was the price of a modius of 
wheat (about nine liters).  In the second century it had been priced at one half a denarius, 
but in 335 A.D. it sold for over 6000 denarii and in 338 for over 10,000 denarii.  In 324 
A.D., the gold solidus, a coin introduced by Constantine, was worth 4250 denarii, but by 
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337 A.D. it was worth 250,000 denarii and in 363 A.D. one solidus was worth 30 million 
denarii.459  
The net effect of the policy of debasement was rampant inflation and rising prices, 
which led to more debasement.  This has an important parallel to today’s situation, as the 
Federal Reserve has largely expanded the U.S. money supply through policies such as 
“Quantitative Easing” and “Operation Twist.”  These policies of expanding the money 
supply are just another term for currency debasement.  This had a devastating effect on 
the Roman Empire, and has the potential to damage the U.S. economy in the same way.  
Although no longer changing the base content of a coin, printing additional money has 
the same effect of increasing the money supply, and thereby decreasing the overall value 
of each dollar printed. 
Another problem the Romans faced was that the tax system was inefficient and 
unable to meet the fiscal demands of the empire.  Once Augustus got rid of tax farmers, 
government agents directly collected taxes from the people.  Over time, this 
responsibility was given to the municipalities, who were made up of the more financially 
successful members of Roman society.  If they were not able to collect sufficient taxes, 
then they were personally held liable for the expenses.  As time wore on, the requirement 
to make up the tax deficiencies got worse. This eventually turned the middle class into 
their own form of tax serfdom.460 
The tax policies of the later emperors did not incentivize economic growth, which 
hurt revenues.  Much of the agricultural output was from large estates.  At various points, 
slaves and then later tenants tilled these lands.461  As taxes became more burdensome, 
many small farmers could not escape the tax collectors.  They were forced to seek the 
protection of the large landowners.462  Tenants fleeing their land became common.463  
One policy that aggravated this situation was the enforcement of uncultivated lands.  
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Small landowners were given the uncultivated lands of those who had deserted them, or 
of lands with marginal yield potential.     They were required to pay taxes on the land and 
therefore were forced to cultivate them at great expense to themselves, 464 but with no 
additional labor with which to do so.  This perpetuated the problem, forcing more small 
landowners who could not pay, to seek refuge under large landowners.  This self- 
perpetuating problem led to a high rate of tax evasion.465  Ultimately, the large land 
holdings promoted a decrease in productivity, for there was no incentive for a tenant or 
serf to produce high yields like there had been when most of the empire was subsistence 
farming.466 This additional burden on the farmers who had not fled meant that they either 
could not pay the additional taxes, or it forced them seek the protection of a large 
landowner.  Another poor policy was that certain types of agriculture, such as grape 
vines, were taxed based on the number of vines.  This incentivized landowners to destroy 
crops above the point where the taxes exceeded the value of the income gained, in order 
not to pay additional taxes.467  
Many emperors resorted to tax waivers to alleviate this burden.  Claudius gave 
ship owners a subsidy in order to ensure regular grain shipments to Rome.468  Trajan was 
the first emperor who had to cancel unpaid taxes. Hadrian implemented “tax waivers that 
amounted to almost one-fourth of the annual expenses of the State’s budget.”469  Pertinax 
also canceled the back taxes imposed under Commodus.470  Constantius II gave tax 
exemptions to senators.  Gratianus gave a general amnesty for all tax arrears.471  The year 
313 A.D. is when the first law was published exempting the Christian clergy from some 
of their taxes.  Other laws were passed soon after that completely exempted them from 
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paying taxes.472  There were multiple other examples of exemptions or tax cancellations 
in the years, 363-436, 445,450, and 458 A.D.473 
These fiscal policies were clearly not aligned with the ultimate goal of the 
emperors, which was ultimately to raise more money.  Successive emperors displayed 
poor judgment in making tax policies that exacerbated the problem, such as the required 
cultivation of abandoned land.  This has relevance with today’s situation.  While some 
people evade taxes illegally, many people are able to pay no taxes by simply using the tax 
code to their advantage.  Tax deductions, credits and exemptions are essentially the same 
as the Roman tax waivers.  The wealthy benefit from these, such as the mortgage interest 
deduction, while the members of society who do not own homes are not afforded this 
deduction.  Although thankfully the United States does not literally levy unpaid taxes on 
the neighbor of the offender, there is a parallel here too.  While 47 percent of the U.S. 
population pays no taxes, the other 53 percent have to pay taxes for 100 percent of the 
population.474  This large section of the populace that does not pay taxes places a larger 
tax burden on those who do pay. 
Another problem with the Roman tax system was it did not respond well to crisis.  
“Taxes were initially levied at fixed rates, and were typically not flexible enough to be 
increased in crises.  The government operated strictly on a cash basis and rarely 
borrowed: its budget was at best minimally planned.”475  This changed with Diocletian’s 
tax reforms.  “One of Diocletian’s major accomplishments was to establish the first 
mechanism whereby the rate of tax in any given year could be geared to estimated 
expenditures.”476  Diocletian also resorted to taxing in kind.  Essentially, he levied taxes 
in the form of goods instead of with money.477  This was to avoid having to accept the 
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worthless coinage the government was minting.478  His reforms used the land as the 
primary means of collecting revenue, in order to offset the costs of his administrative 
reforms.479 
The Roman Empire was on the verge of collapse when Diocletian became 
emperor in 284 A.D.  His reforms kept the Roman Empire afloat for nearly another 200 
years, but his policies also ensured the destruction of the empire.  The most radical 
reform that Diocletian instituted was the “Tetrarchy” or “Rule of Four.”480  In 297, a 
revolt in Egypt was the catalyst that convinced Diocletian that the Empire had become 
too big for one administrator to handle.  His idea split the empire in half, with an 
Emperor in the Eastern and Western halves of the Roman Empire, each with a second in 
command called a Caesar.481  This also solved the problem of Imperial Succession, with 
the Caesar later becoming the Emperor, and then picking a new Caesar to eventually 
become Emperor after him.482  Diocletian’s Tetrarchy had the effect of quadrupling the 
administration size, as both Emperors and both Caesars held a full imperial court in each 
of four different capital cities.483  However, by doing so, he greatly increased the 
complexity of the administration of the Roman Empire.  He also greatly increased 
Imperial expenses, because four capital cities with citizens on the dole and four 
administrations exploded the budget.  This is a clear example of the increasing costs of 
complexity, that though for a time may have increased the resiliency of the Empire in one 
area by decreasing the decision making time to act in a crisis, ultimately also decreased 
the resiliency of the Empire as a whole by putting more fiscal stress on the already 
weakened economy by significantly growing the budget.  
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Diocletian also greatly expanded the military.  The size of the military in 235 
A.D. was roughly 300,000, and by 284 A.D. it had been increased to 400,000.  Under 
Diocletian it rose to between 500,000 and 600,000 and later Constantine increased it so 
that it was 650,000 at the end of the fourth century.484  Both the increase in the size of the 
military and the increase in the size of the bureaucracy brought with it increased costs. 
Finances had gotten to such a point of desperation by the time of Diocletian that 
in 301, he resorted to issuing his Edict on Prices.  It had been tried before but never as a 
permanent policy.485  By fixing wages and prices of goods, Diocletian was attempting to 
curb the inflation mentioned above, but instead set prices too low, favored creditors and 
lowered the cost of transport, which was to the government’s advantage.486  His imposed 
price controls only served to push up prices.  His fiscal policies, while causing a short 
resurgence, did nothing to address the systemic causes of the problems.  This strategy of 
survival worked in the short term, but was not sustainable in the long run, and therefore 
was ultimately ineffective.  
There was also a shortage of manpower.  This forced Diocletian, and later 
Constantine to institute policies of hereditary job succession, where the son was forced to 
do the same occupation as the father.487  His hereditary requirements caused further land 
abandonment.  The Empire also met its labor shortage by recruiting for the military from 
the Northern European and Baltic tribal peoples.  With the increased barbarization of the 
army, came an increased threat of problems from the military that began to have not only 
soldiers, but the officer corps and even generals who were of barbarian or tribal 
descent.488 
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This added a completely different strategic problem.  This led to the settling of 
tribes on imperial soil to provide bodies for the army, but the Romans did not subsume 
the tribes into Roman culture, which caused a rift between them.489  By filling the 
military with these barbarians, and letting their nations settle on Imperial soil, the Roman 
Empire let in the very people it was trying to keep out.  The collapse of the Roman 
Empire, although at the hands of these barbarians, was much more a function of a loss of 
resiliency, due to a weak economy, and a fiscal policy that was unable to support the 
grand strategy of a large standing military, the resource requirements of a growing 
entitlement system and a growing bureaucracy.  The pro- growth fiscal policies of 
Augustus and Tiberius at the beginning of the Roman Empire were forgotten and were 
replaced by increasingly burdensome taxes, increasingly large standing armies and an 
increasing public dole, administered by a growing bureaucracy.  By implementing 
policies that incentivized tax evasion and land abandonment, the Emperors undercut the 
very sector of the economy that supported the majority of the Empire’s expenses.   
This misalignment of fiscal policy with economic prosperity also robbed the 
Empire of its most precious resource, human capital.  With less able bodies to farm and 
fill the ranks of the military, the Emperor’s resorted to enlisting their enemies into the 
ranks of their military.  The Roman Empire already was maintaining an indefensible 
border, but by allowing these tribes to settle on Imperial soil, they undermined their own 
defense for the sake of security.  Simply put, Roman grand strategy of securing borders 
with a large standing army was misaligned with a fiscal policy that was unable to raise 
sufficient revenues to fund said army through a primitive agricultural economy.  
Furthermore, due to fiscal policies that incentivized the flight of human capital, the 
dwindling population was unable to raise enough able bodied men to supply both the 
billets for the army and the labor necessary for the economy.  The costs of maintaining 
this complex empire were too great for the economy to bear, and successive crises had 
taxed what resiliency was left in the system.  The end of the Roman Empire came in 476 
A.D. when Odoacer, a barbarian general overthrew Emperor Romulus Augustulus and 
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declared himself king, effectively ending the Imperial succession in the Western Roman 
Empire. 490  The collapse of Rome was much more a function of poor fiscal policy and 
economic stagnation resulting from that policy, as it was a function of backwards, tribal 
nations invading the most powerful Empire of its time. 
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III. THE BRITISH CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The British Empire is relevant to the discussion of collapse, because although the 
empire itself collapsed, Britain as a nation did not.  This case therefore illuminates the 
other extreme of empires, where, while losing a level of social-political complexity, and 
therefore fitting the first part of Tainter’s definition of collapse, there was no vacuum 
with which to completely implode, thus the British did not fit the second part of Tainter’s 
definition of collapse.  England was still a vibrant and wealthy nation after the fall of its 
empire.  One example of this is that in 1980, over a decade after the fall of its Empire, 
England was the world’s sixth largest economy.491  For the purpose of this thesis, this 
case study will seek to illuminate this other extreme of the collapse of empires, that is, 
graceful decline or degradation until no longer an empire.  The British are a well-known 
example of this, however, many other European countries, such as Spain, France and the 
Netherlands, along with other imperial powers such as the Japanese have experienced this 
same type of collapse from empire to nation state, but not dissolving into obscurity.  The 
British Empire offers a possible conclusion for the United States that is on the opposite 
end of the spectrum of Rome, the possibility of graceful degradation.  Another reason that 
this case study is helpful is that the British Empire is a more recent empire, which allows 
some modern comparisons to things such as global trade, industry, central banking, 
legislative policy decisions and naval power projection. 
This case study will show the disconnect between fiscal policy and grand strategy, 
but it will also demonstrate how fiscal policy can drive grand strategy, and likewise, how 
grand strategy can drive fiscal policy.  Arguably, the early British Empire is an example 
of how fiscal policy drove grand strategy, as economic success and abundant wealth 
drove policymakers to drive to find new sources of colonial wealth to exploit.  However, 
the later British Empire is a case where grand strategy drove fiscal policy.  The World 
Wars, which effectively were one of the main contributing factors to the fall of the British 
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Empire, were a case of grand strategy driving fiscal policy.  Although some argue that the 
grand strategy that Britain embarked upon was necessary for the survival of Britain, from 
a grand strategic standpoint, the vast empire was a burden, not an asset, and the fiscal 
warning signs were ignored.  Britain managed to survive, but the empire did not, and with 
it went her status as a world power, but the institutions that she left behind have helped 
both her and the colonies she ruled maintain their stature in the world, a very different 
outcome from the black hole into which the Roman Empire collapsed.     
B. BRITAIN 
The British Empire was founded on economics.  The mercantilist expansion of the 
British Empire was for the purpose of colonizing satellites for trade and natural resources.  
It was also a strategic and fiscally driven move as well.  At the outset of the Empire, 
Queen Elizabeth was fighting for the very existence of both her throne and the English as 
they were being attacked by Spain, a Roman Catholic nation.  England, being an 
Anglican nation of the Protestant tradition was ethnically, culturally, and religiously 
different from Spain and other Catholic European nations.   
The British Empire began haphazardly as a way of damaging Spain.  The first 
attempts at colonization in the 1580’s in Roanoke, Virginia and Newfoundland failed.492  
It wasn’t until 1588, when the British defeated the Spanish Armada that England as a 
nation began to recognize themselves as “a first-class power.”493  They had defeated the 
Spanish, the strongest empire since the Roman Empire, and then it became apparent that 
they too could start their own empire.494  Colonization was primarily seen as an 
economic and demographic solution to a strained market and overcrowding of population 
centers.  The government supported colonization as well because it would bring a new 
source of revenue through customs duties, which was the primary form of taxation at the 
time.495 
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The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 marked a significant shift in the grand 
strategy of Britain.  This victory gave Britain the clout and the freedom to start colonizing 
on their own, shifting their strategy and policy from one of survival to one of expansion.  
Much of the colonization was done by companies, who were granted charters signed by 
the King or Queen.  The East India Company started in 1600 with a charter signed by 
Queen Elizabeth.  They would go on to found a British Colony in India.496  The Virginia 
Company charter was signed in 1606 and settled at Jamestown, in the Chesapeake Bay in 
May 1607.497 While colonization was seen as an answer to economic problems, it was an 
expedient with which to solve social issues as well.  For example, due to differences in 
religious beliefs, the British Puritan congregation first sailed to Holland in 1607, where 
they struggled for over 10 years to make a life for themselves.  When this did not work, 
they appealed to England, where King James gave them a license through the Virginia 
Company.  They set sail in September 1620 for America on the Mayflower, where they 
founded a British Colony in Plymouth, Massachusetts.498  This colony, founded on 
religious freedom, gave the British a way to expand their empire and get rid of those who 
had different religious views at the same time. 
The British economy was widely varied at the end of the 1500 and the beginning 
of the 1600’s, but was also plagued with problems.  There were still craft guilds, 
hearkening back to medieval times, where teenage boys became apprentices and rose 
through the ranks to eventually master a specific trade.  However, new apprentices were 
finding it more difficult to break into the craftsman guilds.  Some English peasants still 
farmers, but many were increasingly being driven off the land.  Excessive governmental 
regulation was oppressing industry.  At the same times, a significant rise in prices was 
eroding the purchasing power of the British people, as prices rose three times faster than 
wages.499  “The squirearchy, strong in its political alliance with the Crown, owned most 
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of the land and ran all the local government.”500  All the while, London’s merchants were 
looking for new markets.501  Colonies would soon provide these new markets. 
The Jamestown settlement in Virginia was struggling to survive, having failed 
with multiple Mediterranean crops such as wine and olives.  However, a new crop was 
introduced that was to forever transform the economy of the British Empire and stimulate 
the colonization of the Americas.  Tobacco brought in such a boom in revenue to Britain 
that by 1700, it was importing 13 million pounds of tobacco for domestic consumption 
and another 25 million pounds for re-export to Europe.502  It was said that “Spain is more 
damaged by the King’s peace than the Queen’s war,” showing the incredibly positive 
impact that colonization was having on the growth and prosperity of the British 
Empire.503  It was also this type of contemporary rhetoric that demonstrates how 
colonization, and the successful economic benefits reaped from it, was driving grand 
strategy.  By successfully colonizing, it was understood that instead of using war as the 
only way to weaken their opponents, the British could use economics to beat other 
European powers. 
Other colonies began to emerge.  Thomas Warner established the first colony in 
the West Indies in 1623 on the island of St. Christopher.  In addition to St. Christopher, 
by the 1640’s, the British controlled Barbados, Nevis, Montserrat and Antigua.504  The 
British later acquired Jamaica in 1655.  Jamaica was the first colony that was won by 
conquest of a colony already founded by another European power.505  Many English 
adventurers set off to find gold.  Among them was Henry Morgan, who with his 
privateers began to raid Spanish settlements in the Caribbean in 1663.  In 1668, he 
captured so much gold that pieces of eight became legal tender in Jamaica.506  The 
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Crown took notice and in 1670 fortified Port Royal.  Soon, the Caribbean economy was 
transformed from plundering of gold to planting of sugar cane.507  Sugar brought about 
the need for cheap labor, which was found in the institution of slavery.508  Slavery “was 
the foundation of the colonial order.”509  Soon, the Caribbean colonies were 
economically more important to Great Britain than the American colonies.510 
As the colonies started to grow and expand, Britain started to see the fiscal 
revenue stimulus it had anticipated through custom duties levied on the import and trade 
of goods from the “New World.”  Tobacco was the first highly profitable commodity to 
come from Virginia plantations, but sugar and sugar byproducts such as rum from the 
Caribbean islands called the West Indies soon surpassed the revenue from tobacco.  Other 
products such as fish, and cotton, from North America and silk, tea and spices from India 
and coffee from Arabia contributed to the continued increase in revenue, filling the 
coffers of the British government, who was continuously expanding its colonial holdings, 
and likewise its navy to protect said assets.  In order to keep up growth in these 
commodities, especially in sugar, tobacco and cotton, additional manual labor was 
needed.  This was satisfied through the slave trade, which the British soon became 
masters of, owning 50 percent of the slave trade at its peak. 511  Slavery made economic 
growth and expansion possible, which led to a need for even more slaves to sustain 
growth. 
This expansion of the Royal Navy and the continued colonial expansion is a clear 
example of fiscal policy driving grand strategy.  The economic boom that trade and 
colonial commodities brought to both the British economy and the British government 
benefitted everyone.  This encouraged policymakers in Parliament and the throne to 
continue to embark upon a grand strategy of expansion.  Businessmen were also 
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encouraged to seek expansion, as is evident by the fact that many British colonies were 
colonized by businesses, not by military force. 
The economic implications of this widely expanding import trade changed the 
face of the British economy.  Although in many ways industry was tied to the guild 
system of apprenticeship, to journeymen and craftsmen, making the goods at home, many 
goods began to become imported, which started a consumer revolution in Britain.  
Overall, the import of Caribbean sugar, Arabic coffee, Chinese tea and later porcelain, 
Virginia colonial tobacco, wheat and rye, beef, pork, herring and mackerel, 
Newfoundland cod, fine Indian silk and calico, and Canadian Beaver pelt, marked a 
drastic change in the British economy.512  By 1725, the British economy had transformed 
itself into a consumer driven economy.513  It imported many of the products it consumed, 
and in exchange exported capital or British manufactured goods such as glass, castors, 
shoes, hats, bales of canvas, and pewter, iron and brass utensils.514  Consumerism was 
rampant.  It changed the economy and the national lifestyle of England.515  Indian calico 
and silk were preferred to British wool.516  Tea, which is today considered a British 
tradition, came about as a highly sought after drink at this time.  The reason tea was 
preferred to coffee was that coffee had much higher import tariffs.  “Like so many 
national characteristics, the English preference for tea over coffee had its origins in the 
realm of fiscal policy.”517  Tea, coffee, sugar and tobacco, all stimulant drugs, became 
very popular in English society.518  As merchants became more successful from the sale 
of colonial goods, and the economy expanded, the middle class began to be able to afford 
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to purchase these goods, which fueled further economic growth.  Consumerism was 
enabled by mercantilism, and mercantilism was supported by the British Royal Navy.519 
This consumer based economy is very similar to the United States economy.  The 
U.S. imports much of what it consumes.  This would eventually prove to be a strategic 
liability for the British in World War One, as will be seen later in this case study.  Could 
this over reliance on foreign imports be a strategic liability for the United States?  It is 
distinctly possible, especially since history shows that it was for the British.  This 
intricate web of trade of goods through various colonial economies also greatly increased 
the complexity of the British economy, and society at large.  With each new colony, came 
new challenges in integrating that economy into the British realm.  While for a time these 
colonies proved to be economic assets, they were also strategic liabilities, requiring the 
increase in the size of the British Navy.  This is a lucid example to Tainter’s point about 
how increasing the complexity of a society comes with it the increasing costs of 
maintaining that complexity.  The British economy was becoming more flexible and 
resilient, but with it came the cost of a more strategically vulnerable supply and logistics 
train, stretching across many oceans.  This strategic vulnerability was countered by 
growing the size of the Navy to protect the shipping lanes.  
It was in the middle of the seventeenth century that the true beginnings of Great 
Britain as a supreme navy began in earnest.  The Scottish Revolution in the late 1630’s 
that turned into an English Civil War in the 1640’s brought into power a group of people 
who understood and appreciated the importance of a strong navy.  Their motives varied 
as some were religious in nature, others colonial expansionists and still others were 
merchants, but all supported the building of a strong navy.  From 1649 to 1651 the size of 
the British Navy doubled from 39 to 80, and by 1660, a total of 207 new ships had been 
built or purchased for the Navy.  It was at this time that the Navy was first seen as an 
instrument of national policy.520  The Navigation Act of 1651 sparked a “commercial 
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revolution.”521  It supported British shipping by requiring all colonies of the British realm 
to trade with Britain only.522  In fact, the economic power of Great Britain was connected 
to their global mastery, which was a result of the strength of the Royal Navy.523  This 
strong mercantilist economy, supported by a strong navy would continue until the 
Industrial Revolution would change the shape of the British economy, again.  
The Industrial Revolution started with the invention of the steam engine.524  In 
the late 1700s, industry started to mature, and population growth required new a source of 
fuel for heating, as wood was no longer abundant.  This led to coal mining, which, in turn 
led to the invention of the steam engine, in order to have a machine powerful enough to 
pump water out of the mines.  Thomas Newcomen built the first steam engine from 1712-
1718.  James Watt, a Scotsman from the University of Edinburgh, was repairing one of 
Newcomen’s engines in 1776 when he invented his own version that was simpler but 
with greater efficiency than Newcomen’s.525  The steam engine also enabled the 
introduction of steam powered ships, which greatly reduced steaming times from the days 
of sailing vessels.  For example, transatlantic passage during the days of sail was 4 to 6 
weeks, but in 1830 it was only two weeks, and by 1880 it was merely 10 days, all 
because of steam.526  There were three other important inventions or innovations during 
this time that spurred economic growth and expansion.  The invention of the telegraph 
and undersea cables to carry them opened up global communications for the first time.   
The invention of the railroad allowed steam engines to be put to work by hauling people 
and freight over land, a huge improvement over horses.527  The innovation of 
cartography, i.e. mapmaking allowed the British to realize the extent of their empire, and 
knowledge was power.  Whoever made the maps first, could take control first.  George 
Everest (the man Mount Everest was named after) was one of the mapmakers who 
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charted, and therefore controlled British India, which at the time included present day 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, southern Persia and Nepal.528 
These innovations helped propel the British economy and the ever growing 
empire to new heights.  They also increased the complexity of the empire.  The British 
Empire was able to maintain connectivity with its colonies through undersea telegraph 
cables and steam powered ships, that were able to reach anywhere in the world quickly 
because of the power of the steam engine, and the colonial coaling stations that allowed 
the British Royal Navy to refuel in every ocean.  Now with the ability to communicate 
over long distances, the British Empire was now armed with timely information.  Instead 
of having to make decisions on information that was weeks or months old, the telegraph 
enabled them to quickly communicate, which helped the British to disseminate decisions 
quickly enough to act decisively in the event of a crisis.  This was a major advantage and 
increased the Empire’s resiliency.   
Britain’s Industrial Revolution specifically affected two major industries, mining 
and textiles.529  Mining has already been mentioned, but textiles were another story of 
innovation through scientific discovery.  Advances in the bleaching of linen cut almost 6 
months off the production time.530  Also from 1750 to 1830, mechanized spinning 
increased productivity in the textile sector by a factor of 300 to 400, subsequently 
increasing total manufacturing output.531  Between 1760 and 1860, Great Britain’s share 
of world manufacturing output rose from 1.9 percent to 19.9 percent.532  Paul Kennedy, 
in his review of Great Britain during the Industrial Revolution, states that: 
Around 1860, which was probably when the country reached its zenith in 
relative terms, the United Kingdom produced 53 percent of the world’s 
iron and 50 percent of its coal and lignite, and consumed just under half of 
the raw cotton output of the globe.533 
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In addition, the British conducted one fifth of the world’s commerce, two fifths of 
the world’s trade, and owned one third of all merchant vessels.  The British were able to 
achieve this remarkable growth with only 2 percent of the world’s population.534 
The Industrial Revolution changed the British economy again.  Now the British 
were the worlds “first industrial nation.”535  This translated into a significant climb in 
British income.  Average real wages from 1815-1850 increased by 15-25 percent, and 
another 80 percent from 1850-1900.536  Before 1850, “agricultural production and 
distribution formed the basis of national wealth everywhere, even in Britain.”537  This 
meant that the greater populations of Russia and China, with massive peasant workforces, 
had greater national wealth.538  The value of machinery was that it was a workforce 
multiplier, allowing one person to do the work of many, which increased efficiency.  The 
British were able to use machinery, coupled with coal as an energy source, to create more 
wealth than their population size would have otherwise allowed.539  Energy is required 
for all complex societies, and the greater the complexity, the greater the energy 
demands.540  Therefore, energy usage is a helpful metric for determining how complex a 
society has become.  By assessing energy usage in terms of manpower, one can assess 
just how complex a society has become.  In 1870, Great Britain consumed 100 million 
tons of coal, equal to 800 million million Calories of energy, or the equivalent to feed a 
population of 850 million adult males in one year.  The actual population at the time was 
only 31 million people.541  By this measure, the Britain itself was relatively complex, and 
the added effect of the British Empire made it even more so.   
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Another significant way the Industrial Revolution affected Britain was with the 
finance sector of the economy.  The financial sector invested money that made the 
Industrial Revolution possible, and in return, made more money off of the capital that 
was invested.  Much of this capital was invested overseas.  By 1870-1875, roughly £75 
million a year was being invested overseas with a return of £50 million a year in interest 
and dividends alone.  However, most of the money made was reinvested overseas.542  
The main problem with this was that although encouraging growth, this had the effect of 
‘increasing dependence of the British economy upon international trade and, more 
important, international finance.”543  The population and economy was becoming too 
dependent on imported goods for their livelihood, a strategic weakness that could be 
exploited in time of war by cutting off the supply, or through economic means such as 
tariffs or raising prices.  Also, this meant that by the British investing in foreign 
countries, they were paying for the “long-term expansion of other nations” both through 
finance and through the actual building of infrastructure that would later be used to 
compete with the British.544 
 The long term implications this had on the British economy and the Empire 
would prove to be fatal.  After 1815, the British had a “half-century of virtually 
unchallenged maritime and imperial preeminence.”545  By 1870, there were two 
significant problems that were slowly weakening the British economy in relation to other 
nations.  First, industrialization and consequently, military power had started to take off 
around the world, so other nations were becoming more competitive, relative to Great 
Britain.546  Second, and more important, was “the erosion of Britain’s industrial and 
commercial preeminence,” which was subsequently also where they drew their military 
and imperial power from.547  British industry, which had an annual growth rate during 
the height of the industrial revolution of 3 to 4 percent, fell to 1.5 percent after 1875.  
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Although it still had modest growth and increased output, other nations were growing 
faster, and its “relative share of world production steadily diminished.”548  Foreign 
products were being imported to Britain, weakening the British industrial base, a sure 
sign of loss of competitiveness.549  In 1880, Britain commanded 22.9 percent of global 
manufacturing and 23.2 percent of global trade, but by 1913, it only held 13.6 percent of 
global manufacturing and 14.1 percent of global trade.550  Industrially, both the United 
States and Germany had moved ahead of Britain, putting it at the number three spot.551  
The United States economy surpassed the British economy in 1894, signaling the 
beginning of the end for an empire built upon growing its economy.552 
The British started from a strong position of both economic and military 
dominance.  Then the British started to see their industry decline relative to other 
developing industrial nations such as Germany and the United States in the later part of 
the 1800’s.  This can be attributed to many factors, but one implicitly important factor to 
recognize is as the first industrial power, they had pioneered all of the original 
technology, and therefore did not have the latest technology in their manufacturing 
plants, whereas younger industrial nations such as the U.S. were able to expand with 
newer and more efficient technology.  The British at this time also started exporting their 
technology and capital investment to their colonies, as a “mature” economy is expected to 
do.  This was in line with their fiscal needs and strategy.  By exporting capital 
investment, the economy initially saw additional growth off of the capital investments.  
However, this capital investment in foreign countries infrastructure, even though many 
were colonial assets, took away from improvements in homeland industry and 
infrastructure, and seems to coincide with their relative decline.  One point to take away 
from this, which should be explored in another thesis, is whether what is generally 
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considered the maturation of an industrial economy i.e. that of investment of capital in 
foreign countries, always coincides with the relative decline of the nation making the 
investment.  More importantly, this is exactly the same situation that the United States is 
in today.  After World War II, the United States was sitting in a position of economic and 
military preeminence.  However, just like the British before them, the U.S. has followed 
the exact same path in the last 30- 40 years, moving increasing amounts of American 
capital and production capabilities overseas.  This has significantly weakened the U.S. 
industrial base, and at the same time financed the rise of industrial nations such as China 
and India.  Additionally, the increase of U.S. dependence on foreign goods and foreign 
manufacturing is a strategic risk.  It cannot be stressed enough that in this example, the 
U.S. has followed exactly the same path as Britain.  It only stands to reason that the U.S. 
will inherit the same strategic risks that Britain did as a result of these actions. 
As the economy had changed in the early part of the Empire from agriculture and 
guild work to mercantilism to industry, fiscal policy had changed with it.  It important to 
understand that the nature of taxation, the amount of government spending(especially 
through loans) and the overall fiscal burden had profound effects on the growth and 
wellbeing of the British economy. 
There were two main types of taxation used in Britain, direct taxes and indirect 
taxes.  It was not until 1799 that Britain would adopt an income tax. 553  Direct taxes 
were taxes on property and wealth, which originally was land, and later included 
windows, carriages, riding horses and men servants.  Indirect taxes were taxes on 
businesses that were passed on to consumers through higher prices.  These taxes were 
levied on specific consumer goods, so that ultimately indirect taxes were passed onto the 
customers as higher prices.554  In the early part of the Empire, revenue from the Crown 
lands and custom duties were the main forms of revenue for the Treasury and for 
sustaining the Crown.555  For example, from 1699-1701, tobacco and sugar provided 
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roughly 33 percent of custom duties to the British government, a significant portion of 
tax revenues for Britain.556 
Much like Rome, Britain did not have a flexible tax system that was elastic 
enough to meet crises, specifically, to meet the increases needed for wartime spending.  
However, unlike Rome, the British government was able to use loans to get around this 
problem.  Of those taxes that were raised during times of war, the lion’s share primarily 
fell on land taxes.  The land tax fluctuated from 5 to 20 percent of the value of the land.  
However, new taxes were levied or tax rates were later raised to pay the increasing 
interest payments on the loans for war. The table below shows the wartime expenditures 





Total Income Balance Raised 
by Loans 
Loans as % of 
Expenditure 
1688–97 49,320,145 32,766,754 16,553,391 33.6 
1702–13 93,644,560 64,239,477 29,405,083 31.4 
1739–48 95,628,159 65,903,964 29,724,195 31.1 
1756–63 160,573,366 100,555,123 60,018,243 37.4 
1776–83 236,462,689 141,902,620 94,560,069 39.9 
1793–1815 1,657,854,518 1,217,556,439 440,198,079 26.6 
Totals 2,293,483,437 1,622,924,377 670,559,060 33.3 
Table 2.   British Wartime Expenditure and Revenue, 1688–1815 (in 
pounds)557 
It wasn’t until the middle of the Nine Years War that Britain began to have what 
can be considered a true national debt.  Parliament, in an effort to meet spending without 
raising taxes, introduced the concept as an emergency procedure in 1692-1693.  The 
national debt would become a permanent fixture in the British government henceforth.  
The revenue was raised by personal or business purchases of stock, which paid a yearly 
dividend.  This allowed the government to raise additional money without raising 
taxes.558  The British “funding system” was based on the capacity of the government to 
levy taxes.  This meant that loans were indirectly another form of increasing future 
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taxation, but by using loans instead of increasing tax rates to make up the difference in 
revenue, the effects were both delayed and muted, and were more politically palatable to 
the people.  Eventually the payments on interest on the national debt became 40 to 50 
percent of the government’s budget.559 
Britain also had the good fortune of being able to increase its revenue through a 
slowly expanding tax base.560  Part of this expansion has to do with what politicians 
considered taxable commodities, or the products described under indirect taxes above.  
The political rhetoric at the time was in favor of taxing the rich more than the poor. It was 
assumed that “necessities of the poor” should be either exempt or taxed at a low rate.  
“Luxuries” however, should be taxed.561  No thought was given to the changing nature of 
the economy, or the changing patterns of consumption.  As a result, when items such as 
sugar and tobacco became wildly popular there was no thought to how taxes on these 
items affected the masses.  However, because each tax was considered individually, 
without any thought to the interaction of other taxes, the practical outcome of the tax 
code was largely inconsistent with policy desires.562  This illustrates the inconsistency 
with which the fiscal policy at the time was carried out with regards to taxation, and is a 
pertinent example to the current U.S. situation.  The U.S. tax code is so large and 
complex, that although policy makers may try to direct policies in a certain way by 
altering the code, by doing so without taking the whole tax code into consideration, these 
policies do not always produce the desired effect. 
In the 1690’s, land and other direct taxes comprised 47 percent of total revenues, 
but by the 1790’s these same taxes only made up 21 percent of revenues.563  Some 
historians argue that Britain’s increasing tax revenue was due to economic growth, but 
there is a mounting body of evidence that counters this argument.  While Britain’s real 
national income from 1670 to 1810 tripled, tax receipts during the same period increased 
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over 16 times.564  Taxes on domestic consumption, excises and stamps increased tenfold 
from 1690 to 1815.  However, the areas of the economy that were growing as a result of 
the Industrial Revolution, namely cottons, woollens, metallurgy, pottery, wood products, 
canals and banking, all escaped these taxes.  Therefore, the areas where true economic 
growth was being seen was not taxed, and a narrow set of services and commodities 
continued to be taxed more and more severely.565 
This is important because it shows that early on, the fiscal policy was harnessing 
the economic growth from mercantilism, because over 50 percent of taxation was through 
indirect taxes on imported goods but later was not effectively harnessing the growth from 
the Industrial Revolution.  It also demonstrates that economic growth alone was not the 
predominant factor in revenue growth.  If the revenue base had shifted to include more of 
the Industrial Revolution’s growing industries, the income source for the British Empire 
may have raised revenues more effectively.  Also, by structuring fiscal policy to gain 
revenues from the sectors of the economy that were growing rapidly, the British 
government may have been able to lower the overall burden of taxation, and still make 
the same amount of revenue. 
Although taxation was not maximized during the Industrial Revolution, 
government spending was which is how fiscal policy enabled significant economic 
growth.  From 1815 to 1885, Britain was not involved in any exhaustive military 
struggle.566  British Expenditure actually decreased in the period from 1820 to 1850.  In 
the 1850’s, average annual expenditure rose to £59.6 million.  Two decades later, the 
budget had only grown by slightly less than £7 million to an average annual budget 
during the 1870’s of £66 million.567  During this period, from 1820 until the 1870’s 
remarkable fiscal restraint was utilized.  This helped to enable the economic boom that 
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was coinciding with this period of industrialization.  This is similar to the United States 
from the Civil War to World War I, where for a period of about 50 years, no major war 
was fought, and government expenditure was relatively benign, fueling the economic 
growth of the American Industrial Revolution.  This is an important concept, as in both 
cases, decreased government expenditure coincided with periods of significant economic 
growth.  This is not a coincidence, and should be an important consideration when 
making fiscal policy. 
Although fiscal policy generally seemed to support the economy in the early days, 
there were growing problems in the areas of both taxation and budgeting.  One detractor 
from government revenue was that the poor were exempt from taxation. Tax evasion was 
also persistent problem faced by Britain.  Due to incompetent, underpaid and 
understaffed local tax collectors, the government was less effective at enforcing tax laws 
the further a province was geographically from London.  For example, it was difficult to 
force Scotland to pay taxes.  Ireland was not even taxed until 1817.  Patrick O’Brien, in 
writing about British taxes, assumes that 40 percent of the population did not pay, either 
legally or illegally.  This increased the burden of taxation on those who did pay, making 
the effective rate for those paying taxes at 30 percent by 1810.568  After having been 
repealed in 1816, 569 the income tax was reintroduced in 1842.570  This meant that the 
second half of the nineteenth century would see an increase in direct taxes and a decrease 
in indirect taxes, a reversal of the policies pursued through most of the eighteenth 
century. 571  In 1894, Sir William Harcourt introduced a “death duty,” or an inheritance 
tax.  It was a direct tax on the value of inheritance and started at 1 percent on £500 and 
went up to 8 percent on property worth more than £1 million.  This shift in the revenue 
base, along with the rising expenses, began to put pressure on the fiscal situation of 
Britain leading up to the twentieth century.572 
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At the same time, revenues started to increasingly be levied on the population of 
Britain, as opposed to on imports or other methods, expenditures began to rise as well.  
Starting in the 1880’s, budgets began to grow at an increasing rate.  From 1884 to 1890, 
spending grew 5 percent or an average of £.7 million annually (a total of £4.3 million).  
Another six years, from 1890 to 1896 saw a 15 percent increase in expenditure which was 
a £2.3 million pound average annual increase (a total of £13.8 million).  One of the 
contributing factors to these increases in costs was a growing civil service.  In order to 
meet the demand of the labor force, an increase in social welfare programs required an 
increase in civil servants.  The government also provided education assistance, which 
increased four times between the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s.573 
One important parallel here with the U.S. is that before 1900, 40 percent of the 
British population, or possibly more, paid no taxes.  Not only is the U.S. is in a similar 
situation, with 47 percent of the population paying no taxes,574 if the reader recalls, this 
problem was also noted in the Roman Case Study, as significant portions of the Roman 
population paid no taxes.  This is a disturbing theme, especially since it is common to all 
three case studies.  Another theme common to all the case studies is that increasing 
expenditure on social welfare programs was seen at the same time as an increase in the 
size of the public administration.  This is important to recognize, as a secondary effect of 
social welfare programs is that there is an increase in the size of the civil service to 
administer those programs, which further increases overall costs.  Furthermore, these 
increases in social welfare programs coincided with a decrease in economic prosperity. 
By the early 1900’s, the British tax system had evolved to include an income tax 
exemption, a child tax credit, and a super tax on high incomes.  The level of exemption 
was at £160, which was a relatively high number for total yearly wages.  There was a 
child tax credit of £10 per child under the age of 16.  These reforms to the tax code 
ensured that the poor and most of the middle class were exempt from paying the income 
tax.  This greatly reduced the tax base, which was a fiscal policy that was consistent with 
the general consensus that the rich should pay and the poor should not.  For comparative 
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purposes, Prussia at the turn of the century had an exemption rate of £45.  When 
comparing the resultant tax bases, Britain’s tax base was much narrower, including only 
one million people, compared with Prussia, whose lower exemption rate included 3.9 
million.575  In addition, Britain’s Liberal Party enacted a ‘super tax’ on the wealthy to 
pay for social programs and the naval buildup.  This ‘super tax’ was an anathema to the 
Conservatives, who felt that it was not consistent with their principles or beneficial to 
their political interests.576  However, the ‘super tax’ was levied on yearly incomes above 
£5,000.577 
This trend of increasing expenditure showed no signs of stopping either.  From 
1896 to 1907, expenditure increased by 27.7 percent, from £109.7 million to £151.8 
million.578  This was not, however, without protest from certain members of the 
government.  Edward Hamilton, who took office in the Treasury Department in 1895, 
sent a memo out to the cabinet with the title “Some Remarks on Public Finance.”579  In 
it, Hamilton warned of increasing costs in the near future, from commitments that 
previous governments had made to services such as education, being “in their nature 
services of automatic growth.”580  He also recognized that “school teachers are 
demanding pensions: working classes are claiming some provisions for old age- a claim 
which if it be freely satisfied, may mean boundless subsidy from the State.”581  He ended 
his memo with this statement. “In view of these considerations, the question of Imperial 
Finance may very possibly before long become a serious problem.”582  Edward Hamilton 
could not have been more correct in this assertion. 
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The increase in public expenses corresponding to the increase in tax exemptions 
highlights another lesson for the U.S.  When the British increased expenses and 
decreased taxes at the same time, as has been done many times in recent U.S. history, 
they soon found themselves in a fiscal crisis, which will be outlined below.  Another 
important concept here, as noted by British Treasurer Edward Hamilton is that the policy 
commitments of one legislative session carry over into the future, and through automatic 
increases due to inflation and population growth, can quickly explode in size and cost.        
The Boer War helped to precipitate a financial crisis in Britain from 1901-1905, 
although it was only the catalyst, not the cause.  The burdens of the Empire, and the 
doubts on the limits of British financial power were also contributing factors.583  During 
this time, another voice of reason brought serious talk of fiscal constraint into the British 
fiscal policy dialogue.  Austen Chamberlain, son of politician Joseph Chamberlain, 
became the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1903.  He took the tactic of trying to decrease 
defense expenditure as a way of balancing the budget. 584  By 1905, Chamberlain brought 
the concept to the cabinet that any addition in expenditure must be coupled with an 
increase of taxation.585  His initiatives gained some traction, and from 1905 to 1906 £2.5 
million was saved by the Army, but at the cost of withdrawal of troops from multiple 
overseas garrisons and the establishment of a cap on defense commitment to India.  
Likewise, the Navy cut £3.8 million, by decommissioning a number of older ships and 
reorganizing naval assets across the empire.  Savings were coming at the cost of the 
defensive capabilities of the empire.586 
In a different memo to the cabinet in 1905, Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, wrote that Britain’s security rested “under three heads.  They are naval, 
military and financial; each of these divisions is of equal importance both to the 
successful preparation for war and effective conduct of war.”587  This was a widely held 
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belief in Britain at the time, but finding the balance between peacetime readiness levels 
and fiscal austerity was difficult.  Too little expenditure on the military during peacetime 
meant an underprepared Britain, and too much meant an exhausted Treasury on the eve 
of battle.588 
This shows that some in the fiscal policy realm recognized a shift in the strategic 
landscape, due to financial ability.  In order to understand this shift, first one must 
understand the contemporary strategic landscape.  In 1889, a new strategic viewpoint had 
been adopted by the British.  This was called the Two Power Standard, and reflected an 
understanding that the British needed to be able to counter two threats simultaneously, 
France and Russia.  However, in 1904, Lord Selborne wrote a memo to the cabinet that 
recognized that the two biggest threats to Britain from then on were France and Germany.  
Although this policy was inconsistent as it did not address the rise in American naval 
power, nonetheless, this is a clear indication of the grand strategy at the time.589  The 
British were prepared to fight off the next two most powerful navies simultaneously, in 
order to maintain global naval domination.  However, this was out of touch with reality. 
The British Navy had become a European territorial navy, in order to defend itself against 
the German High Seas Fleet, and therefore was not able to defend both Britain and the 
colonial holdings of the empire.590 
It appears that maybe Chamberlain understood this, or at least understood that the 
finances of the British government were such that increasing in spending could not be 
afforded.  As is usual in these types of situations, defense spending is the first to be cut, 
and all too often, is cut too far, so that when war strikes, the military has been cut back 
too much, at the expense of security.  The balance that Chamberlain referred to is a 
difficult one to manage.  However, the fiscal policy of the British did not make similar 
cuts in other areas.  This time period where fiscal austerity was recognized as necessary, 
but appropriate cuts in the budget were not made in other areas is a clear disconnect of 
fiscal policy and grand strategy.  Although the British may not have recognized it at the 
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time, by cutting defense spending, but maintaining the size of their Empire, they were 
advancing a fiscal policy that left their Empire strategically vulnerable.  Essentially, if 
Britain had shed the Empire, or at least consolidated the Empire and shed portions of it, 
she would have had more resources to defend herself, and needed less resources overall 
to do so.  Also, by assuming a strategy of being able to fight two navies simultaneously, 
the British overstated their capabilities, and likewise formulated both strategy and policy 
around an expensive and far reaching goal.  The United States is in a similar situation 
today.  By maintaining the costly strategy associated with the capability of 
simultaneously fighting two wars, the U.S. is now in a position where spending is being 
restrained and the military will make up a significant portion of those cuts.  As a result, 
the U.S. finds itself in a position where it had too ambitious of a strategy, and now cannot 
afford that strategy, but instead of changing its strategy, the government is simply 
changing the military’s funding.   
Prior to World War I saw the rise of Anglo-German antagonism.  One of the 
primary drivers of this was a tension about the shift of economic power between Britain 
and Germany, specifically manifested in “colonial quarrels, naval rivalry and 
disagreement over the European balance of power.”591  This led to a naval buildup 
between the two countries, which was also an “economic marathon” to see which nation 
could out-build the other.592  The British based on number of ships, would end up 
winning this marathon, but it had come at a price; namely more debt.593  However, this 
arms build-up did not mean that Britain was ready for World War I.  It only meant that 
the British Navy was more powerful than the German Navy, a fact which meant that most 
of the decisive fighting would be done on land, where Britain was not at all prepared. 
The decline in Britain’s industrial base had dire consequences for Great Britain in 
World War I, which was alluded to above.  By World War I, Britain’s industrial base was 
not sufficient to adequately support the war effort.  Corelli Barnett states,  
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It is a somber fact that without American steel, we (the British) would 
have lost the Great War by 1916.  It took a wartime industrial revolution 
using American machine-tools to create the impressive munitions 
industries of 1918.594 
By 1914, Britain was already at the point where the costs of the Empire did not 
offset the benefits.  Fortunately for Britain, World War I did not see warfare waged 
outside Europe, and the colonies were not attacked.  This allowed the colonies to send 
help to Britain.  However, it also had the long term strategic effect of blinding the British 
to the strategic weakness that the Empire was to her security.  For example, although 
India did provide troops for World War I, it was less than the number of British troops 
who were garrisoned in India.  Also, additional troops were tied up in Africa and the 
Middle East, just to keep the strategic line of communication between Britain and India 
open.595  This is a clear example of the diminishing returns to the increasing costs of 
complexity.  If Britain did not have the colony of India at all, she would have had a 
greater number of available troops to fight in World War I than she did with the 
assistance of Indian troops. 
World War I had a devastating effect on British finances.  By April 1, 1917, the 
total “inter-Allied war credits had risen to $4.3 billion, 88 percent of which was covered 
by the British government.”596  As a result, Britain’s debt exploded to ten times its size 
before the war.597  In fiscal year 1920-1921, the interest payments were £308.7 
million.598 By the mid 1920’s, the interest payments on the debt were close to 50 percent 
of total government expenditure.599  Although at the end of the war, the British were on 
the winning side, it transformed them from the world’s greatest creditor into a debtor.600  
This manifested itself in a “creeping crisis of confidence” in the British Empire.601 
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This was met with a significant increase in taxation during and after the war.  The 
tax rate for fiscal year 1913-1914 was still around 5.8 percent, but by 1918-1919, the tax 
rate was at 30 percent of income.602  Unlike in the past, when loans had been used and 
taxes were not significantly altered because of war, this time both loans and tax increases 
were utilized.  The tax base was expanded by lowering the level of exemption in 1915-
1916, but still 38 percent of the population was able to find allowances and abatements 
that kept them from paying.  In that same year, the tax free allowance for children was 
increased, and wives were included as well.  This system was out of balance, which the 
Finance Act of 1920 attempted to address, but again it benefitted married men and 
children, further distorting the tax system.603  This shows that British fiscal policy that 
was fundamentally inconsistent with Britain’s strategic aim of winning the war.   
In addition to personal tax increases, another tax, the Excess Profits Duty, or 
EPD, was levied in 1915 on businesses.  This tax had further shifted the balance from 
indirect taxes to direct taxes.  Before the EPD, the ratio of taxation in 1913-1914 was 
42.5 percent indirect and 57.5 percent direct taxes.  In 1918-1919, indirect taxes only 
made up 20.4 percent of revenue, and direct taxes made up 79.6 percent; 36 percent from 
EPD, 43.6 percent from all other forms of direct taxation.  In 1915, the initial rate was 50 
percent of all profits above a rate determined from prewar years of profitability, but by 
1917, the tax was on 80 percent of excess profits.  This tax was supposed to expire at the 
end of the war, but in making up over one third of all tax revenues after the war, this was 
problematic.604   
This continuation of the wartime EPD did not sit well with businesses.  The 
Federation of British Industries is quoted as saying,  
So long as industry is thus deprived by excessive taxation of the power to 
recover, the vicious circle of decreasing trade, decreasing national 
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revenue, and increasing unemployment, with its accompanying heavy 
charge upon the State, must continue.605 
However, the government was stuck.  With over a third of their revenue coming 
from this single tax on business profits, greater loans as a result of the war, and an 
immediate “floating debt” or short term bills that had to be paid totaling £1,570 million, 
they were not in a position to get rid of this war time measure.606  The EPD continued on, 
fluctuating yearly and by 1925, businesses were paying a rate of 13.5 percent.  Finally it 
was recognized by the Chancellor that although British industry had borne the brunt of 
the fiscal load during the war, it was not a normal part of tax policy to tax corporate 
profits.  As soon as it was feasible to do so, the standard before the war was reinstated.607  
However, this excessive tax on profits directly affected reinvestment in the economy, 
which as a result continued to decline.  Whereas in 1900, London had been the financial 
center of the global economy,608  after World War I, New York began to rival London as 
the financial center of the world.  In the inter- war years, while other nations experienced 
industrial booms, Britain’s heavy industries were in a slump, with output in the 1920’s 
below that of 1913.609 
This reduction in competitiveness illustrates a significant division between fiscal 
policy and grand strategy.  At a point when Great Britain was engaged in a World War, 
over a third of the population paid no taxes, and at the same time, additional tax 
exemptions were put in place on wives and children, exempting more of the population, 
instead of less.  Also, by taxing the corporate profits of British businesses, the 
government hurt its own economy to its detriment.  By taking 80 percent of corporate 
profits, the government left very little for businesses to use to continue to grow and invest 
in their corporations, which likewise meant little overall economic growth.  This 
cascading effect had the outcome of continuing the economic decline, causing more job 
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loss, and therefore additional tax revenues lost because of unemployment.  When a 
government taxes the profits of its business sector too much, it stunts economic growth.  
This can be seen today, where the United States has the second highest corporate tax rate 
in the world, and consequently has seen significant job loss and many corporations move 
overseas to other, more business friendly locations worldwide. 
After WWI, the British were in a period of severe fiscal austerity.  The “War to 
End All Wars,” was seen by the government and the public as a good reason to severely 
cut defense spending, because it seemed inconceivable that another war like that would 
ever be fought.   Military spending between 1922 and 1932 was cut by more than 33 
percent, while their French neighbors increased spending by 55 percent and the Italians 
by 60 percent.610  The “10 Year Rule”  was adopted in 1919, and was used by Parliament 
to justify putting off increases in military spending by 10 years, so long as no major 
conflict was foreseen in the next 10 years.611  While in the minds of the politicians and 
the people, this peace dividend may have been necessary, it would not help prepare them 
for the next war.  It was also a blatant disregard of the strategic burden that the larger 
empire was on the homeland.  While this would have been a good time to get rid of many 
colonies that the British could no longer afford to protect, they held on instead.  This was 
probably viewed as a time where fiscal policy and grand strategy was aligned, but in fact, 
they were not further from the truth.  By cutting spending for the military, but not cutting 
the missions of the military, i.e. getting rid of the strategic burdens of the colonies, the 
British Empire significantly increased the risks to the Empire.  This blindness would not 
be realized until the eve of World War II.  
By the time the British realized what a liability the Empire was to their very 
existence, it was too late.  In April of 1939, a British memorandum summarized this 
reality: 
We are considering a situation in which we, allied to France, would be 
engaged in war with Germany and Italy simultaneously and when Japan 
would also be a potential enemy… The British Empire and France would 
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thus be threatened at home, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East at the 
same time, and it would be hard to choose a worse geographical 
combination of enemies.612 
Finally, the British realized the severity of their strategic misstep, but it was too 
late to do anything about it.  World War II started 5 months later.  The Second World 
War revealed something that on the surface the First World War had not, that the Empire 
was a strategic liability, not a strategic asset.613   
By the outbreak of World War II, the British could no longer defend the whole 
empire, and early in the war abandoned their Asian colonies to focus on self-defense and 
survival against Hitler and Imperial Nazi Germany.  During the campaign “of the winter 
of 1939-40, the ultimate collapse of British power was drawing steadily nearer.”614  
Britain, with its colonial holdings, had the trappings of a global power, “but in terms of 
financial resources and industrial base, she was merely a regional European power of 
about half the weight of Nazi Germany Although Lord Stamp, in February of 1940 
released a report to the cabinet that showed that the British “grand strategy had only the 
bog of bankruptcy for a foundation.”615  Lord Stamp was correct.  However, Churchill 
did not listen.  Economic collapse was inevitable, but Churchill and his colleagues “opted 
to wage a war on a scale, far, far beyond British economic resources.”616  Only the 
Americans, with the Lend-Lease act kept the British war effort from failing.  The loans 
amounted to $26 billion dollars, twice what Britain was able to borrow from allies and 
colonies.617  It has been said that World War II turned Britain into “the greatest debtor in 
the history of the world.”618  The war effort had bankrupted Britain, and the costs of the 
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empire had become too great for it to afford any longer.619  The foundations of the 
British Empire were economic, and with $40 billion dollars in debt, Britain could no 
longer maintain her empire.620 
Some may argue that the British had to wage a war far beyond their means to 
counter Hitler.  Although this may or may not have been the case, no one will know.  The 
British could have staged a defensive war effort instead of an offensive one, and they 
certainly could have started preparing earlier.  By denying reality, with the strategy of 
appeasing Hitler, the British government was caught completely unprepared for war.  
Additionally, by denying the strategic implications of maintaining their Empire, the 
British set themselves up for defeat.   
At first, after the war, the British were deluded into thinking that they could 
continue with business as usual, using the colonies as “captive colonial markets.”  This 
was in part due to the fact that Great Britain was one of the “Big Three” at Potsdam in 
1945, which resulted in a return of all of her imperial possessions.621  Britain’s frail 
global and economic status was also masked by the weakness the surrounding European 
states, that were all rebuilding as a result of the devastation from the war.622 Although 
Britain was initially prosperous in the post-World War II years, they soon fell behind 
again as the economies of Europe were rebuilt with new machinery after the war had 
devastated them.623  The British return to “business as usual” by trying to use the colonial 
markets to remake their economy is natural, but again, was lacking the clarity of what 
had happened as a result of World War II.  The British should have taken this opportunity 
to assess the global strategic situation and determine what would best suit their needs 
moving forward.  This is a crucial point for the United States as it moves forward.  The 
current fiscal crisis in the United States should not end with a return to “business as 
usual.”  If it does, and nothing is learned from the crisis, than the U.S. may find itself in a 
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similar situation to Britain, coming out of the other end of a crisis with no lessons 
learned.  One may ask how the current fiscal crisis can be compared to World War II.  
The current fiscal crisis has seen a great explosion in U.S. indebtedness, much like 
Britain in World War II, but instead of wartime funding, this is due to stimulus funding to 
try to jumpstart the economy.  The U.S. is also witnessing its relative decline in the face 
of a rising China, just as Britain witnessed its relative decline in the face of a rising U.S.  
If the U.S. does not fundamentally change both the grand strategy and the fiscal policy, it 
could be repeating history.    
One of the first post-World War II signs of the decline of the British Empire was 
the British relinquishment of responsibility in Greece and Turkey, which encouraged the 
rise of Communist insurgencies in those two countries.624  Another significant indicator 
of this was the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956.  On July 24, 1956, Colonel Nasser, the head of 
Egypt, seized the Suez Canal, claiming that it was Egyptian built.  He planned to use the 
money from the Canal Company to fund the building of Aswan Dam.625  On November 
5, 1956, the British and French invaded the canal to regain control, claiming they were 
keeping the peace between Egypt and Israel.  The result was that the task force could not 
keep the Egyptians from blocking the canal.  This led to a run on the British pound 
sterling.  The British were forced to either debase their currency or request American aid.  
By requesting American aid, it was President Eisenhower, not Prime Minister Eden, who 
named the final terms which ended the crisis.626 
The divestiture of British colonies was relatively quick.  India, who was already 
on track to become independent before World War II, gained independence on August 
15, 1947.627  Ireland became a Free State in 1948 (although it had started to gain some 
level of independence in the early 1920’s).628  The British abandoned Palestine in 
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1949.629  In October 1959, the appointment of Macleod to the office of Secretary for the 
Colonies was the turning point in which Britain changed from a policy “steady progress 
towards independence to brisk action to get rid of all colonies as fast as possible.”630  As 
an example of this, in two years Macleod had “taken the main step towards winding up 
the British Empire in East Africa.”631  The end of the British Empire might be best 
pegged on January 19, 1968, when Prime Minister Harold Wilson “announced the final 
homecoming of the British legions.”632  If British fiscal policy and grand strategy had 
been synchronized before WWI, the British Empire may have lasted a little while longer.  
Today, Britain is merely a region power, but still a player on the world scene, thanks to 
the institutions of her colonies, that of British rule of law, free markets, education and 
parliamentary rule that have continued on as her legacy, and have set her colonies up for 
success far better than those of her opponents, France and Spain.  The maintenance and 
continued investment in these complex institutions and relationships while lacking the 
revenues to justify their continued support caused her imperial collapse.  
However, there is a significant difference between the collapse of the Roman 
Empire and the collapse of the British Empire.  Referring back to Tainter’s discussion of 
collapse and complexity, it is apparent that after World War II, when the British Empire 
began divesting itself of its colonies, this action alone constitutes a loss of complexity.  
“Collapse is a process of decline in complexity.”633  Tainter further states that, “Collapse 
may also manifest itself in a transformation from larger to smaller states...”634  Recalling 
that one part of Tainter’s definition of collapse is “a society has collapsed when it 
displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity,”635 
it must also be noted that Britain while as an empire did collapse, Britain as a nation did 
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not.  The second part of Tainter’s definition is that “collapse occurs and can only occur in 
a power vacuum.”636  There was no power vacuum that sucked up Britain, like the 
vacuum that was present when the Roman Empire collapsed.  Therefore, this is a 
different situation than Rome, because while the Empire declined and eventually 
collapsed, that is lost a level of complexity; Britain itself did not.  This is sometimes 
referred to as imperial decline.  Another way to think about this process is that the British 
Empire experienced graceful degradation.  This is on the opposite end of a theoretical 
spectrum of collapse and decline from the Roman experience.  By referring back to 
Tainter’s concept of diminishing marginal returns, and looking at Figure 3 below, it is 
likely that B1/ C3 was achieved somewhere around World War II.  Instead of dropping 
straight down to the X axis as in Tainter’s model, the British continued to decline at an 
accelerating rate, until they had lost their level of social complexity as an empire, and 
were a nation.  This allowed them to start with a somewhat new slate, and enabled them 
to continue on as a viable socially complex entity, with a more manageable cost of social 
complexity as a nation. 
 
Figure 3.   The Marginal Product of Increasing Complexity637  
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This is a departure from Tainter’s idea that collapse must require a power 
vacuum, because Britain as a nation did not fall.  It is also a departure from his 
diminishing marginal returns curve which shows that after a certain point, the complex 
society collapses down to the X axis.  This isn’t meant to call Tainter’s theory in to 
question, as based on his theory, the British case has not met all the criteria in his 
definition to collapse.  However, regardless of what terminology is used, the British 
Empire did in fact go away.  The British Empire declined, and fell, but does not fulfill 
Tainter’s complete definition of collapse, even though the society lost a level of 
complexity.  While determining the definition for how the British Empires dissolution is 
not the purpose of this thesis, it is important to keep in mind that this is an example of an 
Empire that shows a different ending than the total collapse of the Romans.  It leaves 
open the option for an empire such as the United States to have a different end than that 
of the Roman Empire as well. 
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IV. THE UNITED STATES CASE STUDY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This case study will attempt to summarize and illuminate the history of the United 
States just as the other case studies have of their respective Empires.  It will look at the 
history of the United States from its inception to the present day.  This case study will 
mirror the other case studies in its format and content, with one important exception.  
There are primary resources in the form of newspaper articles and current events that will 
help to contextualize the possible future fate of the United States of America.  No attempt 
will be made to try to forecast or predict the fate of the United States or to put a date on 
its possible collapse, possible decline or possible resurgence or revitalization toward 
greatness.  Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind what historian Paul Kennedy said 
about the British Empire in the context of the present day United States, “Like all other 
civilizations at the top of the wheel of fortune, therefore, the British could believe that 
their position was both “natural” and destined to continue.  And just like all those other 
civilizations, they were in for a rude shock.”638  The United States case study is not 
closed, yet.  Will the United States will tend to be more like Rome, ending in catastrophic 
collapse, or like Great Britain, ending in graceful degradation?   
B. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The American Empire started as the colony of another empire, the British Empire.  
Without revisiting the colonization of North America that was discussed in the British 
case study, the summary of the American Empire will start with the causes behind the 
American Revolution.  The American Revolution started as a movement of political 
opposition to taxes, but more broadly was a moratorium on how the colonies should be 
governed.639  It is also interesting that a war should have started in the American colonies 
over taxation, as the level of taxation on the colonists in relation to British subjects living 
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in England was extremely low.  In 1763, the average Briton paid 26 shillings in taxes to 1 
shilling for a colonist from Massachusetts.640 
The British debt from the Seven Years War, or the French and Indian War as it 
was known in American, was huge, standing at £122,603,336 on January 5, 1763.  The 
taxes were not levied, as many suppose, to pay for the French and Indian War, but rather 
to help pay for the 20 battalions of British troops garrisoned in America in order to 
protect the frontier from Indian attacks and the colonies from other European powers. 641  
However, this did not sit well with the colonists.  The phrase “No taxation without 
representation,” a popular phrase to explain the colonist’s anger with Britain’s policies 
was just one example of this.642  The ember that lit the fire of Revolution however, was 
sparked by General Gage, under orders from the colonial secretary and the king to seize 
the Provincial Congress.  Knowing he would never be able to get to the Provincial 
Congress from Boston, Gage instead formed an expedition to Concord, Massachusetts to 
seize an arsenal of weapons, ammunition and gun powder, and the rest is well-known 
history.  The American Revolution had officially started. 
On July 4, 1776, the Second Continental Congress issued the Declaration of 
Independence.643  It was one of the defining documents of the American Revolution and 
of American history as a whole.  In the preamble, Thomas Jefferson declared, “We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness.”644  This phrase encompasses one of the founding principles of 
American ideology, which will be readdressed in the final chapter. 
The Americans finally got a considerable ally to their cause when France entered 
the war in 1778.  The turning point of the American Revolution was General 
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Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown, VA on October 17, 1781.645  The war raged on for a 
while longer, the official peace was signed on September 3, 1783, and the United States 
was recognized as a sovereign nation.646  The U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1789, 
replacing the Articles of Confederation as the abiding law of the land.647  The birth of a 
new nation, the United States of America was complete.  
The rhetoric around the time of the birth of America foretold of a new empire.  At 
first glance, it would not appear that a series of colonies who had recently thrown off 
imperial rule would not be good candidates for imperial expansion, but this is not the 
case.  George Washington remarked that the United States was a “nascent empire” and 
later an “infant empire.”648  William Henry Drayton, the chief justice of South Carolina, 
stated in 1776, “The Almighty…has made choice of the present generation to erect the 
American Empire.”649  Thomas Jefferson, in talking with James Madison said he was 
“persuaded no constitution was ever before as well calculated as ours for extending 
extensive empire and self-government.”650  Alexander Hamilton, in the first of the 
Federalist Papers, characterized the United States as “in many respects the most 
interesting…empire…in the world.”651  In 1789, an American minister named Jedidiah 
Morse, in his book American Geography, predicted that America would become “the 
largest empire that ever existed.”652 
This had its roots in another concept that had started long before the 
Revolutionary War, called “exceptionalism.”  Started by John Winthrop, one of the 
founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, he called for his colony to be a “city on a 
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hill.”653  This came from Matthew 5:14, a direct quote from the Bible. “Ye are the light 
of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid.”654  Although its meaning 
pertained to Christianity as a religious light in a world of darkness, its biblical meaning 
was altered to fit the concept of American exceptionalism.655  This meant that 
American’s saw themselves as the light in world of dark, backwards governments and 
societies.  The founding fathers furthered this notion by calling the U.S. the “grand 
experiment.”656 The notion of exceptionalism was a part of the national identity, a 
prideful concept which stated that Americans were better than everyone else.  The 
concept of exceptionalism would be repeatedly used by many to validate the superior and 
predestined nature of Americans to conquer and convert others to the American 
government, economy and ideals. 
Another key concept to the grand strategy of the United States was isolationism.  
George Washington codified isolationism in his farewell speech after serving as the First 
President of the United States: 
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in 
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political 
connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us 
have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in 
frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our 
concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, 
by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary 
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.657 
In a similar vein, Thomas Jefferson echoed Washington’s sentiment during his 
inaugural address, stating that the U.S. should pursue “peace, commerce, and honest 
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”658  This concept of 
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isolationism meant that Americans did not want to get involved in the affairs of Europe, 
nor did they want Europe getting involved in the affairs of Americans.  The three 
concepts of expansion, exceptionalism and isolationism are the foundation of the 
narrative of grand strategy in the United States.  They form the basis from which 
American’s deny that the United States is an empire to begin with.  These ideas masked 
the imperial tendencies of Americans, even to themselves. 
Nevertheless, America as an Empire started its expansion west immediately.  The 
terms of the treaty with Britain included the cession of the Northwest Territory to the 
United States.  This makes up present day states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Wisconsin and parts of Minnesota.  This was the first official territory (colony) of the 
United States, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 gave its inhabitants some rights to 
public education, freedom of religion and abolition of slavery in return for solidified 
congressional control over this area, especially with regards to land sales.659 
The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 was the next in a series of land acquisitions by 
the Americans that would continue to greatly expand the territory available to the 
growing empire.  The Louisiana Purchase alone doubled the size of the United States.  
This was largely made possible because the British Navy was keeping the French tied up 
on the continent of Europe, making it nearly impossible for them to use the land anyway, 
and the $11.2 million dollars was badly needed by the French government.  The war of 
1812 between the British and Americans saw only small gains in territory for the 
Americans. 660  Florida was also annexed for $15 million in 1819, after the Spanish lost 
control of their colony.661 
In 1823, President Monroe, in his speech to Congress, articulated what would 
later be called the Monroe doctrine.  It was a three part doctrine;  
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…a reaffirmation of American neutrality in European affairs, a warning to 
the European nations not to interfere with the independent nations of the 
Western Hemisphere, and a pronouncement that the Western Hemisphere 
was no longer open to new colonization.662 
This doctrine was intended by President Monroe as one that would guide the 
national security policy of the United States and discourage foreign powers from 
involving themselves in the affairs of the United States.  This is yet another example of 
an isolationist doctrine, imbedded in U.S. grand strategy.  However, it later turned into a 
doctrine that also helped promote the expansion of the United States, another tenet of its 
grand strategy.  Those invoking the Monroe Doctrine did so as a “reaction to threats 
against the territorial and economic interests of the United States.”663  This was used 
carte blanche as a doctrine to support the imperial expansion of the United States, first as 
the U.S expanded westward, and then beyond the borders North America.664 
The next prize to acquire was Texas.  From the time Texas formally requested to 
be annexed by the United States until the time the United States actually added Texas to 
the Union was 10 years.  The U.S. had already offered Mexico $5 million dollars for it, 
but Congress was divided over the issue of adding a state that might upset the balance of 
slave states to free states.  As the President of Texas, Sam Houston tried to revive the 
issue by petitioning Britain to become a satellite state.  Even this did not work with 
another rejection by the Senate in 1844.  It finally became the twenty-eighth state in 
December 1845, after James K. Polk won a presidential election that had the annexation 
of Texas as a central issue.665  President Polk was a staunch imperialist, fully believing 
American exceptionalism and espousing a policy of expansionism.666  Shortly after his 
election, Polk made good on his promise to annex Texas, which incited the Mexican 
American War.    
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The Mexican American War actually started after Texas became a state.  The 
reason behind this war was American claims of $6.5 million dollars in damage to 
property by the Mexicans, which the Mexicans denied.  President Polk sent General 
Zachary Taylor to the Rio Grande in March of 1846.  The war was short and decisive, 
with the U.S. crushing the Mexicans.667  Ulysses S. Grant, one of the many participants 
who later went on to command troops in the Civil War, called the Mexican American 
War “one of the must unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.”668  The 
U.S. again greatly benefitted from this war.  The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 
February 1848 gave the U.S. Texas and land all the way to the Rio Grande for $5 million 
(to offset the citizens’ claims against Mexico).  In addition, the U.S. paid Mexico $15 
million for the land which is now comprises most of the land in the states of California, 
New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Colorado and Nevada.  The discovery of gold in California 
just before the treaty made this acquisition well worth the cost.669 
Upon the accession of California into the union in 1850, William Henry Seward 
made a speech to the Senate where he said,  
The world contains no seat of empire so magnificent as this, which … 
offers supplies on the Atlantic shores to the overcrowded nations of 
Europe, while on the Pacific coast it intercepts the commerce of the Indies.  
The nation thus situated must command … the empire of the seas, which 
alone is real empire.670 
The Oregon territory was annexed by an agreement with Canada that the 49th 
parallel as the upper limit of the United States expansion should be extended all the way 
to the Pacific Ocean.  The Gadsden Purchase of 1853 from Mexico added a small amount 
of land to New Mexico and Arizona for $10 million.  This was the most paid per acre by 
the U.S. for any land, at $.53 cents per acre.671  In 1868, Seward, now as Secretary of 
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State, bought Alaska from the Russians for $7.2 million.672  This expansion was 
relatively cheap, considering the amount of territory that was bought, and considering 
that no shots had to be fired to acquire it.  The United States spent a total of $77.2 million 
for 1,609,550,720 acres of land, 192 million of which had been free, just by drawing a 
line with Britain on the 49th parallel.673   
The movement west of people was also relatively easy, because the Native 
Americans were no match for the American soldiers and settlers or their weapons.  The 
population difference alone was massive.  In 1820, the indigenous population of Native 
Americans was roughly 325,000, or 3 percent of the American population.  From 1820 to 
1869, 6 million immigrants came to the U.S. looking for opportunities.  From 1869 to 
1913, another 16 million came.  Many of these immigrants headed west, where the 
enticement of free land for farming and the opportunity to start a new life brought a tidal 
wave of people into the Native American’s traditional hunting grounds.674 
The strategy of expansion in the late 1700’s and early to middle 1800’s proved to 
be extremely beneficial to the U.S., much like Roman expansion in the years of the 
Republic.  This expansion led to large increases in agricultural land availability and 
output, as Americans headed west and grew large families to tend to the farms.  The 
result was that, in many ways again like Rome, the early American economy was reliant 
upon agriculture more than any other method of income. From the earliest days, the 
American economy was reliant on agriculture and trade.675  In fact, “agriculture was the 
most important part of economic life from the foundation of Virginia to about 1890.”676  
An additional parallel, although contrary to what present day Americans want to admit, 
was that much of this land was won through conquest.  Although the land was purchased, 
these terms were the terms of treaties after the American Revolution, the War of 1812, 
and the Mexican American War.  The war on the Native American Indians was a war not 
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only of conquest, but also of genocide, completely wiping some tribes off the face of the 
earth and decimating others to a shell of their former strength. 
When expansion was hampered by “unreasonable people,” who were unwilling to 
sell their land, the U.S. took it by force.  U.S. exceptionalism preordained that this land 
would belong to Americans.  A few tribal nations were not going to get in the way of 
territorial expansion of the growing U.S. Empire.  This concept of exceptionalism took on 
a name of its own in 1845, when a journalist named John O’Sullivan, coined the term 
“Manifest Destiny.”  O’Sullivan wrote that it is “…the right of our manifest destiny to 
over spread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given 
us…”677  Manifest Destiny, as exceptionalism had before it, also had a religious 
overtone, using the concept of “Providence,” or God bestowing upon the Americans the 
right and responsibility to take over this land.  This helped some Americans justify 
wiping most of the Native American Indians off the face of the earth for economic gain, 
knowing that God had ordained it.  This expansion paved the way for the economic 
greatness that America would realize as this windfall profit in land was extremely 
valuable; not only because it was fertile, but it was abundant in natural resources as well. 
While the preponderance of the economy was agricultural in the beginning, this 
would soon being to change, as the Industrial Revolution made its way across the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Industry in colonial times had been crude compared to today’s 
standards, because manufacturing was done by a skilled craftsman with a few hand tools.  
Unlike today, where machines do most of the manufacturing, “the worker was the 
dominant factor in production.”678  The Industrial Revolution, which first started in 
America in the 1790’s, changed this forever.  In 1790, Samuel Slater, called the Father of 
the American Industrial Revolution, built the first textile mill in Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island.679  In 1794, Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin, which was a machine that 
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separated seeds from cotton more quickly than hand picking.680  In 1798, Whitney made 
an even more important contribution to the world of manufacturing, the concept of 
interchangeable parts.  The idea started with making muskets with interchangeable parts, 
because up until this time, firearms, like everything else were one of a kind, and crafted 
by hand.  This truly was a revolutionary concept, and many industries started to adopt the 
idea.681  This concept was what made modern manufacturing possible.  With machines 
making interchangeable parts, the products could be assembled at the end much faster.682  
Additionally products could be repaired with the same interchangeable part, instead of 
fabricating a new one by hand. 
One organizational breakthrough around this time that allowed the Industrial 
Revolution to really take off was the concept of the “Factory System.”  Previously, the 
“Outwork System” had been used, where “small parts of a larger production process were 
carried out in numerous individual homes.”683  However, when Boston Associates 
opened a textile factory in Massachusetts in 1823, they recruited thousands of farm girls 
to work as cheap labor in their centralized facility.684  Mass production was born.  As 
industry grew from cottage industry to the concentration of labor in factories and 
manufacturing plants, the industrial strength of the economy began to grow. 
Population growth was an important factor in economic growth.  The population 
between 1800 and 1860 doubled every 23 or 24 years, and every decade during that time 
frame increased by between 32 to 36 percent.685  This growth was still in a large part due 
to large farming families.  “A large family was a real economic asset in circumstances 
where labor was scarce.”686  Another area that helped population growth was emigration.  
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Many Europeans, especially Irish and Germans, immigrated to America primarily for 
economic opportunities not available in the homelands.  The influx of Irish increased 
significantly after potato famine of the 1840’s spurred a mass exodus of Irish citizens to 
America.687   
With the charter of the First United States Bank as part of a tariff law in 1789 
concerned with raising revenue and protecting American manufacturing, a financial 
mechanism was now in place to start increasing capital investment in America. 688  This 
greater flow of capital also had its downside.  The increase in the money supply due to 
lax lending standards by state banks led to “a wave of land-buying and speculation.”  
These inflationary credit policies and increases in private debt directly led to several 
panics, or depressions, most notably in 1819, 1837 and 1857.  Foreign capital was also 
particularly important in the American expansion.689  Much of this came from Great 
Britain, which, as was discussed in the last case study, received in return dividends that 
were 10 to 20 percent or greater annually.690  One way that foreign entities invested in 
the American market and in American industries were through long-term bonds.691  This 
was especially true in the growing transportation network, where foreign investments 
financed the construction of canals and railroads.692   
Panics notwithstanding, the general growth trend from the 1790’s to 1860 was 
upwards.  The growth was uneven due to these setbacks, but it was substantial 
nonetheless.  Using income as a determinant of growth, the average increase in income 
per capita until 1839 was 0.6 percent.  However from 1839 to 1899 it was 1.67 
percent.693  The growth was slower in the first 40 years of the nineteenth century, largely 
due to “the fact that agriculture was the largest single economic activity.  Total 
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production increased little faster than the population.”694  However, as industry started to 
pick up, so did the pace of economic growth.  By 1860, the U.S. was the number two 
industrial nation in the world,695 second only to Great Britain. 
With this economic growth came an increase in purchasing power.  Like the 
British before them, the American economy started to take on some traits of 
consumerism.  They also began to take on the trait of greed.  Foreigners visiting America 
in the first half of the nineteenth century noted “American’s mad rush after money and 
wealth.”696  Some of the more well-known department stores started to develop in the 
1850’s, such as Macy’s, Gimbel’s and Wanamaker’s.  As retail outlets became more 
popular, chain stores started opening at a rapid pace.  These retail establishments, coupled 
with mail order catalogs, which were first offered to the farmers in 1872 from 
Montgomery Ward and Company and in 1886 from Sears Roebuck and Company, all 
worked together to grow the American consumer market.697 
Although industry was starting to make a name for itself, in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, cotton was still the single most important commodity in the economic 
expansion of the United States.698   The South also exported tobacco and sugar, but 
Southern cotton was the single largest export after 1815.  “Between 1836 and 1840, 
cotton provided 63 percent of the total value of American exports.”699  This helped the 
Northeast, which provided “the services to finance, transport, insure and market the 
South’s cotton, but also supplied the South with manufactured goods.”700  The West 
provided the foodstuffs for the South, which in turn fueled Western expansion to meet the 
need of greater foodstuffs for a growing Southern labor force to harvest a growing supply 
of cotton.  Additionally, both the West and the South provided a market for the growing 
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manufacturing sector in the Northeast.  The increase in foreign demand for cotton 
brought in the revenue possible to fund the Northern and Western economic expansion.  
Cotton made all of this possible, and although not the only factor in American economic 
growth, was of major importance.701 
Two other factors contributed to this expanded production capability, the increase 
in foreign credit, which was discussed above, and the building of a transportation 
network to move raw materials to factories where they could be turned into finished 
goods, and to move finished goods from factories to markets where they could be sold.  
The transportation aspect was an essential part of the growth in the U.S. economy.  The 
Erie Canal, built in 1817 in New York, connected the cities of Albany on the Hudson 
River and Buffalo on Lake Erie.  This, along with the invention of the steamboat that 
could overpower currents to move upriver, started an explosion in canal building, so that 
by 1840, the United States had a growing network of regional waterways for 
commerce.702  These waterways were concentrated in the eastern half of the United 
States, specifically on major rivers like the Missouri, Ohio and Mississippi, and in the 
Great Lakes.   
Railroad was no less important, as railroads could reach all the way across the 
United States, something no canal could do.  The first transcontinental railroad was 
completed when the Central Pacific Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad were joined 
together at Promontory Summit in Utah.703  The connection of rail from coast to coast 
opened up new markets for manufactured goods.  Now a good could be transported from 
the East Coast to California for a more affordable price than by wagonload.  This also 
increased the pace of westward expansion.704 By 1860, the U.S. had thirty times the 
railroad mileage of Russia, and even three times the mileage of Great Britain, the number 
one economy in the world.705  This is not unreasonable though, given the incentives that 
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the U.S. government gave to the railroads for building a national transportation network.  
The U.S. government wrote the contracts, gave the loans, and also granted 640 acres of 
land to the railroad companies for each mile of track that they lay.  In all, over 200 
million acres of land were given to the railroads, making some of their owners rich.706  
These incentives were enormous, and gave the railroads an unfair advantage in 
competition with other industries, but ultimately helped to subsidize the upfront costs of 
building a national transportation network of railways.  These subsidies are one clear 
example of the unity of effort of fiscal policy and grand strategy at the time.  Land was 
cheap, because the government owned all of it, and since it was already paid for, it was 
an easy subsidy, to help entice railroads into putting in the significant costs needed to 
feed, house, and pay workers and buy the raw materials needed to lay thousands of miles 
of railroad track.  Fiscal policy was supporting the grand strategy of expansion, and 
likewise, expansion was supporting economic growth, which in turn increased 
government revenues and made the country stronger. 
The increase in manufacturing output was dramatic, and the numbers speak for 
themselves.  U.S. manufacturing output as a percentage of world output in 1830 was 2.4 
percent.  However, this had risen to 7.2 percent in 1860, a 200 percent increase in 
manufacturing output in 30 years.  To put this in perspective, in 1860 there were only two 
nations with a larger share of manufacturing output than the United States: Britain and 
France. 
Another clear indicator of the growth in industrialization is the level of energy 
usage of a complex society.  Kennedy states,  
But perhaps the best measure of a nation’s industrialization is its energy 
consumption from modern forms (that is, coal, petroleum, natural gas, and 
hydroelectricity, but not wood), since it is an indication both of a country’s 
technical capacity to exploit inanimate forms of energy and of its 
economic pulse rate.707 
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During the colonial era, and prior to the industrial revolution, wood had been “the 
universal source of fuel for industry as well as for the home.”708  However, this changed 
during the Industrial Revolution.  There were two significant reasons.  One reason is that 
wood was becoming less plentiful as much of the land had been cleared for farming, and 
therefore coal was a substitute source of fuel for heating homes and cooking.  The other 
reason is that the U.S. began to adopt this fuel source when it started to use the coal fed 
steam engines invented in Britain for industrial machinery.  By 1890, U.S. consumption 
of coal had slightly outpaced British consumption at 147 million metric tons to Britain’s 
145 million metric tons, and was the equivalent of all the consumption for Germany, 
France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan and Italy, despite having less than 20 percent of 
the combined population of these 6 nations.709  America had truly become a complex 
industrialized society.  With the economy connected, the industrial might of the United 
States, continued its growth and stimulated more western expansion.  The complex and 
interconnected nature of this growing empire made it susceptible to internal strife.   
The American Civil War was a devastating war that exploded from discontent 
into conflict because of a rift between the North and the South that had been growing 
between slave states and free states for decades.  In 1861, a debate which had been raging 
in politics for some years over state’s rights and the right to own slaves exploded.  The 
Civil War was by far the bloodiest conflict in all American history with a death toll of 
623,026.710  The Civil War split the North, who were fighting to keep the Union together, 
and the South, who were fighting to secede.  On January 1, 1863, President Lincoln 
signed the Emancipation Proclamation, which made the aim of the war twofold, to keep 
the Union together and to abolish slavery.    The war ended in April 1865.  The outcome 
was that the North won and the South was made to abolish slavery and stay as a part of 
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the United States.711  When the North won the war, and preserved the Union, the United 
States had averted a disaster that might have spelled the end to the growing empire.   
While the South was rebuilding from the war, the industrial machine of the North 
was still growing.  This time period, from 1860 to 1900, was not only a period of 
remarkable growth, but was a period of transformation.  “The most important factor in 
American economic life before 1860 had been the acquisition of vast new territories and 
the settlement of the West.”712  Although this trend continued after the American Civil 
War, there started to be a noticeable change.  While expansion continued into the Pacific 
and Caribbean, which will be discussed shortly, the economy that had subsidized its 
growth through land expansion, much like the Roman Empire, had nowhere to go.  A 
change was needed in order to sustain growth.  “The period around 1890 was a turning 
point in American economic life in that the settlement of the West and agriculture rapidly 
declined in relative importance and industry became the most significant element in the 
economy.”713  This is keenly evident in the fact that in 1889, the U.S. census reported 
that for the first time, the value of manufactured goods had surpassed the value of 
agricultural goods.714  By turning to industry, a large part of the American economy, 
which had previously expanded on cheap land grants, had to reorganize and concentrate 
on making wealth through manufacturing.  
Trade and finance were also growing, and in many ways complimenting each 
other.  The balance of trade shifted in favor of the United States.  Tariffs levied in 1864 
were set at the high rate of 48 percent due to protectionist legislation intended to shelter 
the home market from foreign competition.715  As a result, U.S. exports from 1860 to 
1914 increased from $334 million to $2.365 billion, a sevenfold increase while imports 
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only increased fivefold, from $356 million to $1.896 billion.716  When, in 1860, imports 
had been slightly more than exports, by 1914, exports outpaced ports by almost $500 
billion dollars.  “The vast expansion of foreign trade in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was closely linked to American overseas expansion, to greater foreign 
investments, and to the rapid growth of industrialism in the United States.”717  The 
balance of trade began to turn in favor of the U.S. in 1874, and with some fluctuation, by 
1894, the tide had permanently turned in favor of the United States, where exports were 
greater than imports.718  This “permanent” surplus lasted until 1975, when the balance 
swayed the opposite direction, and ever since 1976, the U.S. has had a balance of trade 
deficit, or has imported more than it has exported.719  
The U.S., as a result of its overwhelming amount of exports, began to affect the 
global market financially as well.  The result of the trade surplus meant that European 
nations had to pay for the extra exports by capital transfers, or in other words exporting 
gold bullion to the U.S.  This was added to the already high number of direct European 
investments in the U.S. which totaled about $7 billion dollars by 1914.  The situation was 
compounded by “the U.S. Treasury’s policy of accumulating (and then just sitting on) 
nearly one-third of the world’s gold stock.”720 
Population growth during this timeframe also helped with economic growth.  The 
period from 1861 to 1910 was the largest influx of immigrants in U.S. history.  During 
this time period, 23 million immigrants came to America, which accounted for 38 percent 
of population growth during this period.721  This contributed to industrialization because 
immigrants provided cheap labor for factories.722  Not only was the labor cheap, but it 
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was skilled.  Many of the laborers brought valuable skills with them.  For example in 
1899 alone, roughly 12 percent of the immigrants were skilled craftsmen.  This growing 
population significantly increased the workforce size as well.  From 1860 to 1910, the 
workforce in the United States went from 10.1 million workers to 37.7 million, an 
increase of over 250 percent in 50 years.723  This large influx of people from different 
countries and cultures speaking different languages also added significant complexities to 
the social and cultural makeup of America with the opening of the borders to 
immigration.  It was during this timeframe that American got the nickname, “the melting 
pot,” because of the vast array of cultures and languages that converged into one complex 
society. 
This “melting pot” also tended to keep to itself in the 1800s.  The grand strategy 
at the time was codified in the Monroe Doctrine, a doctrine of American expansion, and 
subsequent isolation from Europe and the Eastern Hemisphere.  With the exception of 
trade, immigration and some foreign relations, the Americans preferred to keep to 
themselves and not be bothered by the affairs of Europe.  This isolationist attitude not 
only informed U.S. grand strategy, but also helped fuel economic growth.  An isolationist 
power, separated by oceans from other major powers, with no perceived threat of attack, 
did not have to maintain a large military, and could therefore leverage its fiscal policy 
toward economic growth, instead of funding a large standing military.  For example, in 
1880, the U.S. only had a total of 34,000 members of all branches of the military, as 
compared with all the major European powers, who each had between 216,000 and 
543,000, and Russia who had 791,000.724  This enabled the U.S. to prosper without the 
significant fiscal expenses of a large military to drag down the economy through 
burdensome taxes to fund said military. 
At the same time as isolationists were concerned with consolidating the U.S., 
expansionists had their eyes set across the ocean.  While generally America was 
isolationist for nearly all of the nineteenth century, isolationism did not necessarily 
contradict expansion.  One part of isolationism was no European interference, and the 
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Monroe Doctrine had solidified this part of U.S. grand strategy.  However, expanding to 
the islands of the Pacific, away from the European powers was still seen by many as 
advantageous.  Once the United States had included the entire width of the continent of 
North America as part of its growing empire, and after the Civil War was over, it was 
logical that the next American frontier was the Pacific.  At first, the islands in the Pacific 
were seen as “desirable only as naval bases or sources of guano.”725  Midway was 
annexed in 1867 by Captain William Reynolds of the U.S.S. Lackawanna.  Ten years 
later the U.S. Navy got the rights to Pago Pago, a harbor on Tutuila of the Samoan Island 
Chain.726  Another island chain, Hawaii, is considered by Ferguson to be the first 
American colony in the Pacific.  In 1875, a free trade treaty was established between the 
U.S. and Hawaii.  In 1887, a coaling station was built in Pearl Harbor.  The minister to 
the island, John L. Stevens planned and executed the forcible overthrow of Queen 
Liliuokalani in an 1893 coup d’état.727  In 1897, Guam and Wake Island were added to 
the list of U.S. possessions.728  
Whereas before, expansion had led to subsuming territory into the Union as new 
states, this westward expansion (with the express exception of Hawaii), largely led to 
territorializing the islands where the U.S. expanded its presence.  These territories were a 
colony by a different name, and had both strategic implications, such as refueling U.S. 
Navy warships, and economic ones, with expanding trade and opening new markets for 
U.S. exports.  These islands also in some cases took on a representative form of 
government similar but subservient to the U.S., further solidifying the case of the United 
States as a true empire, and not just one in name only.  Other islands came into U.S. 
possession through another war, the Spanish American War.   
The Spanish American War was started because of an accidental explosion on the 
U.S.S. Maine, a Navy battleship, in Havana Harbor, Havana, Cuba in 1898.  The cause 
for war is irrelevant here, but essentially the accident was capitalized upon as an excuse 
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to wage war with Spain.  This was a ruse to allow for further expansion, quelling the 
isolationists by using “yellow journalism”729 to shift popular opinion in support for the 
war.  The war lasted three months, and after the war was over, the United States 
benefitted in getting both Puerto Rico and the Philippines as overseas colonial assets for 
the cost of $20 million dollars.  The Filipinos did not want to be annexed, and under the 
leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, they rebelled.  This led to a war that did not end until 
July 1902.730  Ultimately, the Spanish- American War, and the follow-on Philippine 
Insurrection, were just additional excuses to expand.  The Philippines offered a large new 
market, and access to Asia, while both Puerto Rico and Cuba allowed the U.S. to start its 
expansion into the Caribbean.  This also offered an opportunity for the U.S. to spread its 
ideals of exceptionalism, into allegedly more dark and backwards lands.  These territories 
would be forced to adopt the enlightened U.S. form of governance, as territories or 
colonies of the empire. 
Theodore Roosevelt, in reviving the Monroe Doctrine, came up with what is 
known as the Roosevelt Corollary.  The Roosevelt Corollary stated:  
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening 
of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately 
require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western 
Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine 
may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of 
wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police 
power.731 
This allowed the U.S. to involve itself in the Western Hemisphere where 
intervention was required as the U.S. deemed necessary.  Roosevelt, and his successors, 
Taft and Wilson used this to get involved in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely 
Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Panama.732  The Panama Canal resulted 
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from this intervention, was opened in 1914 and stayed under American control until 
1979.733 
Therefore, it is evident to this point that territorial expansion had both grand 
strategic and economic advantages.  Strategically, the U.S. had isolated itself from major 
peer competitors by grabbing territory that separated it by an ocean between both Europe 
and Asia.  Also, island expansion ensured a strategic cushion between the U.S. and other 
powers, and also afforded Navy bases and refueling stations, much like the British 
Empire before them.  This ocean cushion enabled the U.S. to spend significantly less than 
its peer competitors on defense, and instead allowed it to leverage fiscal policy toward 
continued economic expansion.  This harmony between fiscal policy and grand strategy 
was clearly successful, because by 1894 the U.S. economy was the largest economy in 
the world.734  From an economic standpoint, U.S. expansion had linked the breadth of a 
continent, which garnered significant and abundant natural resources and arable land 
suitable for agriculture.  Islands territories (or colonies by another name) also provided 
captive markets, and refueling locations for global shipping of American manufactured 
goods.  Isolation from competition, coupled with expansion into foreign lands which was 
based in part on spreading American exceptionalism, was alive and well, reiterating 
American grand strategy and its continued alliance with fiscal policy, which saw even 
more gains through economic expansion. 
There was another significant event in 1914 besides the opening of the Panama 
Canal that would affect America’s future: World War I. The Americans did not want to 
get involved in a war in Europe due to isolationism.  “The isolationist American public 
had little concern if the British and Germans tangled on the high seas.”735  However, 
Germany declared unrestricted submarine warfare against all shipping.736  This quickly 
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changed American sentiments with the sinking of the cruise ship Lusitania on May 15, 
1915, which had on board 128 Americans who died as civilian bystanders to a foreign 
conflict.  President Wilson wanted to join the war to protect Britain.  British democracy 
was superior to German authoritarianism.  On April 2, 1917, the U.S. declared war on 
Germany, bringing the U.S. out of isolation and into the First World War.737  This was a 
potential opportunity for the U.S. exceptionalism to export democracy to Europe. 
The United States began mobilizing the industrial base to meet the needs for war 
as early as 1916, after the Lusitania made it became more and more apparent that the 
U.S. would be dragged into the war.  The United States was able to mobilize its industrial 
base through “voluntarism.”  This meant that businesses volunteered to retool their 
factories to make implements of war, where previously most had only made consumer 
products.  This was marginally effective, so the U.S. government stepped in with the 
creation of the War Industries Board and helped centralize the effort in order to more 
efficiently mobilize the industrial base for war.  Armistice Day on November 11, 1918, 
ended the war, and soon after on January 1, 1919, the War Industries Board closed its 
doors. 738 
Figuratively speaking, America also closed its doors, plunging back into 
isolationism after World War I.  This new period of isolation colored the grand strategy, 
which pushed for demobilization of the military, and concentration of fiscal policies 
again towards growth.  This was legislatively supported by the U.S. government’s fiscal 
policy of trade tariffs on foreign manufactured goods, which were levied in order to 
insulate American industry from foreign competition.739 The 1920’s transformed 
America as an economic boom was realized from the industrial advances of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries caught up with the economy. 
The United States continued to grow as consumer based or consumer driven 
economy because the boom in manufacturing allowed for households to buy more and 
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more goods more cheaply than before.740  This was much like Great Britain, although 
Britain really started to become a consumer economy because of the products imported 
from colonies, and later continued the trend as an industrial nation, whereas the U.S. 
really became a consumer economy as a result of industrialization.  This consumerism 
was made possible by rising wages, falling prices, and the changing nature of credit.  The 
concept of cash-and-carry started to become popular, where the customer would package 
the items themselves, or the manufacturer would package the goods before it hit the store.  
This decrease in service led to lower prices, and allowed grocers to expand into 
supermarkets.741  Before World War I, commercial credit was usually based on a credit 
line that was extended for two to three years.  However, with the introduction of the 
installment plan, i.e. fixed monthly payments over an agreed upon period of time, many 
more products became available for purchase.  Banks were the ones to furnish the credit, 
so this led to significant growth in the banking industry.742 
Many started to buy products that were previously available only to the rich, such 
as automobiles.  This time period was known as the “Roaring Twenties.”743  Even the 
prohibition of alcohol, rendered illegal in 1919 by the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution,744 could not spoil the fun of the “Roaring Twenties.”745 However, the stock 
market crash of October 1929 did.  In the 1920’s the stock market had dramatically 
increased, creating a bubble. 746  In all actuality, this was a debt bubble, due to the large 
amount of debt that had been issued in order to buy more stock.  From 1925 to September 
1929, the value of the New York Stock Exchange increased from $27 billion to $87 
billion.  This threefold increase in wealth in four years fueled even more investment.  On 
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Tuesday, October 29, 1929, the Stock Market Crashed, and 16 million shares were 
exchanged for lesser value.747 
This loss of wealth plunged the country into the Great Depression.  Although only 
10 percent of Americans in 1929 owned any stock, there were other problems with the 
American economy that set off the Great Depression.748  Corporate profits hit an all-time 
high of 8.98 percent of GDP.749  The massive increase in corporate profits had created a 
bubble due to over investment in expansion.  Workers’ wages had increased marginally, 
while the increase in wealth of the richest one percent of Americans was huge.  The top 
one percent of Americans owned one third of the nation’s assets.  The middle class was 
too indebted, with too many purchasing cars and household appliances on credit.  Banks 
had encouraged reckless investment in the stock market.  The lack of bank guarantees 
created panic, which lead to runs on banks.  At least 9,000 banks failed after the stock 
market crash.750 
The Great Depression was not isolated to the United States. This depression, 
though starting in America, affected the world economy, especially the economies of 
Europe, a testament to the already complex and interconnected nature of the global 
market economy in 1929.   In an effort to shield businesses from competition because of 
the loss of liquidity, businesses pushed Congress to pass the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 
1930.  However, this exacerbated the problem, as contracting European economies were 
not able to consume their own products, so they stopped importing American goods, and 
retaliated with their own tariffs.  The crisis worsened as a result, and soon became a 
global depression, which had its origins in the United States.751 
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The response by the newly elected president, Herbert Hoover, was seen as 
inadequate.  The New York Stock Exchange was only worth $15 billion in 1932 as 
compared to $87 billion in 1929.  The national unemployment rate was 25 percent.752  
Franklin D. Roosevelt won the 1932 election in a landslide victory of 472 electoral votes 
to 59 for Hoover.  Promptly, F.D.R. announced his “New Deal.”  The “New Deal” was a 
social contract with the American people to make changes that would spur economic 
growth.753  In 1935, both the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act 
were passed.  The NLRA transformed labor relations in the United States, strengthening 
workers’ rights.754  Under the “New Deal,” many social and economic changes took 
place that transformed America and ushered in many of the social welfare programs that 
still exist today, such as Social Security.755   
The New Deal also created jobs through several government programs. The 
Civilian Conservation Corps created about 2 million jobs.  This organization was aimed 
at unemployed single males from ages 17 to 25.  They were paid $30 dollars a month, 
lived in military style camps and built bridges, reservoirs and many other infrastructure 
projects.  The Civil Works Administration put another 4 million to work, and the Works 
Progress Administration created over 9 million additional jobs.756    
However, these fiscal stimulus policies, also known as Keynesian economic 
policies, were not free.  In 1932, when F.D.R. took office, both spending and the deficit 
skyrocketed, while revenues plummeted.  Federal Spending increased by $1.082 billion 
to $4.659 billion, posting a deficit of $2.735 billion.  Part of the reason for the deficit was 
plummeting tax revenues, which dropped from $3.116 billion to $1.924 billion, a loss of 
38 percent.  This was the single biggest loss in tax revenue during the Great Depression.  
In 1934, although tax revenues went up by almost $1 billion dollars to $2.955 billion, 
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spending went up by almost $2 billion to $6.541 billion, increasing the deficit by almost a 
billion dollars to $3.586 billion.  This was problematic, as the deficit alone from 1932 
until 1936 was more than the tax revenues in each year.  That means that in each of these 
years, the U.S. government was spending more than twice the amount of money that was 
coming in through tax revenues (See Appendix B).757   
This was unheard of at the time, because historically, the United States had done a 
pretty good job of living within its means, normally posting surpluses, and only posting 
deficits during war periods.  The debts were then paid off during the postwar period. 758  
The government had not only kept within its means regularly, but had required relatively 
little in the way of revenues as well.  For the 1700s and most of the 1800’s, revenues 
were primarily collected through tariffs on imported goods, and on taxes on alcohol, 
tobacco, sugar and carriages.  One exception to this was that the income tax was first 
introduced in 1861 to pay for the Civil War, but after the war, popular disdain caused 
politicians to rescind it in 1872.759  In fact corporate profits did not start being taxed in 
America until 1909, and even then it was in an effort to pay down debt and attempt to 
maintain no personal income tax.760  Nonetheless, the personal income tax started 4 years 
later, when the 16th Amendment to the Constitution allowed the taxation of personal 
income in 1913. 761  This was how fiscal policy with respect to budgeting and taxation 
was handled in the United States until the Great Depression.762 
The United States muddled through the 1930’s with fiscal policy geared toward 
nothing but survival of the desperate American people and repair of the flailing American 
economy.  These New Deal fiscal stimulus policies, greatly expanded the social welfare 
state in the United States, and through various public works programs cheaply built 
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significant infrastructure that would help propel the U.S. economy toward further growth 
after World War II.  However, while important for laying the groundwork for U.S. 
modern infrastructure, and helping put people back to work, these fiscal policies were not 
successful in ending the Great Depression.  In fact, the double dip recession in 1937, was 
due to fiscal policy gone awry.763  Specifically, it was due to Keynesian fiscal policies 
being in place for too long.  In 1939, the unemployment rate was still 19 percent.  Herein 
lays the problem with Keynesian economic policies.  Although they can temporarily 
affect the involuntary unemployment rate, they do not permanently change the structural 
issues that cause the unemployment.  Therefore, sometimes, as in the Great Depression, 
they can have some positive effect because prices had dropped as a result of several years 
of depression before the Keynesian policies were enacted.  Additionally, there had never 
been a precedent of this type of policy being used, so special interests groups in the 
economy were not able to manipulate its effects the same way as they were later.764  
However, this was not Keynes fault.  In fact, the idea of a permanent stimulus was not 
what Keynes was advocating at all.  He was in favor of getting rid of the fiscal stimulus 
once full employment had been achieved.  Thus, apart from the necessity of central 
controls to bring about an adjustment between the propensity to consume and the 
inducement to invest, there is no more reason to socialize economic life than there was 
before.”765  This is a sticking point that has squarely divided economists over the years.  
However, the unemployment rate did not return to pre-Depression era levels until 1943.  
The massive spending and wartime mobilization of the economy to fight World War II 
was what actually ended the Great Depression.766 
The entrance of the United States into World War II was precipitated because of a 
direct attack by the Japanese on the U.S. Navy stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 
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December 7, 1941.767  The war had actually started on September 2, 1939 with the 
invasion of Poland, but the United States did not enter until it was attacked by the 
Japanese over two years later.  The mobilization of the wartime economy included 
mobilizing women to fill jobs that men had previously held while the men filled the ranks 
of the military.  Nazi Germany surrendered to the U.S., Britain and Soviet Union on May 
8, 1945.768  The Japanese continued to fight until the U.S. dropped two atomic bombs on 
the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945.  The Japanese surrendered 
on August 14, 1945.769 
With the end of World War II came the rise of the United States as a 
superpower.770  In 1945, the United States held 50 percent of worldwide manufacturing 
output,771 due to widespread economic devastation during World War II and the massive 
mobilization of the economy needed to fight a two front offensive World War.  These 
factors, coupled with having already been the largest world economy for 50 years and 
also having a large and powerful military on the winning side of the war, put the United 
States into a position of world leadership.  It also led to the U.S. brokering the peace for 
World War II.  In the immediate postwar period, the United States also orchestrated the 
rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan, named for General George C. Marshall.    
As Secretary of State after the war, Marshall outlined his economic aid plan in a speech 
at Harvard University in the spring of 1947.772  While the Marshall Plan was certainly a 
good example of the United States extending its hand to help rebuild war torn nations, it 
also had an ulterior motive.  The U.S. was able to remake the European economy, with it 
being dependent upon the United States.  This, along with the Bretton-Woods 
Conference, which created several institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, 
                                                 
767 Ferguson, Colossus, 61–62. 
768 ushistory.org, “D-Day and the German Surrender,” U.S. History Online Textbook, 2011, 1, 
Accessed November 2, 2011, http://www.ushistory.org/us/51c.asp. 
769 ushistory.org, “The Decision to Drop the Bomb,” U.S. History Online Textbook, 2011, 1, Accessed 
November 2, 2011, http://www.ushistory.org/us/51g.asp. 
770 Itai Sneh, “World War II.” Encyclopedia of American Studies, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2010, 1, Accessed November 2, 2011. 
http://www.credoreference.com.libproxy.nps.edu/entry/jhueas/world_war_ii. 
771 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 432. 
772 NobelPrize.org, “George C. Marshall Biography,” NoblePrize.Org, 1, Accessed November 2, 
2011, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/marshall-bio.html. 
 157 
the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, allowed the United 
States to also transform the global economy with the U.S. as the reserve currency and the 
global economic leader.  This was a case of pure imperial economic expansion, allowing 
the U.S. to heavily influence the European markets, and helping to export U.S. 
manufactured goods to Europe.  The U.S. also established the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, an organization that would ally much of Europe with the United States 
during the Cold War.773  As brokers of the peace, as well as leading, planning and 
financing the rebuilding effort in Europe through the Marshall Plan, the U.S. became a 
major player on the world stage.  However, at the same time the majority of the American 
electorate still had strong feelings of isolation.   
After WWII, the U.S. faced a strategic dilemma of what to do.  This dilemma was 
quickly solved with the rise of the Soviet Union as a communist menace.  Although allies 
in a common cause to beat Hitler, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were soon engaged in 
their own war; the Cold War.  The Cold War was a war of ideology, fought between the 
ideology of communism, espoused by the Soviet Union, and the ideology of democracy 
and capitalism, supported by the United States.  The term cold war originated in a 1945 
article “You and the Atom Bomb,” by George Orwell, where Orwell discussed a post war 
world where, Russia, China and the U.S. with their nuclear arsenals would put these three 
“superstates” into a “permanent state of cold war.”774 The strategy of containment that 
the United States pursued during the Cold War was originally taken from “The Long 
Telegram,” a telegram written by George Kennan, a Foreign Service Officer in Russia.  It 
was published in 1947 in Foreign Affairs as an article called “The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct” by X.775  Kennan envisioned a strategy that would use economic and 
diplomatic means to contain the Soviet ideology, allowing it to eventually crumble.  Paul 
Nitze, a contemporary of Kennan, saw things differently.  He advocated a military means 
to contain communism, which was largely advocated in his contribution, National 
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Security Council Resolution 68 or NSC 68.  In NSC 68, the military was reorganized to 
meet the threat of Communism, and fight the war of containment.776  The Cold War was 
a peculiar war in that, “There were no direct military campaigns between the two main 
antagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet billions of dollars and millions 
of lives were lost in the fight.”777  However, there were wars that were fought, just not 
between the United States and the Soviet Union directly.  
The wars were not fought directly between the two superpowers.  Instead there 
were several proxy wars, or wars within the Cold War.  The first was the Korean War, 
which started when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded South Korea 
on June 25, 1950.778  The war lasted 3 years, and on July 27, 1953, in a stalemate, an 
armistice was signed with the dividing line being again the 38th Parallel. 779   Another 
proxy war within the Cold War was Vietnam.  Involved as early as 1950, by 1954, the 
U.S. had split Vietnam in half at the 17th Parallel to contain Communism.780  Two North 
Vietnamese Gunboats firing upon a U.S. warship, led to the passage of the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution, giving the President a blank check to wage war in Vietnam with an actual 
declaration of war.781  The “war did not go well for the United States.”782  In the U.S. 
there had been a growing resistance to the war until there was no longer any political 
support for the war, a clear indication that isolationism was still strong in the American 
people.  In January of 1973, the Paris Peace Accords signaled the end of U.S. combat 
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operations in Vietnam.783  These two proxy wars were a clear indication that the U.S. 
was willing to export its exceptionalism, because in both cases, the U.S. installed 
democratic governments on the side it was supporting in the wars, both in South Korea 
and South Vietnam. 
The United States attempted to contain the spread of Communism from the Soviet 
Union wherever they might try to spread it. The grand strategy of containment led to a 
fiscal policy that in the beginning, under Truman and Eisenhower, was more concerned 
with economic strength of America.  Some might argue that the increased spending for 
the Cold War necessitated deficit spending.  This was however, not consistent with the 
thinking or actions of the Presidents at the beginning of the Cold War, although increased 
spending would become more popular later on, especially during the Reagan 
Administration.  A budget surplus was again seen in 1947.  However, in the 64 years 
since 1947, the United States has seen only 12 budget surpluses, and 52 budget deficits.  
In other words, over 80 percent of the time since the end of the budget deficits after 
World War II, the U.S. government has spent more than it has made in revenue.784  This 
is problematic, as this trend of spending more than what was made in tax revenues was 
present in both the days of the Romans and the British towards the end of their Empires.  
Initially though, there was a relatively strong sense of fiscal discipline. In 1949, 
the Defense budget was cut in the face of growing Soviet aggression.  Congressman 
George Mahon, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense said, 
“Nothing would please our potential enemy better than to have us bankrupt our country 
and destroy our economy by maintaining over the years complete readiness.”785  Many 
members of Congress were concerned with the “large-scale borrowing, destabilizing 
inflation, and the accumulation of enormous amounts of new debt” that would follow 
from funding a large standing military.  This would weaken America’s strong and stable 
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economy.786  It was also the belief of both President Truman and President Eisenhower 
that “a strong economy and sound national finances were vital to the country’s 
security.”787 
This is evident in their fiscal policies, as shown through their budgets and their 
impact on the national debt.  As was stated above, only a total of 12 years after World 
War II until the present day have had a budget surplus, however, six of these years were 
under the combined Presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower.  When Truman took office 
at the end of World War II, the national debt had been at 110 percent of GDP.  By the 
time Eisenhower left office in 1960, the national debt was just under 60 percent of GDP.  
This is an incredible accomplishment, especially when considering that during this time 
period, defense spending rose considerably because of the Korean War, from 5 percent of 
GDP in 1949 to 14 percent of GDP in 1953.788 In his farewell speech upon leaving 
office, Eisenhower warned, “We cannot mortgage the material assets of our 
grandchildren without asking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage.  We 
want democracy to survive for all generations, not become the insolvent phantom of 
tomorrow.”789 
As a result of the strength in manufacturing coming out of World War II and the 
prudent fiscal policies of Truman and Eisenhower, the 1950’s were also a time of 
economic prosperity.  Although the 1950’s were also the start of America’s relative 
economic decline, this is understandable.  Fully 50 percent of world manufacturing 
output in 1945 was from the United States, and this percentage could not possibly be 
maintained.  By 1953, the U.S. share of world manufacturing output had fallen to 44.7 
percent.790  An important point here is that the U.S. was and still is the largest economy 
in the world, but started declining relative to other nations, almost immediately after 
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World War II.  However, relative decline does not mean lack of growth.  The U.S. 
economy was still growing, but just not as quickly as other nations.   
There were three obvious reasons for this relative decline that were positive in 
nature and four additional reasons that were negative.  For one thing, the United States 
had grown at a very high rate for a long time already; therefore, room for additional 
growth was already less than other countries in the world.  A second point is that using 
the metric of output per man per hour, the U.S. was already operating at a much higher 
level of efficiency than any other country in the world.  Additionally, the U.S. was not 
structurally damaged by the war like Russia and the European Powers, so while many of 
these countries were able to rebuild their infrastructure with the newest equipment, the 
U.S. still had its older factories.   The first negative reason was the “fiscal and taxation 
policies encouraged high consumption but a low personal savings rate.”791  Two other 
reasons include that with the exception of the military, research and development 
investment had declined, and defense expenditures as a proportion of Gross National 
Product or GNP were higher than any other country.  The final reason was that “an 
increasing proportion of the American population was moving from industry to services, 
that is, into low-productivity fields.”792 
Initially however, this relative decline was masked in the 1950’s and 1960’s 
because of the growth in American technology, especially in aircraft, and the consumer 
boom that followed the purchase of what Paul Kennedy calls “flashy cars and color 
televisions.”793  In this era, increased consumer spending was an indication of the real 
wage growth that occurred in this time period.  For example, total wages increased from 
$112 billion in 1946, to $312 billion in 1963.  Wages had more than doubled in a space of 
17 years.  Additionally, U.S. Gross National Product increased from $332 billion to $585 
billion in the same time frame.  This equates to a 43 percent increase in the total size of 
the U.S. economy.794  These are clear signals of economic prosperity.  During this time, 
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the fiscal environment was also pro-growth, largely due to the policies of Truman and 
Eisenhower.795  Due to the positive growth and budgetary discipline exercised through 
trade-offs of a combination of balancing spending and taxation, President Kennedy was 
left with a surplus when he came into office of $301 billion.796 
Kennedy embarked on a military buildup, using the surplus and the growing 
economy to allow him to do so without raising taxes.  He thought that President 
Eisenhower had relied too heavily on nuclear deterrence, and wanted a broader range of 
military options.797  His campaign slogan was decidedly imperialist, as Kennedy said 
“We stand on the edge of a New Frontier.”798  Kennedy sought to export U.S. 
exceptionalism through such programs as the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress, 
to civil action organizations that provided aid to developing nations.799  This is yet 
another example of American politics and the underlying imperial grand strategy that 
pervaded it. 
When President Johnson took office after President Kennedy’s assassination, he 
envisioned a “Great Society.”  This was the term for his social welfare programs.  
Johnson was concerned that the Vietnam War would get in the way of his social welfare 
programs that he advocated in the Great Society.800  He decided to increase commitment 
to the war in Vietnam without increasing the fiscal commitment from the people in the 
form of increased taxes, decreased spending elsewhere, or some combination of the two.  
Johnson is quoted as saying, “We can continue the Great Society while we fight in 
Vietnam.”801  Although he was warned by his economic advisor Gardner Ackley in 
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December 1965 that he would need to raise taxes significantly to counter inflation, 
Johnson did not listen. In 1965, Johnson also pressured Federal Reserve Chairman Bill 
Martin, against his better judgment, to “keep interest rates down so that the economy 
would continue to grow at a rapid rate and generate sufficient tax revenues to pay the 
mounting costs of his domestic and military programs.”802  Inflation surged in 1966, and 
Martin stated, “Monetary policy has done about all that it properly can.”803  However, by 
refusing to raise taxes or cut spending, Johnson had misaligned fiscal policy and grand 
strategy by relying solely on economic growth pay for increasing costs in both social 
programs and an escalating war.  The budget deficit had increased 133 percent in 1967 to 
$8.643 billion, but the deficit increased nearly 300 percent in 1968, jumping to $25.161 
billion.804  President Johnson imposed a tax surcharge and some domestic spending cuts 
in 1968, but it was too little, implemented too late.  Needless to say, Johnson’s fiscal 
policies were not effective and signal the start of a disturbing trend in American fiscal 
policy: that of a widening chasm between the grand strategy and the means to pay for it.  
His poor policies affected the economy going into Nixon’s term, by sending inflation 
higher and sending the economy into a recession.805 
The presidency of Johnson was a critical departure from sound fiscal policy and 
grand strategy.  It was here that the first significant disconnect between fiscal policy and 
grand strategy can be seen in the American case.  Johnson completely disregarded sound 
policy advice from his economic advisors and attempted to grow the economy by 
increasing spending on social programs, increase spending on a war, and not increase 
revenues to match with this increase in spending.806  Conveniently of course, this policy 
of additional spending in the economy to make it grow was accomplished while spending 
on the social programs that were a part of Johnson’s Great Society.  However, the amount 
of growth necessary to both outpace inflation and provide additional revenue for 
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significant increases in spending was unrealistic.  This clear departure of fiscal policy and 
grand strategy from each other, and from sound fiscal policy practices in general, was the 
first in a series of American presidents and legislatures departing from the basic concepts 
of budgeting.  Johnson envisioned a legacy of social programs and did not want a legacy 
of war.  Instead, not only did he leave a legacy of war, but he also left a legacy of poor 
fiscal policy, which affected the economy of the 1970’s. 
The increase in spending with no appreciable increase in revenue brought on 
inflation that would be a drag on the economy going into the 1970s.807  However, the 
economy had already started an ominous trend that stunted growth, similar to the one 
experienced by the British.  The U.S. started to invest large amounts of money into 
Europe and other foreign countries, “allegedly turning those countries into economic 
satellites.”808  This coupled with expanding U.S. multinational corporations and the 
export of “sophisticated management techniques imbued by American business schools,” 
809 all led to a general feeling of American supremacy.  Labor was cheaper in foreign 
countries, so investment allowed for U.S. goods to be manufactured more cheaply 
overseas, and also opened up overseas markets.  However, the trend eventually shifted so 
that the surplus capital made on exports of goods, food supplies and “invisible” services 
coming back into the U.S. did not exceed the outflow of capital to foreign countries.810  
This was essentially the trade deficit that started in in 1976 and has continued ever 
since.811 
This was key turning point in the U.S. economy, just as it was in the British 
economy.  Just as the British had experienced, the U.S. gains from foreign investment 
were initially very lucrative but eventually were not bringing in as much capital as was 
being exported.  It is interesting that the decline of a modern economy, in both the British 
and American case, should coincide with the rise of capital investment in emerging 
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markets.  This has typically been the defining factor of a modern economy, but seems to 
also be the defining factor in the decline of that same economy.  One reason for this may 
be that there is no longer incentive to invest in new technology to update the 
manufacturing base and infrastructure in the homeland, which inherently puts whatever 
manufacturing sector, is left at a significant disadvantage, as it is competing with newer 
technology in foreign countries that also have lower labor costs.  This could be the topic 
of another thesis, but is an unmistakable commonality between both Britain and the 
United States at the time of their economic decline. 
When President Nixon took office, he had a surplus in his first year, due to the tax 
increases imposed by Johnson.  Nixon started to deescalate the war subsequently cut 
military spending, from 8.7 percent of GDP in 1969 to 5.9 percent in 1973.  However, the 
damage by President Johnson’s poor fiscal policies had already been done.  Inflation in 
1970 hit 5.5 percent.  In 1971, Nixon took the U.S. off the gold standard, free floating the 
U.S. dollar against foreign currencies, which undermined the Bretton Woods system that 
the U.S. had implemented after World War II, because the U.S. was no longer financially 
strong enough to continue to make it work.812  President Nixon also imposed wage and 
price controls, in an effort to stabilize the economy, but they were unevenly applied and 
caused major market imbalances.813  Wage and price controls are typically instituted in 
order to combat inflation, but as was seen in the Roman Case, Diocletian’s attempt at 
wage and price controls made the problem larger, eventually leading to hyperinflation. 
One of the problems with wage and price controls is that they do not usually get the wage 
or price set at the correct value, in relation to other values.  For example, as outlined in 
the Roman case, Diocletian did not accurately account for transportation costs.  Nixon’s 
wage and price controls, worked no better than Diocletian’s attempt over 1,600 years 
before.  After Israel defeated its Arab enemies in the Yom Kippur War, the price of oil 
shot up when the Arab nations used OPEC to increase oil prices in retaliation for the 
defeat.  This further harmed the economy, which soon felt significant inflation.  President 
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Ford and President Carter were unable to stop the rise in inflation, which went above 18 
percent in the summer of 1980 under President Carter.814 
In order to fix the economy, President Reagan introduced a fiscal policy plan 
which was called “Reaganomics.”  He proposed tax cuts, mostly on the upper classes, in 
order to encourage investment in the economy, called trickle-down economics.  However, 
this plan did not work.  Reagan’s saving grace was that in August 1979, before he was 
even elected, Paul Volcker had been brought on as the Federal Reserve Chairman.815  
Volker and the Federal Reserve raised interest rates from 12.28 percent in October of 
1980 to 18.9 percent in December of 1980.816  This triggered a recession from 1981-
1982.817  By raising interest rates sharply, Volcker deliberately traded off short term 
growth by triggering a recession, for long term control of inflation, a disinflationary 
monetary policy.818 The interest rate eventually stabilized at 5 percent by the end of 
1983,819 and the economy began to grow. 
The 1980’s also saw resurgence in active measures to contain the Soviet Union 
and win the Cold War.820  President Reagan embarked on an expensive buildup that was 
due to a “window of vulnerability” to Soviet nuclear attack.821  President Reagan’s fiscal 
policies caused “large-scale increases in defense expenditures, plus considerable 
decreases in taxation, but without significant reductions in federal spending elsewhere,” 
(emphasis in original).822  This caused the U.S. Federal debt to balloon.  In 1980, when 
Reagan took office, the national debt was roughly $900 billion dollars.  When he left 8 
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years later, it had tripled in size to $2.7 trillion dollars.823  President Reagan’s fiscal 
policies had turned “the world’s largest creditor to the world’s largest debtor nation, in 
the space of a few years,” (emphasis in original).824  This was the same milestone that 
Britain achieved as a result of World War I.  Reagan, while hailed as a hero by 
conservatives and liberals alike, set the U.S. on a poor fiscal footing. 
Reagan’s fiscal policy turned toward leveraging the economy to fund the effort to 
build up a military capable of beating the Soviet Union.  Ultimately, this was a clear 
disconnect of fiscal policy and grand strategy.  There may have been the illusion of 
alignment, as it was thought prudent to ‘outspend’ the Soviet Union.  Whether or not this 
deficit spending by Reagan actually caused the collapse is not known, however, based on 
structural problems in the Soviet economy, it is likely that the Soviet Union would have 
eventually suffered from its own political and economic collapse anyway.  There was no 
real end to the Cold War, as the Soviet Union broke up starting in June of 1989 and 
ending in December of 1991.825  This caused a problem of historical closure.  “The 
events that had taken place during the cold war simply ceased happening, and the 
narratives that had endowed historical events with their intelligibility simply broke 
off.”826  This caused a strategic dilemma for Americans of what to do next. 
Francis Fukuyama coined the phrase “end of history,” as a symbol of closure, 
trying to signal that once and for all, the Western way of life had triumphed over 
Communism.827  This was really was nothing more than another assertion of American 
exceptionalism.  When the Soviet Union fell, the strategy of containment was deemed 
justified, and the profligate spending that accompanied the strategy in the latter half of 
the Cold War was likewise seen as necessary.  This was seriously flawed thinking, and 
allowed the strategic mismatch between fiscal policy and grand strategy to continue.  
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There was no acknowledgement of what had led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, as 
many assumed that it was deficit spending that had bankrupted the rival of the U.S.  This 
gave politicians carte blanche to use deficit spending as a tool to win wars in the future. 
As the Cold War came to a close, a separate conflict in the Middle East flared up.  
In August of 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait.  The U.S. responded with Operation 
Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, a U.S. military operation defending Saudi Arabia and 
pushing the Iraqi’s out of Kuwait.828  This was not the only menace from the Middle 
East, as the 1990’s also saw the rising threat of terrorism.  On February 26, 1993, a bomb 
in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center in New York City went off, 
killing 6 people, and wounding over 1,000.829  Terrorism would continue to be a growing 
problem throughout the 1990’s.830 
The next phase in U.S. fiscal policy was somewhat similar to the British 10 year 
rule, when the British justified that they would not fight in another war for at least 10 
years, and therefore cut defense spending as a peace dividend.  The same was true in the 
U.S., as the post- Cold War 1990’s were a time of significant personnel and budget cuts 
to defense spending under President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton.  The 
U.S. military went from 2.1 million personnel under President Bush to 1.4 million under 
President Clinton,831 and spending was cut appropriately in conjunction with these cuts.  
President Clinton also managed to balance the budget 1998 and bring in a surplus in the 
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830 The start of terrorist attacks on the U.S. originating from Islamic groups started in 1979 when 
radical Islamic students in Tehran, Iran kidnapped 66 Americans from the U.S. Embassy. The threat 
intensified in the 1990’s.  On August 7, 1998, the U.S. Embassy’s at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, 
Kenya were simultaneously bombed.  A total of 224 Americans were killed, 213 in Kenya and 11 in 
Tanzania, with over 4,500 injured.  On October, 12, 2000, the U.S.S. Cole, a U.S. Navy guided missile 
destroyer, which was in port at Aden, Yemen, was severely damaged during a refueling detail when shaped 
charge from a small boat ripped through the hull, killing 17 sailors. See infoplease, “Terrorist Attacks in the 
U.S. or Against Americans,” 1.   
831 Ron Chusid, “Factchecking Republicans on Bill Clinton and Military Spending,” (blog) 
LiberalValues.com, January 6, 2008, 1, Accessed December 9, 2011,  
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last few years of his time in office (see Appendix B).832  While these efforts to control 
spending worked in the short run, they left the U.S. military unprepared for the 
challenges ahead, and they failed to alter the true debt drivers: mandatory spending on 
entitlement programs.  Additionally, this surplus should have been used to pay down the 
national debt, as a peace dividend should be used to get out of debt, not enable the 
country to get into more debt.  Therefore, while a balanced budget temporarily restored 
sound fiscal practices, it failed to address the real underlying issues behind the debt, and 
wasted a peace dividend that could have been used to start paying down the national debt.  
This is not only a misalignment of fiscal policy and grand strategy, but it is eerily similar 
to the British, as at the other end of their peace dividend was World War II, which 
bankrupted them, and at the other end of the U.S. peace dividend was the Global War on 
Terror. 
On September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center in New York City was again 
bombed but this time both towers were toppled using kamikaze style attacks with 
commercial airliners.  A plane also hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and another 
was taken down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania before it could meet its target.  A total of 
2,953 innocent people died as a result of the attacks.833  This attack prompted a response 
from America that had not been seen before as the result of terrorist attacks.  In an 
address to Congress on Sept. 20, 2001, President George W. Bush stated, “Our war on 
terror will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated.”834 The Bush administration demanded that the Taliban, the ruling party of 
Afghanistan, surrender Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorists to the U.S.  The 
Taliban refused, which prompted the start of Operation Enduring Freedom.835  The 
Global War on Terror had begun, and America’s strategic dilemma had been solved in 
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one day.  This new war would be a change from the strategy of conventional warfare on 
state actors, such as Germany in World War II or Iraq in Desert Storm, to an 
unconventional war on non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda. 
Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001, just four weeks after the 
September 11 attacks.  The first American ground troops were Special Operations Forces, 
working alongside Taliban opposition forces. 836  However, the war and reconstruction in 
Afghanistan continues to this day.  The Global War on Terror was expanded when the 
United States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003.  President Bush declared major combat 
operations over on May 1, 2003, and a transition to stability and reconstruction 
operations. 837 Those operations are in the process of ending, as President Barrack 
Obama has declared that all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011.838 
Fiscal policy was again not aligned with grand strategy.  President Bush enacted 
tax cuts in 2001 and 2003839 while simultaneously starting two wars in the same years. 
“If the war on terrorism was considered the nation’s highest priority, it was not reflected 
in U.S. fiscal policy, which was not altered to free up resources to pay for it.”840  
Additionally, the population was not mobilized for these wars, and the funding of the 
wars turned surpluses into deficits.  The decision to fight two wars on the heels of two tax 
cuts was based on flawed logic.  The rhetoric at the time suggested that the tax cuts 
“actually result in more money for the government.”841  The Bush Administration 
thought that tax cuts would spur enough economic growth to produce enough revenue to 
offset the cuts, although the economists in the administration admitted this was not the 
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case in the 2003 Economic Report of the President.842  Tax cuts can only produce more 
revenue when the tax base is widened.  This is usually accomplished by removing 
deductions, exemptions and tax credits from the tax code.  While tax cuts may 
temporarily increase economic growth, as was noted in 2003, the growth does not usually 
make up the difference in revenue.  However, while the economy did not grow enough to 
offset the tax cuts, it did grow nonetheless. 
The current financial crisis started in 2007.  In 2007, gas prices in the United 
States began to rise.  According to a CNN Money News Article, on May 21, 2007, gas 
prices were at their highest level, adjusted for inflation.843  This gas crisis was followed 
by a subprime mortgage crisis that started in June 2007 when two Bear Stearns hedge 
funds that were heavily invested in mortgages collapsed.  This sent a ripple effect through 
the financial market and subsequently the world markets.  Foreclosures on homes began 
to increase dramatically.844  This led to both President Bush845 and President Obama846 
enacting stimulus bills, which have not had the desired effects.  They have simply raised 
the deficit and national debt to record levels (See Appendix B).847 
This economic crisis coupled with the fiscal stimuli to combat it led to a federal 
government fiscal policy crisis.  There are multiple clear examples of this.  The first 
example is that the Federal government has not passed a Federal Budget since April 29, 
2009.848  There are multiple examples in the last few years of how the U.S. government 
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has been unable to enact sound fiscal policies. One clear indicator of this dysfunction was 
the fight over raising the debt limit. Without the debt ceiling being raised, by law, the 
federal government could not spend any more money beyond what was coming into the 
Treasury.849  However, with the federal government currently borrowing 48 percent of its 
operating funds, tax revenues alone were not enough to keep the government from 
shutting down.850 The debt limit was raised by Congress and signed by the President just 
hours before the deadline.851 
The sheer amount of borrowing is an important indicator of the declining fiscal 
health of the U.S. government.  U.S. exceptionalism is used to justify this incredible 
over–reliance on debt to fund the government, because Americans tell themselves that the 
U.S. is different, as the strongest economy in the world.  However, history paints a 
different picture of what happens when governments leverage themselves too heavily. 
Peter Bernholz, professor emeritus at Basel University, Switzerland in his book Monetary 
Regimes and Inflation: History, Economic and Political Relationships, recognized that 
prolonged government deficits above 40 percent of spending is the common tipping point 
for a country to experience hyperinflation.852 
This massive amount of borrowing is coming at the same time as the Federal 
Reserve’s actions to expand the U.S. money supply through Quantitative Easing.  
Quantitative easing is none other than printing money to expand the money supply when 
the interest rate is zero.  This runs the risk of “spurring hyperinflation, or the risk of not 
being effective enough, if banks opt simply to pocket the additional cash in order to 
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increase their capital reserves.”853  In other words, this is debasement of currency by 
another name only this time by printing more paper money instead of melting and 
reminting coins. While it is distinctly a monetary policy today, it must be remembered 
that in the Roman case study, this was considered fiscal policy because there was no 
differentiation between the two as the Emperor was in charge of all policy decisions and 
will be considered here as a contributing factor to the U.S. fiscal crisis. These factors 
contribute to the perilous nature of the current budget deficits.  This is not to say that the 
U.S. will experience hyperinflation, for only the future will tell, but history shows that it 
is possible, and it is certainly a clear warning signal that something in the fiscal policy 
arena is broken.  Though some may be skeptical of the possibility of hyperinflation, this 
again is purely hubris, and evidence of American exceptionalism.  By believing that 
history will have a different outcome for the U.S. than for every other nation before it, 
Americans deny the facts.   
The debt limit fight led to a crisis in confidence in the U.S. government, which 
prompted Standard and Poor’s, a credit rating agency, to downgrade the U.S. treasury 
bonds on August 5, 2011.  “Yesterday’s downgrade of T-bonds that had long been treated 
as literally as good as gold by the world’s central bankers marks the first full, public 
admission that this is no longer the case.”854  This has prompted central banks to buy 
148.4 metric tons of gold, the largest amount of gold in one quarter since the World Gold 
Council was established in 1987.  In fact, central banks have been net sellers of gold for 
two decades until that trend reversed in 2009.855  This downgrade of the U.S. debt rating 
and loss of faith in the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency, illustrates two more 
examples of the depth of the fiscal policy crisis in the United States.  These are also clear 
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indicators that the U.S. is not as insulated from hyperinflation as may be suspected, 
because gold is typically seen as a hedge against inflation and weak currencies. 
America is caught in a political fiscal crisis, that is a crisis of lack of leadership 
and lack of global confidence, which is evidenced by the downgrade of U.S. sovereign 
debt, the fleeing of central banks from Treasuries into gold as reserve currency, and the 
political stalemate of the U.S. executive branch and legislature to effectively work 
together to pass a budget for nearly three years.  This fiscal crisis, along with monetary 
policies that have the potential856 to produce significant inflation or hyperinflation, and 
coupled with an uneven implementation of grand strategy, has cause for concern with 
regards to the future sustainability of the U.S. Empire. 
The U.S. economy is also plagued with significant structural problems.  The 
service sector dominates the U.S. economy today.  In 2007 services accounted for 78.5 
percent of GDP and manufacturing accounted for 20.5 percent.  Although agriculture is 
still an important industry in America, it only contributed 1 percent toward GDP. 857  
Interestingly, these numbers closely match employment levels as well.  In 2009, the 
services sector employed 79.1 percent of the workforce, with manufacturing, mining, 
transportation and crafts accounting for 20.3 percent of the economy and agriculture 
(farming, fishing, and forestry), accounting for 0.7 percent of the labor force.858  This is a 
clear indicator of how the American economy has grown and evolved.  It is also clear that 
because the service sector is the largest sector of the U.S. economy, it would be hit the 
hardest by the recent recession.  The service sector is now contributing only 67.8 percent 
toward GDP, a drop of over 10 percent in just a few short years. 859  This can probably be 
attributed to the massive amounts of capital that were lost during the recession in the 
financial services sector, and the large numbers of unemployment, which have decreased 
output in services.  This can be compared to similar situations in both case studies.  In the 
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case of the Roman economy, an over reliance on one economic sector for both its 
economic output and its government revenue meant that during periods of drought and 
plague, like seen during Marcus Aurelius, saw a significant decrease in both, which 
decreased the Roman’s economic resilience towards crises.  In the British case, an over 
reliance on the service sector, and especially financial services, directly correlated to their 
economic decline, which lowered their economic resiliency, making them vulnerable to 
the shocks brought on by World War I and II.  The U.S. has likewise suffered a similarly 
significant decline in resiliency, and a drop in 10 percent of GDP coming from the largest 
sector of the economy of services, with the largest subsector of financial services, is a 
clear parallel and a significant problem for the U.S. economy as it attempts to recover.860 
The very complex nature of today’s world poses a significant risk to the United 
States.  As the shift from wood to coal during the nineteenth century was a clear indicator 
of the increasing complexity of industrial societies, the late twentieth and early twenty–
first centuries see a similar transformation taking place.  The rise of the computer, and the 
recognition of Moore’s Law861, are a clear indicator of an exponential mathematical shift 
in increasing complexity.  Computer technology and the subsequent increase in the 
volume and velocity of information have significantly increased the complexity of not 
only the United States, but of the world.  One example of this is especially evident in the 
financial sector, where complex derivatives that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis 
are still not fully understood three years later. 
This technology has also led to an increasing amount of interconnectedness.  The 
world is globally connected, but it is also full of people.  Referring back to Tainter’s 
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second portion of the definition of collapse, where a vacuum of power is required for a 
collapse, one can see that the world is completely populated, unlike in Roman times, 
where there was no power big enough to fill the Roman’s shoes.  Today is far different.  
It is for the reasons of global interconnectedness, and of no vacuum existing due to a 
fully populated planet, that Tainter postulates that “Collapse, if and when it comes again, 
will this time be global.  No longer can any individual nation collapse.  World civilization 
will disintegrate as a whole.”862 Whether or not this is true is yet to be seen, but it does 
raise a good point about the complexity of the United States Empire.  The U.S. is globally 
interconnected in a much more complex manner than even the British Empire was.  This 
indication of the seriousness of complexity and the effects it has on collapse is relevant to 
the current U.S. situation. 
The United States stands at a crossroad.  U.S. fiscal policy and grand strategy 
have been misaligned for forty years, and the chasm is getting both deeper and wider, 
spurred along by the political divisiveness that the two party system engenders.  Yet, the 
three main tenets of U.S. grand strategy, isolationism, exceptionalism and expansionism 
are all alive and well.  As the U.S. draws down from Iraq, and Afghanistan, a popular 
feeling of isolationism is breeding in the populace.  The U.S. does not want to get 
involved in any more foreign conflicts.  Likewise, Americans also do not want to be a 
part of the solution to the Euro crisis, which in a globally interconnected world will 
greatly affect America.  However, most Americans falsely believe that the exceptional 
U.S. economy, American resolve and superior will power, and a strong government will 
isolate this nation from the worldwide crisis that is unfolding.  Americans wrongly 
believe that this crisis is nothing that can’t be handled, as many other crises in the past 
have been.   
At the same time as the U.S. is drawing down troops overseas and making 
significant cuts to the Defense Budget, President Obama sent 100 American Special 
Forces troops into Uganda on Wednesday, October 12, 2011, to help the government 
fight the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group that has been in Uganda for at least 20 
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years.863  If the Lord’s Resistance Army has not threatened the United States in the last 
20 years, it is not a threat today either.  This simply illustrates another example of 
American exceptionalism and expansionism playing out in the current sitting President of 
the United States.  The United States feels like it has to help Uganda, because the U.S. an 
exceptional country and is allegedly much better than Uganda.  Additionally, Africa has 
mineral resources that the U.S. expansion, not through colonization, but a “strategic 
partnership,” might benefit from.  However, with no stated strategic objective, a 
shrinking defense budget, and no real bearing on the security of the United States, the 
President is getting ground troops involved in another foreign conflict.  This is yet 
another example of the problems the U.S. is facing in realigning fiscal policy with grand 
strategy. 
While there will always be a reason to support increased spending in the face of 
some “threat,” there is no greater threat that the U.S. faces today than economic disaster 
due to high levels of debt and the debasement of the U.S dollar.  This is a problem that no 
bomb or bullet can fix.  It is clear that the United States has a choice.  The choice is this: 
Does the United States want to pursue a realignment of fiscal policy and grand strategy 
that will allow the U.S. to more closely mirror Britain’s decline and maintenance as a 
regional power and world influence?  Or does the United States prefer to continue 
profligate spending until it flat lines like Rome?  Decline is already on the doorstep.  The 
International Monetary Fund already stated in April of 2011 that China’s economy will 
be larger than the U.S. economy by 2016.864  The flawed strategic concept of 
exceptionalism has blinded Americans to the reality of both historical lessons and 
contemporary signals of decline.  The final chapter will explore the range of possibilities 
available for the United States Empire, and make recommendations on how the United 
States could change its course, before history repeats itself again. 
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Figure 4.   The End of the Age of America865 
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V. COMPARISON, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will seek to explore the similarities and differences between the case 
studies, make conclusions about them and recommendations for the United States moving 
forward.  This chapter will also look at whether or not the hypothesis was sustained.  This 
thesis set out to look at the collapse and decline of empires through the lenses of the 
relationship between fiscal policy and grand strategy, using a case study framework.  The 
first two case studies, Rome, and Britain were explored in an effort to inform about the 
future of the third case study, the United States.  This comparison was made in order to 
make a generalization about the theory that fiscal policy has a critical role to play in the 
sustainability of the United States Empire, which is the hypothesis of this thesis.  Rome is 
useful in that it shows one end of the spectrum, that of collapse.  Rome ended in chaos, 
with tribal nations attacking and taking over parts of it, and the Empire as a whole 
leaving behind nothing but archaeological ruins and old manuscripts.  Britain is on the 
other end of the spectrum, that of a graceful degradation.  The Empire did collapse, but 
the nation lived on and is still a strong nation today.  Britain is also a good case study for 
the other end of the spectrum because the Empire dissolved under peaceful conditions, 
unlike Rome.  These two cases allow for a wide range of options for the United States, 
which may fall on one end or the other of the spectrum or somewhere in the middle.  The 
following comparisons, conclusions and recommendations will attempt to bring clarity to 
the position the United States is in, using the historical lenses of economic analysis, and 
hopefully will shed light on the path that needs to be taken by policy makers in order to 
avoid some of the clear mistakes made by Rome and Britain. 
B. COMPARISONS 
One method useful for comparison is using a table to compare the similarities and 




Category Rome  Britain United States 
Era Ancient 
31 A.D to 476 A.D 
Middle Ages to 
Modern 
1588 to 1967 
Modern 
1776 to Present 
Complex Society? Yes Yes Yes 
Loss of Complexity? Yes Yes Potential Exists 
Empire Collapsed? Yes Yes; nation survived Potential Exists 
Collapsed into Vacuum? Yes No Potential Exists 
Grand Strategy and Fiscal 
Policy Aligned: During 
Prosperity? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Aligned: During Crises? No No No 
Budgets: Type of Budget  Simple Complex Complex/Split (12 part) 
Methods to meet budget 
shortfalls:      Raised Taxes? 
Yes Yes Yes 
                      Debasement? Yes No Yes 
                                Loans? No Yes Yes 
Deficit spending used for 




For:Entitlements/Welfare? Yes (same as above) Yes Yes 
Taxation: Type of Tax 
System 
Relatively Simple Sophisticated Very Sophisticated 
Tax Exemptions? Yes Yes Yes 
Tax Evasion prevalent? Yes Yes Yes 
Large % of people pay no 
taxes? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Income Tax? Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate Income Tax? N/A- No corporations Yes Yes 
Income Tax high during 
growth? 
No No No 
CIT high during growth? N/A No No 
Majority of Taxes from 
Income/ Direct taxes during 
periods of growth? 
%’s unknown- but 
tribute from new 
lands substantial 
No- used custom 
duties from imports, 
indirect/ sales taxes 
on goods 
No- used tariffs from 
imports, indirect/sales 
taxes on goods 
Economy: Type of 
Economy during decline 
Agrarian Industrial to 
Financial & Services 
Industrial to 
Financial & Services 
Consumer Based? No Yes Yes 
Economy peaked before 
military? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Over reliance on one sector? Yes, Agricultural 
Sector 
Yes, Service Sector Yes, Service Sector 





Price Controls spurred 
inflation? 
Yes (Diocletian) No- did not use. Yes (Nixon) 
Experienced 
Hyperinflation? 
Yes No Potential Exists 
Table 3.   Comparison of Rome, Britain and U.S. 
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After reviewing Table 3, it is evident that there are many similarities and 
differences between the three case studies.  Rome is an ancient empire, while Britain and 
the United States are both modern empires, and although Britain was certainly an older 
empire, it did last until the middle of the twentieth century.  Rome had a much more 
primitive monetary system in general than the other two.  It had a simple budget, a 
relatively simple tax system and a financial sector that did not have the sophistication for 
modern loans or substantial credit.  In these terms, the British and American cases are 
much closer to each other.  While the British had a sophisticated budget, the U.S. 
budgetary system, with its 12 different budget resolutions covering different parts of the 
government, is even more complex and disjointed than the British.  The British and U.S. 
tax systems were far more advanced than the Roman tax system. One example of this is 
that Rome did not have corporations in the modern sense, and therefore had no corporate 
income tax.  Like the U.S., the British also had a modern financial system that could 
handle loans.  The Roman economy was agrarian, and the British and American 
economies were relatively similar, with the exception that the British economy went 
through a period of mercantilism that the U.S. was a part of as a colony, but not really a 
part of once it became an independent nation.  So far, it may seem that there is no 
common ground between the U.S. and Rome.   
However, this is far from the truth.  The U.S. and Rome both debased their 
currencies, something that Britain did not do.  Rome had a wheat entitlement, something 
that can be related to the social welfare programs in Britain and the U.S.   Both Rome and 
the U.S. used price controls during times of crisis to curb inflation but were unsuccessful.  
Rome also experienced hyperinflation, something that Britain did not.  Although the U.S. 
has not seen hyperinflation yet, the third case study outlined some indicators that leave 
the U.S. vulnerable in this respect. 
In addition to this, there is common ground to all three case studies.  All three 
were complex societies.  All of them had their grand strategies aligned in times of 
prosperity and misaligned during crises.  For example, in the beginning of the Roman 
Empire, Emperor Augustus saw a time of unprecedented economic growth, and his grand 
strategy of consolidation was in line with his fiscal policy of encouraging economic 
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growth within the empire.  His successor Tiberius followed suit.  Soon after however, 
grand strategy shifted toward survival while fiscal policy was a means to survive.  This is 
really no alignment at all, and the poor policies of successive emperors began to kill the 
sector of the economy that accounted for most of the wealth of the empire.  The British 
had their policies aligned well with strategy in the beginning, using colonies to weaken 
their opponents on the mainland of Europe.  This continued until eventually their fiscal 
ability to pay for the security of the British Empire decreased, but the number of colonies 
did not.  The United States sits in a similar situation today, with a massively contracting 
defense budget, and seemingly no equal decrease in missions.  In fact, new missions are 
being embarked upon while spending is decreasing. 
Deficit spending was used to pay for the military and the growing entitlements in 
all three empires.  While the Roman budget was not sophisticated enough to record a 
deficit, it is akin to running out of money, which emperors did often.  Debasing the 
currency, as Nero did, or selling palace furniture, as Marcus Aurelius was forced to do, is 
the real acceptance of a budget deficit by using other means to pay the bills.  Therefore, 
all three empires experienced budget deficits and because of the nature of their strategies 
and their situations, all three expanded their militaries using budget deficits to meet real 
or perceived threats, a clear departure from sound fiscal policy.  Although deficits were 
paid for in Rome by using debasement and in Britain by leveraging themselves with 
loans, the U.S. has used both methods. 
Taxation is another area that all three empires find similarities, which outweigh 
the differences in the complexity of the system itself.  Even Rome, which clearly had a 
much simpler tax system than the other two, had tax waivers that at one point accounted 
for a fourth of the budget, something eerily similar to the U.S. situation today.  Another 
similarity besides the tax waivers, exemptions, deductions, credits or whatever name 
might be assigned to them, is that at the point of decline or collapse, both previous 
empires had a situation where a significant portion of the population was paying no taxes, 
which is also the case in the United States today, with 47 percent of Americans paying no 
taxes last year.  All three empires saw the need to tax incomes, but did not do so at all, or 
did sparingly during the times of growth in the beginning of the empires.  For example, 
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Rome got a significant portion of tax revenues from the tribute from captured lands, 
which continued even after the Roman Republic became the Roman Empire.   Later 
however, the burden fell to the farmers to pay the taxes for Rome.  In the beginning, 
Britain was able to tax mostly imported goods using custom duties, indirect taxes on the 
consumption of luxuries and varying levels of land taxes.  Later, as the government 
needed more revenue, this was shifted toward personal and corporate incomes.  The 
United States is similar as well, relying on tariffs on imported goods and sales taxes on 
the consumption of certain luxury items in the beginning, but later shifted to direct 
taxation of both corporate and personal incomes.  This essentially equates to a low or 
non-existent level of taxation on incomes during periods of great economic growth, and a 
higher level of income taxation during periods of low or no growth. 
The economies, while very different, provide some powerful similarities as well.  
Putting aside the fact that the Roman economy was primitive compared to Britain and the 
U.S., it is important to understand that the structures were similar.  All three societies 
relied heavily on one sector of the economy.  This similarity outweighs the differences in 
the types of economies, because it draws on the concept of risk diversification, regularly 
cited in today’s investment world.  By having most of the economy structured around one 
type of economic activity, the risk is much higher than an economy that is diversified 
across many different types of activities.  This is masked in modern days by the fact that 
the economy at face value is vastly complex, and seemingly diversified.  However, at the 
core of what the current U.S. economy is made up of, the service sector dominates with 
79.1 percent of the total employees.  This was made clear at the end of the last chapter, 
and just like droughts or plagues, or war sufficiently shocked the Roman economy, the 
2008 financial crisis shocked the U.S. economy enough that it decreased the service 
sectors percentage of GDP by over 10 percent in a few short years. 
Essentially, while it may be easy to look at the big picture and discount the 
similarities between the Roman and British Empires with the current U.S. experience, 
history tells a different story.  Once the differences are accounted for, and in many cases 
they are just nuance, the similarities are significant.  It is difficult to ignore how closely 
the U.S. is following in the steps of these two once great, but fallen empires. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
It is the conclusion of this author that the similarities displayed in the case studies 
support the hypothesis that fiscal policy plays a critical role in the sustainability of the 
United States Empire.  Judging from the historical case studies, it not only plays a critical 
role, but may in fact play the most critical role in the sustainability of empires.  Fiscal 
policy and monetary policy are the critical underpinnings to an empires economy, and 
therefore drive the health and wealth of the economy.  However, in the same fashion, 
fiscal policy is also reliant upon the economy to gain its revenues, and therefore the 
economy is also where the government derives its wealth from.  That being said, it is 
imperative for the United States government to recognize that because fiscal policy is 
critical to the sustainability of the United States and its ability to prosecute a national 
grand strategy, it is of utmost importance to return the current U.S. fiscal situation to a 
responsible state of affairs. 
There was also a corollary to the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this thesis, 
and that was whether or not the National Strategic Narrative can be used to make 
recommendations about fiscal policy that would positively affect the course the United 
States of America.  Before answering this, it is important to reiterate the relationship 
between fiscal policy and grand strategy.  As was shown in the case studies, when fiscal 
policy and grand strategy were aligned, empires could achieve greatness, and their 
economies boomed.   However, in the same vein, when grand strategy went in a different 
direction than sound fiscal policy, the economy suffered through stagnation or slow 
growth, the government suffered through smaller revenues, the military suffered with 
significant budget cuts, and the empire eventually suffered through strategic defeat, 
collapse or decline in greatness. 
This is essential for policy makers to recognize, as the realignment of grand 
strategy and fiscal policy is the only way to maintain some level of greatness without 
going bankrupt from overstretching the fiscal abilities of the empire.  There is more to 
security than military might.  Prosperity, specifically economic prosperity, is the key to a 
sustainable future for any empire, and as this thesis has shown, when empires had a 
prosperous economy, they also were secure militarily.  It is when the economy was 
 185 
weakened, and the military is cut in the face of smaller tax revenues that true challengers 
start to make considerable dents in the armor of the strongest empires.  This thesis has 
shown that grand strategy and fiscal policy are inextricably linked.  For example, when 
the British started cutting the size of the aging fleets amid a budget crisis following the 
Boer War, they were no longer capable of defending all of the colonies of their far flung 
empire.  They started to draw down their military, but did not take steps to draw down 
their missions in conjunction with this.  In the case of the British, this would have meant 
turning loose some of the colonies that were outside the realm of their protection.  This 
does not mean they would have had to sever all ties, as the British could have continued 
to trade with these new formed countries, but the British would have no longer been 
politically, militarily or strategically responsible for their former colonies. 
Based on this historical example, the U.S. needs to learn from the British 
experience and fundamentally realign its military strategy with its financial capabilities or 
it may find itself in the same situation as the British were prior to World War I.  This will 
mean cutting missions, not just men.  Ultimately this means that the U.S. will have to 
downsize its military, but it will also mean closing foreign bases, ending missions and 
bringing troops home from places where the U.S. may have had a clear presence for a 
long time.  What missions should be cut or which bases should be closed is outside the 
scope of this thesis.  However, it is clear that without cutting missions, there not only be 
the “phantom” of cost savings, by hollowing out the military force and leaving the 
structure intact, but the U.S. will be left strategically vulnerable.  This vulnerability may 
not be realized until it is too late, as it was in the case of the British in World War II.  
Although they were vulnerable going into World War I, the support they got from the 
colonies masked the fact that World War I was only a world war because the world got 
involved.  It was mainly a regional war fought on a global level, because the fighting 
really did not leave Europe.  However, when World War II was fought, and the British 
Empire was pressed in on all sides by enemies in both Europe and the Pacific, it was too 
late to recover. 
The United States has a similar situation in that it is spread all across the world, 
with bases in 135 countries and “strategic” interests almost everywhere.  Literally 
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anything can be justified as a strategic interest in this day and age.  This was alluded to in 
the last paragraph of the U.S. case study, as new “threats” surface nearly every day.  That 
type of thinking is not only dead, but decaying: 
In our complex, interdependent, and constantly changing global 
environment, security is not achievable for one nation or by one people 
alone; rather it must be recognized as a common interest among all 
peoples. Otherwise, security is not sustainable, and without it there can be 
no peace of mind.866 
The United States needs to consider a method with which to frame this paradigm 
shift in thinking.  It truly will need to be a paradigm shift.  In order to realign grand 
strategy with fiscal policy, an attitude of sustainment will have to pervade over the old 
and established attitude of containment.  Although the Cold War ended 20 years ago, the 
attitude still permeates every level of the military, with policymakers still thinking that 
they can use the military to “control” foreign entities.  Control is relative, but the U.S. 
certainly no longer possesses the financial capability to control others by using superior 
military forces (it is questionable if the U.S. ever really did).  This is supremely evident 
in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the best trained military force ever 
to set foot on the earth, with the most advanced technology that has ever been used in 
warfare in the history of the world, cannot control two insurgencies run by Islamic 
fundamentalists who have neither military capability, the financial capability, nor the 
technological capability to match the U.S. force on force.  However, after 10 years in 
Afghanistan alone, and less than a month from pulling out of Iraq, the U.S. still manages 
to lose soldiers every month to insurgent attacks. 
Ultimately, the grand strategy of the Global War on Terror “has a bog of 
bankruptcy.”  As Lord Stamp recognized going into World War II, the U.S. needs to 
recognize today that it cannot kill enough terrorists to end the Global War on Terror.  
Ideologies cannot be stamped out by force, unless they are eliminated through genocide.  
The U.S. government needs to realize that the grand strategy going forward needs to 
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reflect strategic partnerships, where other partners actually participate on their own, 
without U.S. assistance. 
If the U.S. attempts to continue to strategically hold the hand of every nation in 
the world, the U.S. will fail.  However, if the U.S. were to adopt the National Strategic 
Narrative, and move forward in identifying what missions need to be turned over to allies 
and partners, then there is hope for the sustainability of the United States Empire.  The 
National Strategic Narrative fundamentally can provide a framework with which fiscal 
policy and grand strategy can be realigned.  Therefore, the corollary to the hypothesis is 
also sustained.  How the National Strategic Narrative could shape a framework for the 
fundamental realignment of fiscal policy and grand strategy will be explored in the final 
section, Recommendations for the United States of America. 
Finally, in order to end the conclusions completely, complexity and collapse need 
to be revisited.  The U.S. is in a complex and interdependent world.  Globalization is real.  
This means that, as Tainter states, the next collapse could very well be a global 
collapse.867  This does not mean that the collapse of the United States Empire has to 
involve a global collapse, mass anarchy and a return to the Stone Age.  There is the other 
end of the spectrum to consider, that of graceful degradation.  Will the U.S. go quietly 
into the night, slipping slowly from its number one status?  Or will the U.S. fight to 
maintain its global predominance?  Only time will tell.  The good thing is that there is a 
spectrum, and not a single point where the fall of all empires must end up.  That being 
said, the U.S. is not only in relative decline, but in the opinion of the author, in real 
decline, and soon will face reality, whether by global economic collapse, by slipping to 
the number two economy in 2016 because of an ascendant China, or by some other 
means.  The very nature of the complex and interconnected nature that the Internet and 
computers in general have brought to the world also means that collapse has the potential 
to happen far more quickly this time around than in the past.  The speed of information is 
partly responsible for the speed of collapse.  With electrons moving at incalculable speed 
through fiber optics Internet cables worldwide, a collapse could happen in the space of 
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hours or days as opposed to months or years.  Without any way to predict what will 
happen, the best course of action is for the United States to fundamentally return to a 
course of sound and responsible fiscal policies. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
How can the United States return to a course of sound and responsible fiscal 
policies?  The answer lies with history.  By analyzing the historical faults of the Roman 
and British Empires, a lot can be learned from their mistakes.  First and foremost, fiscal 
policy and grand strategy need to be reunited.  This could happen, but it will take a 
fundamental paradigm shift in the way the U.S. thinks about strategy. 
The National Strategic Narrative provides that shift.  By focusing on sustainability 
instead of capability, and opportunities instead of threats, the National Strategic Narrative 
paints a picture of a national dialogue where “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” or 
as Porter and Mykleby distill down to prosperity and security, drive the nation to meet its 
goals.  Prosperity and security, they argue, are the United States two fundamental and 
enduring national priorities.  Prosperity and security sound a lot like fiscal policy and 
grand strategy.  Is this a coincidence?  History tells us that it is not.  What Porter and 
Mykleby fundamentally understood when they wrote the National Strategic Narrative, is 
that history has shown that prosperity and security go hand in hand.  They require each 
other in order to be successful.  For example, no matter how great or small a level, if 
someone makes money, they need to safeguard that money so it will not be stolen.  The 
only way to do so is to protect that money.  This is typically achieved by spending money 
for a safe, or dog, or gun, or bodyguard or bank account.  At the same time, a mansion 
with body guards, a high tech laser security system and a pack of rabid attack dogs is 
useless if the mansion is empty, due to the owner selling all his valuable possessions to 
pay for the security system. 
The National Strategic Narrative recognizes this, and calls for a realignment of 
U.S. strategy to reflect the environment the U.S. is in, not the environment the U.S. came 
from.  Heisenberg uncertainty principle is famous for recognizing “that it is impossible to 
determine with perfect accuracy both the position and momentum of a particle at any 
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given point in time.”868  In the same vein, the National Strategic Narrative is calling for 
the U.S. to stop focusing on its position and start focusing on its momentum.  This 
document will not solve the problems of the United States.  It is only the first step in the 
right direction.  However, by generating a national conversation around the fundamental 
and enduring ideals that form what is called America, the National Strategic Narrative 
has the potential to unlock the greatest treasure of its people, their ideas.  America was 
founded by great men with great ideas.  America will only find its resurgence in allowing 
new great men and women to shape a national conversation rooted in sound fiscal 
principles. 
The current path the U.S. is on is unsustainable, as is evidenced by the 
condemning analysis in the historical case studies.  However, by utilizing historical 
lessons from these and other case studies yet to be looked at, the U.S. has the potential to 
learn from the past while shifting its momentum in a sustainable direction for the future.  
Some of the fundamental principles found in the case studies are as follows.  The first 
lesson, as the Romans found out, is that debasing currency only leads to currency 
collapse.  The Federal Reserve needs to stop debasing the U.S. dollar, or history tells us 
that it too will eventually collapse, or at the very least will lead to significant inflation, 
and possibly even hyperinflation. 
The tax structure needs to be fundamentally reformed.  The best way to reform 
11,000 pages is probably to throw them in the recycling and start over again.  While 
Augustus was very successful in implementing a flat tax, the British were equally 
successful in taxing the consumption of goods.  A national flat tax, or a national sales tax 
should be considered when reforming the U.S. tax code.  While this thesis did not study 
tax policy in depth enough to make a determination of what is the best tax policy, history 
has shown that both can be effective.  More research into the best possible tax structure 
should be made with the goal of reducing the tax burden and providing a sustainable 
source of revenues, unable to be altered by interest groups.  This could mean that a 
constitutional amendment to make it unconstitutional to carve out any exemptions from 
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the tax code may be needed to keep the tax code free from all distortions, allowing 
politicians to only raise or lower the rate of taxation, but not touch the code itself.  The 
reason a constitutional amendment is recommended for re-writing the tax code, is so that 
it is sufficiently difficult for the tax code to be changed and distorted.  The tax base also 
needs to be widened, as in both Rome and Britain a significant portion of the population 
both legally and illegally, evaded taxes, which was a structural problem that hurt 
revenues.  A constitutional amendment could eliminate that problem.  Also, a lower 
corporate tax should be considered to allow for the reinvestment of corporations in 
America.  With the second highest corporate tax rate in the world,869 and the fifth highest 
on new investments,870 it is really no mystery why the U.S. manufacturing jobs have 
been moving overseas over the past 30 to 40 years. In the British case study and the 
American case study (as Rome did not have corporations), the taxation of corporate 
profits was not permanently implemented until after both economies had grown to their 
full or nearly full potential.  This would suggest that high corporate tax rates are a drag on 
economic growth.  This is another area that should be studied further, and while this 
thesis did not dig deep enough to find the definitive answer with regards to this assertion, 
the historical trend is at least present on the surface.  If further research sustains this 
assertion, then a lower corporate tax rate might have the potential to bring an inflow of 
corporate investment funding back into the United States. 
The U.S. budgetary process also needs to be reformed.  It is critical that the U.S. 
budget get balanced.  This is the only way to get out of debt.  In fact, there would need to 
be an eventual surplus in funding to pay down the principal balance in order to get out of 
debt.  No historical example is needed to support this assertion, as this is just a 
fundamental principle of finance.  However, the case studies support it anyway, as 
balanced budgets were another feature that was seen regularly in prosperous times of the 
case studies.  In the early days of both the British and U.S. Empires, deficits were only 
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seen during wars, and then subsequently the debt was paid off after the war was over.  In 
keeping with this line of reasoning, it is recommended that the U.S. pass a Balanced 
Budget Amendment to the Constitution, as it is keenly evident that policymakers are 
more concerned with their reelection than the sustainable future of the United States, 
something President Eisenhower noted in his farewell speech upon leaving office over 50 
years ago. 
The only way to make the budgets sustainable are to prioritize spending that is 
essential to the grand strategy of the United States, and cut spending that is not.  This 
sounds easier that it really is, and therefore, the National Strategic Narrative could help in 
guiding this process.  As was seen in the British case, cutting the funding for the military 
in times of austerity is a popular sport for politicians, but this alone cannot balance the 
U.S. budget.  In fact, every last dime of the DOD budget could be cut (which would 
obviously have a significant impact on U.S. security), and the budget would only be 
halfway to being balanced.  This means that while it is convenient to cut the military, it is 
not feasible to only look to the military for cost savings.  The bigger problem is the 
entitlements that are contained in mandatory spending, namely Social Security, Medicare 
and Medicaid, along with a host of other smaller Federal entitlement programs.  
Everyone knows that this is the largest portion of the budget but no one is willing to tell 
the American people that relying on Social Security and Medicare for retirement is no 
longer affordable.  This too was seen in the case of Rome specifically, and although 
Britain also had its own social welfare programs, this thesis did not discuss them in any 
detail.  However, the Roman Emperor’s had a hard time controlling the amount of people 
who were on the “dole” and in some cases, they enlarged the dole, to the budgetary 
detriment of the Roman Empire.  While it is true that 48.5 percent of Americans are 
currently dependent upon some form of government benefit,871 entitlement spending, is 
not an essential government function, and further study should be undertaken to 
determine the best way to phase them out, or at the very least, decrease the level of future 
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benefits, because they are not sustainable.  If all that the U.S. government spent its money 
on was looked at through the lens of sustainability, a lot of cuts could be made to 
responsibly balance the budget, something that will eventually need to be done.  No 
person or corporation can continue to borrow without paying off any debt indefinitely, or 
they will eventually go bankrupt.  The same is true for governments, but they have a 
much larger bank account and credit limit, so it just takes longer to get there. 
The structural problems in the U.S. economy also need to be addressed.  As long 
as the service sector, and more specifically the financial services subsector, dominates the 
U.S. economy, and manufacturing continues to leave America’s shores, the economy will 
continue to be vulnerable to shocks to the system like the one that was seen in 2008, due 
to a lack of economic diversification.  This was seen in Rome as has already been 
mentioned several times, but was also seen in Britain, as the cause of their economic 
decline was basically the same as the U.S. only Britain did it first.  By sending their 
investments overseas, and growing their financial services sector, Britain sent much of 
their manufacturing overseas, just as the U.S. has done, except once again, the British did 
it first.  The U.S. should learn from this example, which is exactly the same as what the 
U.S. is continuing to do today.  Additionally, the U.S. economy is highly regulated.  
Although not explored in any great depth, this thesis did mention the business 
government partnership in the early part of the British Empire which helped to grow the 
economy.  This means that while it appears the case studies support less regulation, much 
more research would be needed to determine the right answer to this question.  However, 
the fact is, U.S. regulations cost businesses $1.75 trillion dollars in 2008.872  While the 
merits or political feelings about more or less regulation tend to cloud people’s decisions, 
essentially, a bipartisan economic study should be done on a wide range of U.S. 
regulations across the economy to determine the cost benefit analysis of the regulations 
themselves.  If this were accomplished, then a well informed decision about this topic 
could be made. 
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Another recommendation comes directly from the Roman case study.  When 
Diocletian increased the size of the Roman government, he did so to better be able to 
handle a crisis.  However, this had the ultimate effect of significantly increasing the 
budgetary pressure due to the increase in the size of the bureaucracy.  The size of the U.S. 
government has increased significantly since the start of the fiscal crisis at 11.7 percent, 
or the equivalent of 230,000 jobs, however during this same time period the private sector 
has lost 6.6 percent or the equivalent of 7.5 million jobs.873  That U.S. government jobs 
have increased since the crisis does not mean that they were all created because of the 
crisis, as they were in the days of Diocletian.  However, just as the military has grown in 
recent years and will need to be cut in size, the federal workforce will also need to be cut.  
One argument that regularly is made against cutting federal employees is that those jobs 
will just be filled by contractors.  As of June 2011, the U.S. federal payrolls had 2.1 
million workers while contractors had 10.5 million workers.874  This is not a solution at 
all, and is yet another reason why it is essential to rewrite U.S. grand strategy to 
synchronize with fiscal policy.  Firing a federal employee and replacing their position 
with a contractor is not a cost savings and is not sound fiscal policy.  Firing a federal 
employee and terminating their position is a cost savings and will be required, as 
essentially, no area of the budget should be considered sacrosanct.  Adding to the 
bureaucracy when revenues are decreasing due to a recession is not sound fiscal policy 
any more than pursuing two wars with no tax increases to pay for them is.  The blame 
does not lie with one president, on political party or one political ideology.   
If the United States wants to fundamentally return to sound fiscal policies, it will 
require lawmakers finding a way come up with a bipartisan solution to effectively find 
real savings, and effectively find ways to reform the tax code to permit real revenue 
increases.  The true answer comes with analyzing history and implementing sound fiscal 
policy to cut the budget in such a way that spending actually decreases and revenue 
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actually increases.  Raising taxes and cutting spending is truly a bipartisan solution, but 
will not be popular with anyone.  Ultimately, many of the recommendations in this thesis 
are just that, not popular.  However, they are sound fiscal policies, backed by historical 
economic case studies.  More research should be done in this area to determine a range of 
options available to meet the policy priorities as spelled out in a new grand strategy.   In 
order to do that, a new grand strategy has to be crafted.  The only way that a new strategy 
will be successful is by coming up with a bipartisan agreement on what that strategy 
should look like.  The National Strategic Narrative can provide the framework with 
which to realign fiscal policy and grand strategy in such a way that the nation’s priorities 
are focused on, with an attempt to leverage opportunities and create a national 
momentum in the direction of sustainability.  If Americans really want to sustain the 
United States of America “for ourselves and our posterity,” as the preamble to the U.S. 
Constitution states, then tough, unpopular, and sound fiscal policies will need to be 
implemented.  No person, party, faction, special interest group, rhetoric or ideology 
should come between the National Strategic Narratives goal of creating a National 
Prosperity and Security Act, which would lawfully direct the United States in a new 
strategic direction.  Fiscal policy is the keystone in the archway of grand strategy, with a 
solid foundation representing the prosperity that it is built upon and a strong door 
providing the security for those who would enter.   Stone masons knew that without a 
keystone and archway would collapse, and likewise, without sound fiscal policy, the 
grand strategy of the United States will collapse into a pile of rubble.  The National 
Strategic Narrative can provide the mortar to hold the archway together if given the 
opportunity, but only if politicians and the American people come together and decide to 
pick up the trowel. 
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APPENDIX A. NATIONAL STRATEGIC NARRATIVE BY MR. Y 
Published April 8, 2011 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, with Preface by Ann-Marie Slaughter. 
A. PREFACE 
By Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor of Politics 
and International Affairs Princeton University, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. 
Department of State, 2009–2011. 
The United States needs a national strategic narrative. We have a national security 
strategy, which sets forth four core national interests and outlines a number of dimensions 
of an overarching strategy to advance those interests in the twenty-first century world. 
But that is a document written by specialists for specialists. It does not answer a 
fundamental question that more and more Americans are asking. Where is the United 
States going in the world? How can we get there? What are the guiding stars that will 
illuminate the path along the way? We need a story with a beginning, middle, and 
projected happy ending that will transcend our political divisions, orient us as a nation, 
and give us both a common direction and the confidence and commitment to get to our 
destination. 
These questions require new answers because of the universal awareness that we 
are living through a time of rapid and universal change. The assumptions of the twentieth 
century, of the U.S. as a bulwark first against fascism and then against communism, make 
little sense in a world in which World War II and its aftermath is as distant to young 
generations today as the War of 1870 was to the men who designed the United Nations 
and the international order in the late 1940s. 
Consider the description of the U.S. president as “the leader of the free world,” a 
phrase that encapsulated U.S. power and the structure of the global order for decades. Yet 
anyone under thirty today, a majority of the world’s population, likely has no idea what it 
means.  Moreover, the U.S. is experiencing its latest round of “declinism,” the periodic 
certainty that we are losing all the things that have made us a great nation. In a National 
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Journal poll conducted in 2010, 47 percent of Americans rated China’s economy as the 
world’s strongest economy, even though today the U.S. economy is still 2 ½ times larger 
than the Chinese economy with only 1/6 of the population. Our crumbling roads and 
bridges reflect a crumbling self-confidence. Our education reformers often seem to 
despair that we can ever educate new generations effectively for the twenty-first century 
economy. Our health care system lags increasingly behind that of other developed nations 
– even behind British National Health in terms of the respective overall health of the 
British and American populations. 
Against this backdrop, Captain Porter’s and Colonel Mykleby’s “Y article” could 
not come at a more propitious time. In 1947 George Kennan published “The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym X, so as not to reveal his 
identity as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. The X article gave us an intellectual 
framework within which to understand the rise and eventual fall of the Soviet Union and 
a strategy to hasten that objective. Based on that foundation, the strategic narrative of the 
Cold War was that the United States was the leader of the free world against the 
communist world; that we would invest in containing the Soviet Union and limiting its 
expansion while building a dynamic economy and as just, and prosperous a society as 
possible. We often departed from that narrative in practice, as George Kennan was one of 
the first to recognize. But it was a narrative that fit the facts of the world we perceived 
well enough to create and maintain a loose bipartisan national consensus for forty years. 
Porter and Mykleby give us a non-partisan blueprint for understanding and 
reacting to the changes of the twenty-first century world. In one sentence, the strategic 
narrative of the United States in the twenty-first century is that we want to become the 
strongest competitor and most influential player in a deeply inter-connected global 
system, which requires that we invest less in defense and more in sustainable prosperity 
and the tools of effective global engagement. 
At first reading, this sentence may not seem to mark much of a change. But look 
closer. The Y article narrative responds directly to five major transitions in the global 
system:  
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1) From control in a closed system to credible influence in an open system. The 
authors argue that Kennan’s strategy of containment was designed for a closed system, in 
which we assumed that we could control events through deterrence, defense, and 
dominance of the international system. The 21st century is an open system, in which 
unpredictable external events/phenomena are constantly disturbing and disrupting the 
system. In this world control is impossible; the best we can do is to build credible 
influence – the ability to shape and guide global trends in the direction that serves our 
values and interests (prosperity and security) within an interdependent strategic 
ecosystem. In other words, the U.S. should stop trying to dominate and direct global 
events. The best we can do is to build our capital so that we can influence events as they 
arise. 
2) From containment to sustainment. The move from control to credible influence 
as a fundamental strategic goal requires a shift from containment to sustainment 
(sustainability). Instead of trying to contain others (the Soviet Union, terrorists, China, 
etc), we need to focus on sustaining ourselves in ways that build our strengths and 
underpin credible influence. That shift in turn means that the starting point for our 
strategy should be internal rather than external. The 2010 National Security Strategy did 
indeed focus on national renewal and global leadership, but this account makes an even 
stronger case for why we have to focus first and foremost on investing our resources 
domestically in those national resources that can be sustained, such as our youth and our 
natural resources (ranging from crops, livestock, and potable water to sources of energy 
and materials for industry). We can and must still engage internationally, of course, but 
only after a careful weighing of costs and benefits and with as many partners as possible. 
Credible influence also requires that we model the behavior we recommend for others, 
and that we pay close attention to the gap between our words and our deeds.  
3) From deterrence and defense to civilian engagement and competition. Here in 
many ways is the hard nub of this narrative. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike 
Mullen has already said publicly that the U.S. deficit is our biggest national security 
threat. He and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have also given speeches and written 
articles calling for “demilitarizing American foreign policy” and investing more in the 
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tools of civilian engagements – diplomacy and defense. As we modernize our military 
and cut spending the tools of twentieth 20th century warfare, we must also invest in a 
security complex that includes all domestic and foreign policy assets. Our credibility also 
requires a willingness to compete with others. Instead of defeatism and protectionism, we 
must embrace competition as a way to make ourselves stronger and better (e.g. Ford 
today, now competing with Toyota on electric cars). A willingness to compete means a 
new narrative on trade and a new willingness to invest in the skills, education, energy 
sources, and infrastructure necessary to make our products competitive.  
4) From zero sum to positive sum global politics/economics. An interdependent 
world creates many converging interests and opportunities for positive-sum rather than 
zero-sum competition. The threats that come from interdependence (economic instability, 
global pandemics, global terrorist and criminal networks) also create common interests in 
countering those threats domestically and internationally. President Obama has often 
emphasized the significance of moving toward positive sum politics. To take only one 
example, the rise of China as a major economic power has been overall very positive for 
the U.S. economy and the prosperity and stability of East Asia. The United States must be 
careful to guard our interests and those of our allies, but we miss great opportunities if we 
assume that the rise of some necessarily means the decline of others.  
5) From national security to national prosperity and security. The piece closes 
with a call for a National Prosperity and Security Act to replace the National Security Act 
of 1947. The term “national security” only entered the foreign policy lexicon after 1947 
to reflect the merger of defense and foreign affairs. Today our security lies as much or 
more in our prosperity as in our military capabilities. Our vocabulary, our institutions, 
and our assumptions must reflect that shift. “National security” has become a trump card, 
justifying military spending even as the domestic foundations of our national strength are 
crumbling. “National prosperity and security” reminds us where our true security begins. 
Foreign policy pundits have long called for an overhaul of NSC 68, the blueprint for the 
national security state that accompanied the grand strategy of containment. If we are truly 
to become the strongest competitor and most influential player in the deeply 
interconnected world of the twenty-first century, then we need a new blueprint.  
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A narrative is a story. A national strategic narrative must be a story that all 
Americans can understand and identify with in their own lives. America’s national story 
has always see- sawed between exceptionalism and universalism. We think that we are an 
exceptional nation, but   core part of that exceptionalism is a commitment to universal 
values – to the equality of all human beings not just within the borders of the United 
States, but around the world. We should thus embrace the rise of other nations when that 
rise is powered by expanded prosperity, opportunity, and dignity for their peoples. In 
such a world we do not need to see ourselves as the automatic leader of any bloc of 
nations. We should be prepared instead to earn our influence through our ability to 
compete with other nations, the evident prosperity and wellbeing of our people, and our 
ability to engage not just with states but with societies in all their richness and 
complexity. We do not want to be the sole superpower that billions of people around the 
world have learned to hate from fear of our military might. We seek instead to be the 
nation other nations listen to, rely on and emulate out of respect and admiration.  
The Y article is the first step down that new path. It is written by two military men 
who have put their lives on the line in the defense of their country and who are non-
partisan by profession and conviction. Their insights and ideas should spark a national 
conversation. All it takes is for politicians, pundits, journalists, businesspeople, civic 
leaders, and engaged citizens across the country to read and respond. 
 
B. A NATIONAL STRATEGIC NARRATIVE 
By Mr. Y 
This Strategic Narrative is intended to frame our National policy decisions 
regarding investment, security, economic development, the environment, and engagement 
well into this century. It is built upon the premise that we must sustain our enduring 
national interests – prosperity and security – within a “strategic ecosystem,” at home and 
abroad; that in complexity and uncertainty, there are opportunities and hope, as well as 
challenges, risk, and threat. The primary approach this Strategic Narrative advocates to 
achieve sustainable prosperity and security, is through the application of credible 
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influence and strength, the pursuit of fair competition, acknowledgement of 
interdependencies and converging interests, and adaptation to complex, dynamic systems 
– all bounded by our national values.  
1. From Containment to Sustainment: Control to Credible Influence 
For those who believe that hope is not a strategy, America must seem a strange 
contradiction of anachronistic values and enduring interests amidst a constantly changing 
global environment. America is a country conceived in liberty, founded on hope, and 
built upon the notion that anything is possible with enough hard work and imagination. 
Over time we have continued to learn and mature even as we strive to remain true to 
those values our founding fathers set forth in the Declaration of Independence and our 
Constitution.  
America’s national strategy in the second half of the last century was anchored in 
the belief that our global environment is a closed system to be controlled by mankind – 
through technology, power, and determination – to achieve security and prosperity. From 
that perspective, anything that challenged our national interests was perceived as a threat 
or a risk to be managed. For forty years our nation prospered and was kept secure through 
a strategy of containment. That strategy relied on control, deterrence, and the conviction 
that given the choice, people the world over share our vision for a better tomorrow. 
America emerged from the twentieth century as the most powerful nation on earth. But 
we failed to recognize that dominance, like fossil fuel, is not a sustainable source of 
energy. The new century brought with it a reminder that the world, in fact, is a complex, 
open system – constantly changing. And change brings with it uncertainty. What we 
really failed to recognize, is that in uncertainty and change, there is opportunity and hope.  
It is time for America to re-focus our national interests and principles through a 
long lens on the global environment of tomorrow. It is time to move beyond a strategy of 
containment to a strategy of sustainment (sustainability); from an emphasis on power and 
control to an emphasis on strength and influence; from a defensive posture of exclusion, 
to a proactive posture of engagement. We must recognize that security means more than 
defense, and sustaining security requires adaptation and evolution, the leverage of 
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converging interests and interdependencies. To grow we must accept that competitors are 
not necessarily adversaries, and that a winner does not demand a loser. We must regain 
our credibility as a leader among peers, a beacon of hope, rather than an island fortress. It 
is only by balancing our interests with our principles that we can truly hope to sustain our 
growth as a nation and to restore our credibility as a world leader. 
As we focus on the opportunities within our strategic environment, however, we 
must also address risk and threat. It is important to recognize that developing credible 
influence to pursue our enduring national interests in a sustainable manner requires 
strength with restraint, power with patience, deterrence with detente. The economic, 
diplomatic, educational, military, and commercial tools through which we foster that 
credibility must always be tempered and hardened by the values that define us as a 
people.  
2. Our Values and Enduring National Interests 
America was founded on the core values and principles enshrined in our 
Constitution and proven through war and peace. These values have served as both our 
anchor and our compass, at home and abroad, for more than two centuries. Our values 
define our national character, and they are our source of credibility and legitimacy in 
everything we do. Our values provide the bounds within which we pursue our enduring 
national interests. When these values are no longer sustainable, we have failed as a 
nation, because without our values, America has no credibility. As we continue to evolve, 
these values are reflected in a wider global application: tolerance for all cultures, races, 
and religions; global opportunity for self-fulfillment; human dignity and freedom from 
exploitation; justice with compassion and equality under internationally recognized rule 
of law; sovereignty without tyranny, with assured freedom of expression; and an 
environment for entrepreneurial freedom and global prosperity, with access to markets, 
plentiful water and arable soil, clean and abundant energy, and adequate health services.  
From the earliest days of the Republic, America has depended on a vibrant free 
market and an indomitable entrepreneurial spirit to be the engines of our prosperity. Our 
strength as a world leader is largely derived from the central role we play in the global 
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economy. Since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, the United States has been 
viewed as an anchor of global economic security and the U.S. dollar has served as an 
internationally recognized medium of exchange, the monetary standard. The American 
economy is the strongest in the world and likely to remain so well into the foreseeable 
future. Yet, while the dramatic acceleration of globalization over the last fifteen years has 
provided for the cultural, intellectual and social comingling among people on every 
continent, of every race, and of every ideology, it has also increased international 
economic interdependence and has made a narrowly domestic economic perspective an 
unattractive impossibility. Without growth and competition economies stagnate and 
wither, so sustaining America’s prosperity requires a healthy global economy. Prosperity 
at home and through global economic competition and development is then, one of 
America’s enduring national interests. 
It follows logically that prosperity without security is unsustainable. Security is a 
state of mind, as much as it is a physical aspect of our environment. For Americans, 
security is very closely related to freedom, because security represents freedom from 
anxiety and external threat, freedom from disease and poverty, freedom from tyranny and 
oppression, freedom of expression but also freedom from hurtful ideologies, prejudice 
and violations of human rights. Security cannot be safeguarded by borders or natural 
barriers; freedom cannot be secured with locks or by force alone. In our complex, 
interdependent, and constantly changing global environment, security is not achievable 
for one nation or by one people alone; rather it must be recognized as a common interest 
among all peoples. Otherwise, security is not sustainable, and without it there can be no 
peace of mind. Security, then, is our other enduring national interest.  
3. Our Three Investment Priorities 
As Americans we have access to a vast array of resources. Perhaps the most 
important first step we can take, as part of a National Strategy, is to identify which of 
these resources are renewable and sustainable, and which are finite and diminishing. 
Without doubt, our greatest resource is America’s young people, who will shape and 
execute the vision needed to take this nation forward into an uncertain future. But this 
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may require a reawakening, of sorts. Perhaps because our nation has been so blessed over 
time, many of us have forgotten that rewards must be earned, there is no “free ride” – that 
fair competition and hard work bring with them a true sense of accomplishment. We can 
no longer expect the ingenuity and labor of past generations to sustain our growth as a 
nation for generations to come. We must embrace the reality that with opportunity comes 
challenge, and that retooling our competitiveness requires a commitment and investment 
in the future. 
Inherent in our children is the innovation, drive, and imagination that have made, 
and will continue to make, this country great. By investing energy, talent, and dollars 
now in the education and training of young Americans – the scientists, statesmen, 
industrialists, farmers, inventors, educators, clergy, artists, service members, and parents, 
of tomorrow – we are truly investing in our ability to successfully compete in, and 
influence, the strategic environment of the future. Our first investment priority, then, is 
intellectual capital and a sustainable infrastructure of education, health and social services 
to provide for the continuing development and growth of America’s youth. 
Our second investment priority is ensuring the nation’s sustainable security – on 
our own soil and wherever Americans and their interests take them. As has been stated 
already, Americans view security in the broader context of freedom and peace of mind. 
Rather than focusing primarily on defense, the security we seek can only be sustained 
through a whole of nation approach to our domestic and foreign policies. This requires a 
different approach to problem solving than we have pursued previously and a hard look at 
the distribution of our national treasure. For too long, we have underutilized sectors of 
our government and our citizenry writ large, focusing intensely on defense and 
protectionism rather than on development and diplomacy. This has been true in our 
approach to domestic and foreign trade, agriculture and energy, science and technology, 
immigration and education, public health and crisis response, Homeland Security and 
military force posture. Security touches each of these and must be addressed by 
leveraging all the strengths of our nation, not simply those intended to keep perceived 
threat a safe arm’s length away.  
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America is a resplendent, plentiful and fertile land, rich with natural resources, 
bounded by vast ocean spaces. Together these gifts are ours to be enjoyed for their 
majesty, cultivated and harvested for their abundance, and preserved for following 
generations. Many of these resources are renewable, some are not. But all must be 
respected as part of a global ecosystem that is being tasked to support a world population 
projected to reach nine billion peoples midway through this century. These resources 
range from crops, livestock, and potable water to sources of energy and materials for 
industry. Our third investment priority is to develop a plan for the sustainable access to, 
cultivation and use of, the natural resources we need for our continued wellbeing, 
prosperity and economic growth in the world marketplace. 
4. Fair Competition and Deterrence 
Competition is a powerful, and often misunderstood, concept. Fair competition – 
of ideas and enterprises, among individuals, organizations, and nations – is what has 
driven Americans to achieve greatness across the spectrum of human endeavor. And yet 
with globalization, we seem to have developed a strange apprehension about the efficacy 
of our ability to apply the innovation and hard work necessary to successfully compete in 
a complex security and economic environment. Further, we have misunderstood 
interdependence as a weakness rather than recognizing it as a strength. The key to 
sustaining our competitive edge, at home or on the world stage, is credibility – and 
credibility is a difficult capital to foster. It cannot be won through intimidation and threat, 
it cannot be sustained through protectionism or exclusion. Credibility requires 
engagement, strength, and reliability – imaginatively applied through the national tools of 
development, diplomacy, and defense.  
In many ways, deterrence is closely linked to competition. Like competition, 
deterrence in the truest sense is built upon strength and credibility and cannot be achieved 
solely through intimidation and threat. For deterrence to be effective, it must leverage 
converging interests and interdependencies, while differentiating and addressing 
diverging and conflicting interests that represent potential threats. Like competition, 
deterrence requires a whole of nation effort, credible influence supported by actions that 
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are consistent with our national interests and values. When fair competition and positive 
influence through engagement – largely dependent on the tools of development and 
diplomacy – fail to dissuade the threat of destructive behavior, we will approach 
deterrence through a broad, interdisciplinary effort that combines development and 
diplomacy with defense. 
5. A Strategic Ecology 
Rather than focusing all our attention on specific threats, risks, nations, or 
organizations, as we have in the past, let us evaluate the trends that will shape 
tomorrow’s strategic ecology, and seek opportunities to credibly influence these to our 
advantage. Among the trends that are already shaping a “new normal” in our strategic 
environment are the decline of rural economies, joblessness, the dramatic increase in 
urbanization, an increasing demand for energy, migration of populations and shifting 
demographics, the rise of grey and black markets, the phenomenon of extremism and 
anti-modernism, the effects of global climate change, the spread of pandemics and lack of 
access to adequate health services, and an increasing dependency on cyber networks. At 
first glance, these trends are cause for concern. But for Americans with vision, guided by 
values, they represent opportunities to reestablish and leverage credible influence, 
converging interests, and interdependencies that can transform despair into hope. This 
focus on improving our strategic ecosystem, and favorably competing for our national 
interests, underscores the investment priorities cited earlier, and the imaginative 
application of diplomacy, development, and defense in our foreign policy. 
Many of the trends affecting our environment are conditions-based. That is, they 
have developed within a complex system as the result of conditions left unchecked for 
many years. These global trends, whether manifesting themselves in Africa, the Middle 
East, Asia, Eurasia, or within our own hemisphere impact the lives of Americans in ways 
that are often obscure as they propagate over vast areas with cascading and sometimes 
catastrophic effect.  
Illiteracy, for example, is common in countries with high birth rates. High birth 
rates and illiteracy contribute to large labor pools and joblessness, particularly in rural 
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areas in which changing weather conditions have resulted in desertification and soil 
erosion. This has led to the disruption of family and tribal support structures and the 
movement of large numbers of young, unskilled people into urban areas that lack 
infrastructure. This rapid urbanization has taxed countries with weak governance that 
lack rule of law, permitting the further growth of exploitive, grey and black market 
activities. Criminal networks prey upon and contribute to the disenfranchisement of a 
sizeable portion of the population in many underdeveloped nations.  
This concentration of disenfranchised youth, with little-to-no licit support 
infrastructure has provided a recruiting pool for extremists seeking political support and 
soldiers for local or foreign causes, often facilitated through the internet. The wars and 
instability perpetrated by these extremists and their armies of the disenfranchised have 
resulted in the displacement of many thousands more, and the further weakening of 
governance. This displacement has, in many cases, produced massive migrations of 
disparate families, tribes, and cultures seeking a more sustainable existence. This 
migration has further exacerbated the exploitation of the weak by criminal and 
ideological profiteers and has facilitated the spread of diseases across natural barriers 
previously considered secure. The effect has been to create a kind of subculture of 
despair and hopelessness that is self-perpetuating. At some point, these underlying 
conditions must be addressed by offering choices and options that will nudge global 
trends in a positive direction. America’s national interests and values are not sustainable 
otherwise. 
We cannot isolate our own prosperity and security from the global system. Even 
in a land as rich as ours, we too, have seen the gradual breakdown of rural communities 
and the rapid expansion of our cities. We have experienced migration, crime, and 
domestic terrorism. We struggle with joblessness and despite a low rate of illiteracy, we 
are losing our traditional role of innovation dominance in leading edge technologies and 
the sciences. We are, in the truest sense, part of an interdependent strategic ecosystem, 
and our interests converge with those of people in virtually every corner of the world. We 
must remain cognizant of this, and reconcile our domestic and foreign policies as being 
complementary and largely congruent.  
 207 
As we pursue the growth of our own prosperity and security, the welfare of our 
citizens must be seen as part of a highly dynamic, and interconnected system that 
includes sovereign nations, world markets, natural and man-generated challenges and 
solutions – a system that demands adaptability and innovation. In this strategic 
environment, it is competition that will determine how we evolve, and Americans must 
have the tools and confidence required to successfully compete. 
This begins at home with quality health care and education, with a vital economy 
and low rates of unemployment, with thriving urban centers and carefully planned rural 
communities, with low crime, and a sense of common purpose underwritten by personal 
responsibility. We often hear the term “smart power” applied to the tools of development 
and diplomacy abroad empowering people all over the world to improve their own lives 
and to help establish the stability needed to sustain security and prosperity on a global 
scale. But we can not export “smart power” until we practice “smart growth” at home. 
We must seize the opportunity to be a model of stability, a model of the values we 
cherish for the rest of the world to emulate. And we must ensure that our domestic 
policies are aligned with our foreign policies. Our own “smart growth” can serve as the 
exportable model of “smart power.” Because, truthfully, it is in our interest to see the rest 
of the world prosper and the world market thrive, just as it is in our interest to see our 
neighbors prosper and our own urban centers and rural communities come back to life. 
6. Closing the “Say-do” Gap - the Negative Aspects of “Binning” 
An important step toward re-establishing credible influence and applying it 
effectively is to close the “say-do” gap. This begins by avoiding the very western 
tendency to label or “bin” individuals, groups, organizations, and ideas. In complex 
systems, adaptation and variation demonstrate that “binning” is not only difficult, it often 
leads to unintended consequences. For example, labeling, or binning, Islamist radicals as 
“terrorists,” or worse, as “jihadis,” has resulted in two very different, and unfortunate 
unintended misperceptions: that all Muslims are thought of as “terrorists;” and, that those 
who pervert Islam into a hateful, anti-modernist ideology to justify unspeakable acts of 
violence are truly motivated by a religious struggle (the definition of “jihad,” and the 
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obligation of all Muslims), rather than being seen as apostates waging war against society 
and innocents. This has resulted in the alienation of vast elements of the global Muslim 
community and has only frustrated efforts to accurately depict and marginalize 
extremism. 
Binning and labeling are legacies of a strategy intent on viewing the world as a 
closed system. Another significant unintended consequence of binning, is that it creates 
divisions within our own government and between our own domestic and foreign 
policies. As has been noted, we cannot isolate our own prosperity and security from the 
global system. We exist within a strategic ecology, and our interests converge with those 
of people in virtually every corner of the world. We must remain cognizant of this, and 
reconcile our domestic and foreign policies as being complementary and largely 
congruent. Yet we have binned government departments, agencies, laws, authorities, and 
programs into lanes that lack the strategic flexibility and dynamism to effectively adapt to 
the global environment. This, in turn, further erodes our credibility, diminishes our 
influence, inhibits our competitive edge, and exacerbates the say-do gap. 
The tools to be employed in pursuit of our national interests – development, 
diplomacy, and defense – cannot be effective if they are restricted to one government 
department or another. In fact, if these tools are not employed within the context of a 
coherent national strategy, vice being narrowly applied in isolation to individual countries 
or regions, they will fail to achieve a sustainable result. By recognizing the advantages of 
interdependence and converging interests, domestically and internationally, we gain the 
strategic flexibility to sustain our national interests without compromising our values. 
The tools of development do not exist within the domain of one government department 
alone, or even one sector of society, anymore than do the tools of diplomacy or defense. 
Another form of binning that impedes strategic flexibility, interdependence, and 
converging interests in the global system, is a geo-centric approach to foreign policy. 
Perhaps since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, westerners have tended to view the world 
as consisting of sovereign nation-states clearly distinguishable by their political borders 
and physical boundaries. In the latter half of the twentieth century a new awareness of 
internationalism began to dominate political thought. This notion of communities of 
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nations and regions was further broadened by globalization. But the borderless nature of 
the internet, and the accompanying proliferation of stateless organizations and ideologies, 
has brought with it a new appreciation for the interconnectivity of today’s strategic 
ecosystem. In this “new world order,” converging interests create interdependencies. Our 
former notion of competition as a zero sum game that allowed for one winner and many 
losers, seems as inadequate today as Newton’s Laws of Motion (written about the same 
time as the Westphalia Peace) did to Albert Einstein and quantum physicists in the early 
twentieth century. It is time to move beyond a narrow Westphalian vision of the world, 
and to recognize the opportunities in globalization.  
Such an approach doesn’t advocate the relinquishment of sovereignty as it is 
understood within a Westphalian construct. Indeed, sovereignty without tyranny is a 
fundamental American value. Neither does the recognition of a more comprehensive 
perspective place the interests of American citizens behind, or even on par with those of 
any other country on earth. It is the popular convergence of interests among peoples, 
nations, cultures, and movements that will determine the sustainability of prosperity and 
security in this century. And it is credible influence, based on values and strength that 
will ensure America’s continuing role as a world leader. Security and prosperity are not 
sustainable in isolation from the rest of the global system.  To close the say-do gap, we 
must stop behaving as if our national interests can be pursued without regard for our 
values. 
7. Credible Influence in a Strategic Ecosystem 
Viewed in the context of a strategic ecosystem, the global trends and conditions 
cited earlier are seen to be borderless. The application of credible influence to further our 
national interests, then, should be less about sovereign borders and geographic regions 
than the means and scope of its conveyance. By addressing the trends themselves, we will 
attract others in our environment also affected. These converging interests will create 
opportunities for both competition and interdependence, opportunities to positively shape 
these trends to mutual advantage. Whether this involves out-competing the grey and 
black market, funding research to develop alternate and sustainable sources of energy, 
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adapting farming for low-water-level environments, anticipating and limiting the effects 
of pandemics, generating viable economies to relieve urbanization and migration, 
marginalizing extremism and demonstrating the futility of anti-modernism, or better 
managing the global information grid – international divisions among people will be less 
the focus than flexible and imaginative cooperation. Isolation – whether within national 
borders, physical boundaries, ideologies, or cyberspace – will prove to be a great 
disadvantage for any competitor in the evolution of the system.  
The advent of the internet and world wide web, that ushered in the information 
age and greatly accelerated globalization, brought with it profound second and third order 
effects the implications of which have yet to be fully recognized or understood. These 
effects include the near-instantaneous and anonymous exchange of ideas and ideologies; 
the sharing and manipulation of previously protected and sophisticated technologies; vast 
and transparent social networking that has homogenized cultures, castes, and classes; the 
creation of complex virtual worlds; and, a universal dependence on the global grid from 
every sector of society that has become almost existential. The worldwide web has also 
facilitated the spread of hateful and manipulative propaganda and extremism; the theft of 
intellectual property and sensitive information; predatory behavior and the exploitation of 
innocence; and the dangerous and destructive prospect of cyber warfare waged from the 
shadows of non-attribution and deception.  Whether this revolution in communication 
and access to information is viewed as the democratization of ideas, or as the 
technological catalyst of an apocalypse, nothing has so significantly impacted our lives in 
the last one hundred years. Our perceptions of self, society, religion, and life itself have 
been challenged. But cyberspace is yet another dimension within the strategic ecosystem, 
offering opportunity through complex interdependence. Here, too, we must invest the 
resources and develop the capabilities necessary to sustain our prosperity and security 
without sacrificing our values. 
8. Opportunities beyond Threat and Risk 
As was stated earlier, while this Strategic Narrative advocates a focus on the 
opportunities inherent in a complex global system, it does not pretend that greed, 
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corruption, ancient hatreds and new born apprehensions won’t manifest into very real 
risks that could threaten our national interests and test our values. Americans must 
recognize this as an inevitable part of the strategic environment and continue to maintain 
the means to minimize, deter, or defeat these diverging or conflicting interests that 
threaten our security. This calls for a robust, technologically superior, and agile military – 
equally capable of responding to low-end, irregular conflicts and to major conventional 
contingency operations. But it also requires a strong and unshakable economy, a more 
diverse and deployable Inter Agency, and perhaps most importantly a well-informed and 
supportive citizenry. As has also been cited, security means far more than defense, and 
strength denotes more than power. We must remain committed to a whole of nation 
application of the tools of competition and deterrence: development, diplomacy, and 
defense. Our ability to look beyond risk and threat – to accept them as realities within a 
strategic ecology – and to focus on opportunities and converging interests will determine 
our success in pursuing our national interests in a sustainable manner while maintaining 
our national values. This requires the projection of credible influence and strength, as 
well as confidence in our capabilities as a nation. As we look ahead, we will need to 
determine what those capabilities should include. 
As Americans, our ability to remain relevant as a world leader, to evolve as a 
nation, depends as it always has on our determination to pursue our national interests 
within the constraints of our core values. We must embrace and respect diversity and 
encourage the exchange of ideas, welcoming as our own those who share our values and 
seek an opportunity to contribute to our nation. Innovation, imagination, and hard work 
must be applied through a national unity of effort that recognizes our place in the global 
system. We must accept that to be great requires competition and to remain great requires 
adaptability, that competition need not demand a single winner, and that through 
converging interests we should seek interdependencies that can help sustain our interests 
in the global strategic ecosystem. To achieve this we will need the tools of development, 
diplomacy and defense – employed with agility through an integrated whole of nation 
approach. This will require the prioritization of our investments in intellectual capital and 
a sustainable infrastructure of education, health and social services to provide for the 
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continuing development and growth of America’s youth; investment in the nation’s 
sustainable security – on our own soil and wherever Americans and their interests take 
them, including space and  cyberspace; and investment in sustainable access to, 
cultivation and use of, the natural resources we need for our continued wellbeing, 
prosperity and economic growth in the world marketplace. Only by developing internal 
strength through smart growth at home and smart power abroad, applied with strategic 
agility, can we muster the credible influence needed to remain a world leader. 
9. A National Prosperity and Security Act 
Having emerged from the Second World War with the strongest economy, most 
powerful military, and arguably the most stable model of democracy, President Truman 
sought to better align America’s security apparatus to face the challenges of the post-war 
era. He did this through the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47). Three years later, 
with the rise of Chinese communism and the first Russian test of a nuclear device, he 
ordered his National Security Council to consider the means with which America could 
confront the global spread of communism. In 1950, President Truman signed into law 
National Security Council finding 68 (NSC 68). Often called the “blueprint” for 
America’s Cold War strategy of containment, NSC 68 leveraged not only the National 
Security structures provided by NSA 47, but recommended funding and authorization for 
a Department of Defense-led strategy of containment, with other agencies and 
departments of the Federal government working in supporting roles. NSA 47 and NSC 68 
provided the architecture, authorities and necessary resources required for a specific time 
in our nation’s progress. 
Today, we find ourselves in a very different strategic environment than that of the 
last half of the twentieth century. The challenges and opportunities facing us are far more 
complex, multinodal, and interconnected than we could have imagined in 1950. Rather 
than narrowly focus on near term risk and solutions for today’s strategic environment, we 
must recognize the need to take a longer view, a generational view, for the sustainability 
of our nation’s security and prosperity. Innovation, flexibility, and resilience are critical 
characteristics to be cultivated if we are to maintain our competitive edge and leadership 
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role in this century. To accomplish this, we must take a hard look at our interagency 
structures, authorities, and funding proportionalities. We must seek more flexibility in 
public / private partnerships and more fungibility across departments. We must provide 
the means for the functional application of development, diplomacy, and defense rather 
than continuing to organizationally constrain these tools. We need to pursue our priorities 
of education, security, and access to natural resources by adopting sustainability as an 
organizing concept for a national strategy. This will require fundamental changes in 
policy, law, and organization. 
What this calls for is a National Prosperity and Security Act, the modern day 
equivalent of the National Security Act of 1947. This National Prosperity and Security 
Act would: integrate policy across agencies and departments of the Federal government 
and provide for more effective public/private partnerships; increase the capacity of 
appropriate government departments and agencies; align Federal policies, taxation, 
research and development expenditures and regulations to coincide with the goals of 
sustainability; and, converge domestic and foreign policies toward a common purpose. 
Above all, this Act would provide for policy changes that foster and support the 
innovation and entrepreneurialism of America that are essential to sustain our qualitative 
growth as a people and a nation. We need a National Prosperity and Security Act and a 
clear plan for its application that can serve us as well in this strategic environment, as 
NSA 47 and NSC 68 served a generation before us.  
10. A Beacon of Hope, a Pathway of Promise 
This Narrative advocates for America to pursue her enduring interests of 
prosperity and security through a strategy of sustainability that is built upon the solid 
foundation of our national values. As Americans we needn’t seek the world’s friendship 
or to proselytize the virtues of our society. Neither do we seek to bully, intimidate, cajole, 
or persuade others to accept our unique values or to share our national objectives. Rather, 
we will let others draw their own conclusions based upon our actions. Our domestic and 
foreign policies will reflect unity of effort, coherency and constancy of purpose. We will 
pursue our national interests and allow others to pursue theirs, never betraying our values. 
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We will seek converging interests and welcome interdependence. We will encourage fair 
competition and will not shy away from deterring bad behavior. We will accept our place 
in a complex and dynamic strategic ecosystem and use credible influence and strength to 
shape uncertainty into opportunities. We will be a pathway of promise and a beacon of 
hope, in an ever changing world.  
Mr. Y is a pseudonym for CAPT Wayne Porter, USN and Col Mark "Puck" 
Mykleby, USMC who are actively serving military officers. The views expressed herein 
are their own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. 
Marine Corps, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. 
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APPENDIX B. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUMMARY OF 
RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND SURPLUSES OR DEFICITS: 1789–2016  
Year 
Total 
Receipts Outlays Surplus or Deficit (−) 
1789–1849 1,160 1,090 70 
1850–1900 14,462 15,453 -991 
1901 588 525 63 
1902 562 485 77 
1903 562 517 45 
1904 541 584 -43 
1905 544 567 -23 
1906 595 570 25 
1907 666 579 87 
1908 602 659 -57 
1909 604 694 -89 
1910 676 694 -18 
1911 702 691 11 
1912 693 690 3 
1913 714 715 −* 
1914 725 726 −* 
1915 683 746 -63 
1916 761 713 48 
1917 1,101 1,954 -853 
1918 3,645 12,677 -9,032 
1919 5,130 18,493 -13,363 
1920 6,649 6,358 291 
1921 5,571 5,062 509 
1922 4,026 3,289 736 
1923 3,853 3,140 713 
1924 3,871 2,908 963 
1925 3,641 2,924 717 
1926 3,795 2,930 865 
1927 4,013 2,857 1,155 
1928 3,900 2,961 939 
1929 3,862 3,127 734 
1930 4,058 3,320 738 
1931 3,116 3,577 -462 
1932 1,924 4,659 -2,735 
1933 1,997 4,598 -2,602 
1934 2,955 6,541 -3,586 
1935 3,609 6,412 -2,803 
1936 3,923 8,228 -4,304 
1937 5,387 7,580 -2,193 
1938 6,751 6,840 -89 
1939 6,295 9,141 -2,846 
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1940 6,548 9,468 -2,920 
1941 8,712 13,653 -4,941 
1942 14,634 35,137 -20,503 
1943 24,001 78,555 -54,554 
1944 43,747 91,304 -47,557 
1945 45,159 92,712 -47,553 
1946 39,296 55,232 -15,936 
1947 38,514 34,496 4,018 
1948 41,560 29,764 11,796 
1949 39,415 38,835 580 
1950 39,443 42,562 -3,119 
1951 51,616 45,514 6,102 
1952 66,167 67,686 -1,519 
1953 69,608 76,101 -6,493 
1954 69,701 70,855 -1,154 
1955 65,451 68,444 -2,993 
1956 74,587 70,640 3,947 
1957 79,990 76,578 3,412 
1958 79,636 82,405 -2,769 
1959 79,249 92,098 -12,849 
1960 92,492 92,191 301 
1961 94,388 97,723 -3,335 
1962 99,676 106,821 -7,146 
1963 106,560 111,316 -4,756 
1964 112,613 118,528 -5,915 
1965 116,817 118,228 -1,411 
1966 130,835 134,532 -3,698 
1967 148,822 157,464 -8,643 
1968 152,973 178,134 -25,161 
1969 186,882 183,640 3,242 
1970 192,807 195,649 -2,842 
1971 187,139 210,172 -23,033 
1972 207,309 230,681 -23,373 
1973 230,799 245,707 -14,908 
1974 263,224 269,359 -6,135 
1975 279,090 332,332 -53,242 
1976 298,060 371,792 -73,732 
TQ 81,232 95,975 -14,744 
1977 355,559 409,218 -53,659 
1978 399,561 458,746 -59,185 
1979 463,302 504,028 -40,726 
1980 517,112 590,941 -73,830 
1981 599,272 678,241 -78,968 
1982 617,766 745,743 -127,977 
1983 600,562 808,364 -207,802 
1984 666,438 851,805 -185,367 
1985 734,037 946,344 -212,308 
1986 769,155 990,382 -221,227 
1987 854,288 1,004,017 -149,730 
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1988 909,238 1,064,416 -155,178 
1989 991,105 1,143,744 -152,639 
1990 1,031,958 1,252,994 -221,036 
1991 1,054,988 1,324,226 -269,238 
1992 1,091,208 1,381,529 -290,321 
1993 1,154,335 1,409,386 -255,051 
1994 1,258,566 1,461,753 -203,186 
1995 1,351,790 1,515,742 -163,952 
1996 1,453,053 1,560,484 -107,431 
1997 1,579,232 1,601,116 -21,884 
1998 1,721,728 1,652,458 69,270 
1999 1,827,452 1,701,842 125,610 
2000 2,025,191 1,788,950 236,241 
2001 1,991,082 1,862,846 128,236 
2002 1,853,136 2,010,894 -157,758 
2003 1,782,314 2,159,899 -377,585 
2004 1,880,114 2,292,841 -412,727 
2005 2,153,611 2,471,957 -318,346 
2006 2,406,869 2,655,050 -248,181 
2007 2,567,985 2,728,686 -160,701 
2008 2,523,991 2,982,544 -458,553 
2009 2,104,989 3,517,677 -1,412,688 
2010 2,162,724 3,456,213 -1,293,489 
2011 estimate 2,173,700 3,818,819 -1,645,119 
2012 estimate 2,627,449 3,728,686 -1,101,237 
2013 estimate 3,003,345 3,770,876 -767,531 
2014 estimate 3,332,588 3,977,141 -644,553 
2015 estimate 3,583,043 4,189,773 -606,730 
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